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1 The world is everything that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts.
1.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also that is not the case.
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1921
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Abstract
Jihadist terrorism represents a global threat for societies and a challenge for scien-
tists interested in understanding its complexity. This complexity continuously calls
for developments in terrorism research. Enhancing the empirical knowledge on the
phenomenon can potentially contribute to developing concrete real-world applica-
tions and, ultimately, to the prevention of societal damages. In light of these aspects,
this work presents a novel methodological framework that integrates network science,
mathematical modeling, and deep learning to shed light on jihadism, both at the
explanatory and predictive levels. Specifically, this dissertation will compare and an-
alyze the world’s most active jihadist terrorist organizations (i.e. The Islamic State,
the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and Al Shabaab) to investigate their behavioral
patterns and forecast their future actions. Building upon a theoretical framework
that relies on the spatial concentration of terrorist violence and the strategic perspec-
tive of terrorist behavior, this dissertation will pursue three linked tasks, employing
as many hybrid techniques. Firstly, explore the operational complexity of jihadist
organizations using stochastic transition matrices and present Normalized Transition
Similarity, a novel coefficient of pairwise similarity in terms of strategic behavior.
Secondly, investigate the presence of time-dependent dynamics in attack sequences
using Hawkes point processes. Thirdly, integrate complex meta-networks and deep
learning to rank and forecast most probable future targets attacked by the jihadist
groups. Concerning the results, stochastic transition matrices show that terrorist
groups possess a complex repertoire of combinations in the use of weapons and tar-
gets. Furthermore, Hawkes models indicate the diffused presence of self-excitability
in attack sequences. Finally, forecasting models that exploit the flexibility of graph-
derived time series and Long Short-Term Memory networks provide promising results
in terms of correct predictions of most likely terrorist targets. Overall, this research
seeks to reveal how hidden abstract connections between events can be exploited to
unveil jihadist mechanics and how memory-like processes (i.e. multiple non-random,
parallel and interconnected recurrent behaviors) might illuminate the way in which
these groups act.
iii
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Introduction
From 2000 to 2015, the number of civilians killed due to terrorist attacks dramatically
increased by 550%, ranging from 2,000 to 12,500 deaths. In 2015, more than 60% of
the member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) experienced at least one terrorist attack, accounting for a total of 577 deaths
(Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). This represented the highest peak since
2004, the year of the Madrid bombings. In 2016, 79 countries reported at least one
death caused by terrorists (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017). The estimated
global economic impact of terrorism (in U.S. Dollars) was 52 billion in 2017 (Institute
for Economics and Peace, 2018). These few data contribute to picture terrorism as
a global threat that has caused damages to civilians, governments, and economic
systems. Terrorism is indeed an actual and very complex issue that continuously
affects many countries in the world. While keeping in mind the existence of different
types of terrorism, jihadism has played a leading role in recent decades in terms of its
geographical scope of action, lethality, and impact. Overall data, when disaggregated,
demonstrate that jihadists are the main characters of the dramatic terrorist scenario.
The rise of jihadism as the most relevant form of terrorism worldwide has contributed
to the spread of attention over Islamist organizations in research, and the progressive
availability of data attracted the attention of scientists from different fields. Indeed,
government and institutional funding for scientific projects related to terrorism in
the last years has been increasingly directed towards applied research, calling for
technical expertise and skills that can only be achieved through the collaboration
among distinct research domains.
In parallel, in the years following the 9/11 attacks, studies tried to describe and
assess the state of the terrorism research domain, in order to detect critical issues
and positive trends. Reid and Chen (2007) were among the first to identify a shift
of perspective in research: indeed, they reported how the focus on terrorism as a
low-intensity conflict was substituted by the widespread idea that the phenomenon
assumed the connotation of an actual global threat. Soon after this study, Silke (2008)
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pointed out how the attacks led to a substantial increase in the number of individuals
working in the field. However, the author highlighted how, albeit statistical analyses
started to become more popular (work applying inferential statistics on terrorism
data more than trebled since then), still the shift from mere literature review-based
studies was insufficient to guarantee solid and reliable findings and conclusions on the
phenomenon.
In spite of the cautious optimism that was circulating among researchers and
funding agencies, Sageman (2014) harshly criticized and contrasted the narrative of
a successful research path towards the aim of unfolding terrorism. In a largely com-
mented and debated paper, Sageman blamed the government strategies of funding
projects on terrorism without sharing primary source information with academics for
the problem of “stagnant” research on terrorism. According to the author, these
strategies avoided solving the gap between the lack of expertise of intelligence agen-
cies in terms of scientific methods and technical skills and the scarcity of relevant
and reliable data at disposal of academic researchers and scientists. His solution was
to make non-sensitive data available to academia and to inaugurate a new process
of dialogue and collaboration between the two sides. Sageman developed his thesis
starting from the fact that research is still too far away from answering the funda-
mental question “why a person should turn to terrorism?”. Critiques and comments
about his opinions were addressed to Sageman by other scholars in the field that
either contested his diagnoses or his evaluation of the results achieved by terrorism
research, besides existing failures (Taylor, 2014; Schmid, 2014).
In the last (in chronological order) attempt to assess the situation of terrorism
research, Schuurman (2018) identified encouraging improvements in the way terrorism
is investigated and studied, starting from increasing use of primary and original data
and the (although slow) diffusion of quantitative works. Notably, Schuurman also
recognized existing issues, such as the predominance of qualitative works and the
nature of many authors who are one-time contributors, failing thus to provide a
constant and significant contribution to the field. Besides these matters of concern,
however, the author in the conclusions of the works claims that research on terrorism
is flourishing, rather than stagnating. Each of the different points regarding the state
of the field contains ideas and considerations that may deserve attention. Indeed, the
lack of agreement has to be coupled to the difficulty to obtain estimates on real-world
impacts and consequences of terrorism research, therefore forcing the debate to build
upon views and opinions, rather than actual facts. In such context, where data sources
are few and still government funding are reticent in information sharing, a researcher
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should try to extract the best from the available. In spite of the popularity and great
diffusion of the existing open access databases on terrorism, my intuition is that there
is still a lot of knowledge that can be exploited for research and policy purposes, and
the only way to gather this knowledge is to invest on innovative methodologies that
go beyond the state-of-the-art. Investing in novel techniques may be risky in the first
phase: pitfalls might arise, and results may not be accurate or relevant enough to
encourage government and institutions to fund new research on terrorism. However,
my strong belief is that terrorism research needs a boost in order to attain success not
only in terms of journal articles but also in terms of real-world initiatives, and this
boost can only go through innovation and training of young researchers that shall be
highly skilled in analytical terms and have a strong knowledge of the phenomenon.
Some considerations regarding this point will be made later in the work: this belief,
however, represents the main motivation that led me to write this thesis, on this
precise topic, with this precise shape and this precise focus.
That considered, this dissertation will focus on jihadist terrorism (also called Is-
lamist) and will specifically seek to detect jihadist organizations’ behavioral patterns
and assess the predictability of their actions over time through the attempt to merge
network science and artificial intelligence. The analytic part will rely on a three-fold
structure. The main conceptual intuition behind the work is that treating multi-
dimensional event data as meta-networks that are connected through time allows de-
tecting hidden relations that traditional methodological frameworks and techniques
fail to capture. These relations, which in most cases are abstract, connect together
multiple entities that can be observed and monitored over time: this complex typol-
ogy of networks is effective in capturing recurring behaviors and detecting potential
anomalies, making it possible to conduct analyses at explanatory and predictive lev-
els. Results are encouraging and indicate that network-derived models and analysis
are able to capture inter-dependencies and to use them to enhance the knowledge
of how these organizations act in the global scenario. Moreover, time-series analy-
sis using Neural Networks indicate how terrorist organizations follows two parallel
behavioral pathways in terms of attacked targets: while some patterned dynamics
emerge, other mechanics seem to be random or extremely challenging to capture and
will require additional data or further analyses to be better depicted and understood.
This thesis develops as follows. The first chapter will illustrate the conceptual
background of the work. Specifically, it will first focus on the main contributions on
the issues of defining terrorism, also proposing a four-dimensional focus on its most
relevant dimensions. Additionally, the theoretical framework of the work is introduced
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and described. The second chapter will then explain the aims and motivations of
the work, with an additional note on the state of research in social sciences and
criminology.
The third chapter will first review the origins, history and main features of the
jihadist groups that will be analyzed throughout the dissertation, namely the Islamic
State, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and Al Shabaab. Data will be then
described, providing a general overview of the Global Terrorism Database, the source
from which all the data used in this dissertation are retrieved.
The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters will represent the core of the work. The fourth
chapter (Stochastic Matrices of Terrorism: Complexity and Heterogeneity of Jihadist
Behavior) will present the work on N -dimensional super-state transition networks
and trails of terrorist events, highlighting the complexity of terrorist patterns in their
operational choices and presenting a novel pairwise coefficient for assessing similarity
among groups.
The fifth chapter (Hawkes Processes of Jihadism) will focus on point processes of
jihadist attacks, showing the spatio-temporal clustering of events and the presence of
memory-like dynamics in attacks against specific targets.
The sixth chapter (Deep Learning and Terrorism: Long Short-Term Memory Net-
works for Jihadist Target Forecasting) will then present the framework that combines
dynamic network science and machine learning for the prediction of future terrorist
targets.
Finally, a conclusive chapter will provide a homogeneous and comprehensive overview
of the strengths and limitations of the work, highlighting the most relevant results
and the future research pathways, also proposing a broader reflection on the state of
the study of terrorism.
4
1 Background
1.1 Conceptualizing Terrorism
Framing terrorism is an arduous task. Over the decades, academics with different
backgrounds have tried to develop definitions as precise as possible, nevertheless fail-
ing to produce an unambiguous and universally accepted definition of the concept.
One of the motivations is that terrorism is deeply embedded in the historical, politi-
cal and social context in which it is manifested and therefore it becomes difficult to
judge it in a totally objective way. In many cases in the past, the border between
terrorists and freedom fighters has been labile and largely dependent on the observa-
tion point of view (Laqueur, 1987). Terrorism research has exploded after the 9/11
attacks (Hoffman, 2002; Buckley and Fawn, 2003; Enders and Sandler, 2006; Simons
and Tucker, 2007), nonetheless scholars have started to attempt to frame the issue
long before that date. This paragraph will review some of these attempts.1
1.1.1 Defining Terrorism
In order to find a starting point in reviewing the debate around the concept of ter-
rorism, it is helpful to introduce the review with the work of Jongman and Schmid
(1988). The authors analyzed 109 definitions of terrorism coming from a question-
naire with the aim of systematizing the most recurring features. The outcome of the
analysis, however, did not lead to a satisfactory homogeneity of the results. Defini-
tions analyzed by the two scholars highlighted the presence of twenty-two recurring
characteristics. Similarly, Weiberg et al. (2004) sought definitions from three main
academic journals in the area of terrorism, comparing the frequencies of the twenty-
1For the purposes and nature of this thesis, this section will only refer to definitions produced by
researchers and academics, thus excluding from the review legal definitions provided by governments
and international institutions.
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two features appeared in Jongman & Schmid with the outcome frequencies of their
analysis. Table 1.1 summarizes both the outcomes. The results in the table demon-
strate the wide heterogeneity of elements that emerge from experts’ definitions of
terrorism.
N Element Jongman & Schmid Weibert et al.
1 Violence, force 83.5 71
2 Political 65 60
3 Fear, Terror emphasized 51 22
4 Threat 47 41
5 Psychological effects and (anticipated) reac-
tions
41.5 5.5
6 Victim-target differentiation 37.5 25
7 Purposive, Planned, Systematic, Organized
action
32 11
8 Method of combat, strategy, tactic 30.5 31.5
9 Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules,
without humanitarian constrains
30 0
10 Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance 28 5.5
11 Publicity aspect 21.5 18
12 Arbitrariness, impersonal, random character,
indiscrimination
21 0
13 Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders
as victims
17.5 22
14 Intimidation 17 11
15 Innocence of victims emphasized 15.5 10
16 Group, movement, organization as perpetrator 14 29
17 Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others 13.5 5.5
18 Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpected-
ness of occurrence of violence
9 1
19 Clandestine, covert nature 9 7
20 Repetitiveness, serial or campaign character of
violence
7 0
21 Criminal 6 5.5
22 Demands made on third parties 4 1
Table 1.1: Prevalence (%) of Definitional Elements of Terrorism in Jongman & Schmid (1988) and
Weiberg et al. (2004). Source: (Weiberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004)
Considering the complexity of building a comprehensive definition of terrorism,
some scholars have limited their scope to a list of features that distinguish terrorism
from other forms of violence. Hoffman (1998) claims that terrorism, compared to
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other types of political violence is:
“(1) ineluctably political in aims and motives; (2) violent - or, equally im-
portant, threatens violence; (3) designed to have far-reaching psycholog-
ical repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; (4) conducted
either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or con-
spiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying
insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly
influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or example of
some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders; (5) and perpetrated
by a subnational group or nonstate entity”.
Matusitz (2012) - partially mirroring the approaches of Jongman and Schmid and
Hoffmann- has collected the most commonly cited definitions in literature, either from
academic and institutional sources. The common elements were:
1. The use of violence to create fear for political, religious or ideological reasons;
2. The civilian (and sometimes iconic) targets;
3. The spectacular nature of the actions in order to gain publicity for a cause;
4. A change in the regulatory system;
5. The concept of “asymmetric warfare”2
In addition, Ganor (2002), in an effort to separate terrorism from the concepts of
revolutionary violence, guerrilla and national liberation, proposes three fundamental
discriminating factors that qualify terrorism:
1. Violence as the very essence of terrorist activity;
2. The political aim of the activity;
3. The civilian targets
This brief review underlines the challenges in defining terrorism. To solve this
problem, several authors have tried to focus on the definition of specific types of
terrorism. Indeed, terrorism has many different faces depending on the object of the
analysis. In the last years, the impossibility to build a universal concept of terrorism
has shifted the spotlights to the different shades of the phenomenon.
2Asymmetric warfare is intended as “the use of random/unpredictable violence by a weak group
(i.e., one with a smaller force) against a stronger power (i.e., military, government, or even society
in general) to gain advantage”(Matusitz, 2012, p.4-5)
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1.1.2 A Four-Dimensional Focus on Terrorism
The review presented above demonstrates the difficulties to provide a tout-court def-
inition of terrorism. Nevertheless, to disentangle the problem, terrorism can be dis-
tinguished by many dimensions (Ganor, 2008). The present sub-section proposes a
four-dimensional focus on terrorism motives, strategies, structure and geographical
range of action as fundamental aspects for framing it under different perspectives.
1.1.2.1 The Motives and Goals of Terrorist Organizations
In the aftermath of 9/11, Rapoport published an article developing the thesis of the
“four waves of terrorism”. According to the American scholar, terrorism has evolved
in its values and motives across the centuries, stressing the radical shifting from its
positive meaning during the French Revolution to the terrible attacks occurred in the
United States (US). Even though the word “terrorism” first appeared as a product
of the French Revolution, Rapoport claimed that the first wave started around 1880
as a consequence of some economic reforms introduced by the czars in Russia. These
reforms caused political assassinations and the wave expanded across borders, con-
ducting also to the anarchist violence that invaded many countries in Europe. The
second wave started in the 1920s and lasted until the 1960s: its main feature was
national self-determination. The grievance against colonial powers led to atrocities
against police forces, making this wave an intersection between terrorism and guer-
rilla. The third wave was represented by the reaction of the Vietcong against the
US military forces. Rapoport notes that this third wave gave birth to a territorial
displacement. The violent resistance against the US showed the vulnerability of the
Western countries. Many terrorist groups emerged in Europe with the aim to fight
capitalism and the power of Western governments (e.g.: The Italian Red Brigades
or the German Red Armed Fraction). This third wave ended in the 1980s, leaving
room to the final fourth wave. Two events contributed to the starting of this new
era: the Iran Revolution in 1979 and the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan
in 1989. The most important element of this fourth wave is the role of religion and
the protagonist of this wave is Al Qaeda. In his work, Rapoport called for the pos-
sibility of a new wave, relying on the fact that terrorism can renovate its ideology
and its motives, re-emerging with new strength. In his theory, Rapoport states that
terrorism is deeply rooted in modern culture.
The use of an historical review to describe political and ideological motives of
terrorist organizations described in Rapoport’s work can be found also in other con-
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tributions. Ganor (2008) reviews the most popular terrorist motives categories and
the subsequently demonstrates that terrorism is not solely a religious business, even
though today jihadism is the protagonist of the terrorist scenario. Table 1.2 shows
these categories.
Typology Description
Revolutionary Organizations Organizations that act to change a nation’s
regime with the aspiration to bring about
a change in the government (e.g.: Nepalese
Maoists)
National Liberation Organizations Organizations that act to vanquish and expel
an occupying force and to achieve national
independence (e.g.: Palestinian Fatah organi-
zation)
Social Organizations Organizations that act to change a nation’s
socioeconomic order (e.g.: El Salvadorian
FMLN)
Separatist Organizations Organizations that advocate the territorial
separation of an ethnic minority in a multi-
ethnic state (e.g.: The Irish IRA)
Radical Ideological Organizations Organizations that act to advance extremist
ideologies. This category includes communist,
anarchist, and fascist groups (e.g.: Italian Red
Brigade)
Religious Organizations Organizations that aim to advance religious
interests or disseminate a religion via violence
while fulfilling what the organization’s mem-
bers believe is “the will of God”). At times,
such organizations’ activities stem from an
aspiration to defend a religion from hostile
sources or sources that are interpreted as such
(e.g.: Al Qaeda, IS)
Table 1.2: Classification of terrorist organizations based on their motives. Source: author’s adapta-
tion of Ganor (2008)
In the effort to describe the objectives of terrorist organizations, Kydd and Walter
(2006) detect five ultimate goals of terrorism:
1. Regime change;
2. Territorial change;
3. Policy change;
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4. Territorial control;
5. Status quo maintenance
Kydd and Walter point out that many organizations hold more than one goal
and can use one as a facilitator for another. They analyzed the Foreign Terrorist
Organizations list released by the US State Department, highlighting how most these
organizations (31 out of 42) seek regime change. Another significant part (19) seek
territorial change, while policy change and maintenance of the status quo are residual
goals. Finally, Picco (2004) notes that goals can change over time and that they can be
less important than the idea of “perpetual confrontation”. This process introduces the
confrontation between tactical and strategic terrorism, well described by the behavior
of Al Qaeda. According to the author, tactical terrorism is characterized by stable
and well-known objectives, while strategic terrorism is dynamic with respect to goals
because contraposition itself is the most important feature regardless of political
objectives.
1.1.2.2 The Strategies of Terrorism
Terrorism is often described as “senseless” or “mindless”. However, many have con-
tested this statement, proving that terrorism is the product of strategic calculations.
Strategies of terrorism are intrinsically connected with its aims, and scholars have
sought to investigate not only the “what” but also the “how”. The attempts to un-
derstand the strategies and tactics of terrorism are many and rooted in history (May,
1974; Fromkin, 1975; Price, 1977; Dobson and Payne, 1979). Due to the great num-
ber of these attempts and the multifaceted nature of terrorism, there is no universal
consensus on a universal set of strategies that comprehensively describes the “how”
used for reaching the “what”. Nevertheless, many of the conceptualizations of the
strategies of terrorism provided by scholars are similar.
Harmon (2001) enumerates five different strategies that he considers as the most
common in the behavior of terrorist organizations:
1. Creation of societal dislocation and chaos;
2. Discrediting or destroying a particular government;
3. Rendering economic and property damage;
4. “Bleeding” state security forces and doing other military damage;
5. Spreading fear for international effects
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The author indicates that all these strategies involve calculation and that an
organization can employ different strategies at different points in time to adapt to its
environmental context.
Kydd and Walter (2006) start their explanation of terrorism strategies from the
concept of uncertainty. According to the authors, the uncertainty about power, re-
solve and trustworthiness governs the process that leads a terrorist group to act
against another subject (namely a government, a community, etc.) in a certain way
at a certain time. To resolve uncertainty, terrorists use costly signaling instead of
other legal methods to convince the audience they talk to. These audiences are of
two kinds: 1. governments and 2. individuals they hope to positively influence.
Combining the three uncertainty dimensions (power, resolve and trustworthiness)
with the two audiences, Kydd and Walter develop a theoretical set of five distinct
terrorist strategies. Table 1.3 shows this classification.
Target of Persuasion
Enemy Own Population
Subject of Uncertainty
Power
Attrition
Intimidation
Resolve Outbidding
Trustworthiness Spoiling Provocation
Table 1.3: Strategies of terrorism/political violence. Source: Author’s adaptation of Kydd and
Walter (2006)
The theoretical development of objectives and strategies carried out by Kydd and
Walter started from the assumption that terrorist organizations often achieve their
goals. Abrahms (2006) largely contested this assumption, trying to demonstrate
that the literature which claims that terrorist works (Dershowitz, 2003; Pape, 2005)
is actually confined to game-theoretic models or case studies and therefore it does
not reflect the generalized reality. In fact, Abrahms tries to empirically show that
terrorism actually does not work. He analyzes the strategic effectiveness of 21 terrorist
organizations included in the list released by the US State Department. The results
corroborate the inability of terrorists to achieve their goals as posited by Schelling
(1991): indeed, Abrahms demonstrates that terrorist organizations included in his
sample have achieved their goals less than 10% of the times. The conclusion of
Abrahms is that terrorism is not solely ineffective and inefficient as an instrument
itself, but that its failures are often determined by the tactics that these terror groups
use, especially when these tactics involve deaths of civilians.
Neumann and Smith (2005) also focused on the strategies adopted by terrorist
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organizations and on their inherent limitations. The authors identify three different
modi operandi with related objectives (Table 1.4).
Modus Operandi Objectives
Disorientation To alienate the authorities from their citizens, reducing the government
to impotence in the eyes of the population
Target Response To induce a target to respond in a manner that is favorable to the insur-
gent cause
Gaining Legitimacy To exploit the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative
political message
Table 1.4: Modus operandi and objectives of terrorism. Source: Author’s adaptation of Neumann
and Smith (2005)
Besides this classification, the authors argue that strategic terrorism has many
limitations since it is based on wrong assumptions related to the psychological behav-
ior of individuals or institutions in critical situations. These assumptions are two:
1. The target’s group determination to hold on a particular policy or possession
will collapse once it has been exposed to terrorist violence;
2. A terrorist campaign will instill a degree of fear within the target population;
In their work, Neumann and Smith review these assumptions listing cases that
prove their weakness, concluding that strategic terrorism is intrinsically limited be-
cause it principally “relies on the exploitation of the psychological rather than the
destructive effect of armed action” (Neumann and Smith, 2005, 591).
1.1.2.3 The Organizational Structure of Terrorist Organizations
As for the concept of terrorism, many scholars have attempted to provide a com-
prehensive definition of terrorist organization. Considering the many-sided nature of
these organization, this is a hard task. Matusitz (2012) defines a terrorist organiza-
tion as “an illicit clandestine organization that generally consists of planners, trainers,
and actual bombers/killers”. For security purposes, institutions and governments are
conducting censuses of the existing terrorist organizations all over the world. The
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted two resolutions in 1999 (1267)
and 2011 (1989) for the creation of a list of “entities and other groups and under-
takings associated with al Qa’ida”. This list was intended to counter the financing
to terrorism, the transit of terrorist affiliates and the supply of arms. Moreover, in
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2001 the European Union, in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, has published an additional list of terrorist organizations to extend the efforts
to prevent terrorist activities. This list was lastly updated in 20163
The investigation of organizational processes and dynamics of terrorist groups has
long interested academia. Many approaches have been used to describe how terrorist
organize, communicate, employ resources. Notably, Crenshaw (1987) compares the
instrumental theory with the organizational perspective, developing the “Organiza-
tional Process Theory” (Table 1.5).
Instrumental Perspective Organizational Perspective
The act of terrorism represents a strategic
choice
The act of terrorism is the outcome of internal
groups dynamics
The organization using terrorism acts as a
unit, on the basis of collective values
Individual members of an organization dis-
agree over ends and means
The means of terrorism are logically related
to ends and resources, surprise compensate for
weakness
The resort to terrorism reflects the incentives
leaders provide for followers and competition
with rivals
The purpose of terrorism is to bring about
change in an actor’s environment
The motivations for participation in terrorism
include personal needs as much as ideological
goals
The pattern of terrorism follows an action-
reaction process, terrorism responds to what
the government does
Terrorist actions often appear inconsis-
tent,erratic and unpredictable
Increasing the cost of terrorism makes it less
likely, decreasing cost or increasing reward
makes it more likely
External pressure may strengthen group co-
hesion; rewards may create incentives to leave
the group
Terrorism fails when its practitioners do not
obtain their stated political objectives
Terrorism fails when the organization disinte-
grates; achieving long-term goals may not be
desirable
Table 1.5: Assumptions of instrumental and organizational perspectives on terrorist organizations.
Source: (Crenshaw 1987, 27)
At that time, the organizational perspective was rarely used in the study of terror-
ism. After listing the founding assumptions of the two, Crenshaw claims that the final
goal of every organization is the maintenance of the organization itself, regardless of
the aim the organization had when it was created. This statement clearly divides the
individual reasons and interests of the subjects that form the group to the behavior
3After the signing of the Colombia peace agreement between the government and the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the Council suspended the sanctions against the
FARC, excluding the organization from the list.
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of the group itself. The theory had the aim to explain the position of the organization
related to the use of violence and the process through which an organization decides
to shift to it.
After Crenshaw’s work, considered the historic events happened during the 1990s
and the 2000s, the organizational study of terrorist organizations gained importance
in the academic debate. Abrahms (2008) refers to the instrumental perspective call-
ing it “the strategic model”, empirically demonstrating its invalidity. Abrahams lists
seven “puzzles” that show how the strategic model has many weaknesses despite its
policy relevance in the field of counter-terrorism strategies. The “natural systems”
model proposed by the author in the final chapter of his work intersects the organiza-
tional and the motivational areas. The model states that terrorist organizations “will
routinely engage in actions to perpetuate and justify their existence, even when these
undermine their political agenda”, in a similar fashion to what Crenshaw wrote.
Focusing specifically on the structure of terrorist organizations, Ganor (2008) re-
views the most popular typologies emerged from the literature. The main distinction
is between hierarchical and network organizations. On one hand, hierarchical orga-
nizations have a clear division with authority between the leadership, officials with
specific responsibilities, activists and supporters (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas). On the
other hand, network organizations are composed of weakly connected cells and do
not present any clear hierarchical authority (e.g., Al Qaeda). Piazza (2009) proposes
a further distinction, however focusing only on jihadist groups. Using a case study
of post-invasion in Iraq, Piazza develops two categories, merging groups’ goals and
structure. He divides jihadist organizations acting in Iraq between “strategic groups”
and “abstract/universal” groups. The former typology is composed by groups that
are similar to secular national-liberation and regime change movements, while the
latter is made of groups affiliated with the Al Qaeda network.
The organizational issue also poses relevant questions on whether the organiza-
tional structure itself has a significant impact on the lethality of attacks if compared
with other types of non-organized terrorism. Indeed, despite the historical prevalence
of organized terrorist structures (either hierarchical or network based), during the last
years, Western countries have experienced the attacks of lone-wolf terrorists. Even
though lone wolf terrorism stems its root long before these days (Malet, 2010, 2013),
the increase of their actions has marked a significant turning point. The emergence
of the Islamic State (throughout the work also referred as IS)4 has brought a wave of
4Other authors refer to the IS also as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or ISIL (Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant) or Daesh (an acronym for the Arabic phrase al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq
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violent attacks (especially in Europe) carried out by individual lone wolves (Institute
for Economics and Peace, 2016). Comparing a lone wolf with a member of a terrorist
organization, the former is a person that “act without group or organizational sup-
port” (McCauley et al., 2013). Similarly, Spaaij (2010) defines lone wolves as persons
who “(a) operate individually, (b) do not belong to an organized terrorist group or
network, and (c) whose modi operandi are conceived and directed by the individual
without any direct outside command or hierarchy”. Concentrating on more recent
dynamics, Feldman (2013) defines lone wolves terrorism as:
“self-directed political or religious violence undertaken through the “ter-
rorist attack cycle” by individuals—typically perceived by its adherents
to be an act of asymmetrical, propagandistic warfare—which derives from
a variable amount of external influence and context (notably now online),
rather than external command and control”
The definition provided by Feldman foregrounds the use of the internet. Indeed,
leaderless terrorism has exploited the role of social media and web propaganda, cre-
ating the conditions for easier radicalization processes (Aly et al., 2016).
Among OECD countries, the deadliest recent attacks from lone actors occurred
in Turkey, France and United States. Specifically, in the United States attacks from
lone actors have been estimated to account for the 98% of the total number of ter-
rorist attacks since 2006 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). To testify the
criticality of this dimension, it is worth to note that the San Bernardino and the Nice
attacks have originated from the actions of lone wolf terrorists. Moreover, scholars
have tried to model recurring patterns among lone actor profiles: several studies em-
phasize the prevalence of young males, and rapid radicalization processes occurred
quite recently before the actions as important features (Spaaij, 2011; Bates, 2012;
Basra and Neumann, 2016). Nevertheless, Alakoc (2017) empirically demonstrates
that organizationally linked suicide attacks are deadlier than lone wolf attacks, sug-
gesting that the issue of lone wolves must not overshadow the power of proper terrorist
organizations.
1.1.2.4 The geographical range of action of terrorist organizations
When looking at the activities of terrorist organizations, it is necessary also to focalize
on their geographical range of action. Usually, the main distinction is between domes-
al-Sham (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). IS is the english translation of how the terrorist
organization calls itself. All these acronyms refer to the same terrorist organization
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tic and international (also foreign) groups. Many scholars have analyzed these two
different dimensions (Dugard, 1973, 1974; Hoffman, 1997; Kurowski and Sussman,
2011).
Simply put, Bergesen and Lizardo (2004) define international terrorism as that
kind of terrorism in which the perpetrator, the target groups or the location of the
incident involve at least two different countries. Domestic terrorism, on the other
hand, is related in its various dimensions only to a single country. Merari (1978)
proposed a bi-dimensional point of view to label terrorist organizations, based on
their target population and base of operation. The author developed four profiles:
• Domestic-based xenofighters
• Foreign-based xenofighters
• Domestic-based homofighters
• Foreign-based homofighters
Thereby, the base of operation can be either domestic or foreign and the action
can be conducted either against a foreign entity (i.e.: xenofighters) or a domestic
target (i.e.: homofighters). These four categories lead to three results:
• Xenofighters terrorist groups tend to adopt more indiscriminate tactics than
homofighters;
• Foreign-based terrorist groups tend to perpetrate international terrorism;
• Foreign-based terrorist organizations are mostly dependent upon foreign coun-
tries’ support
Drawing upon more recent patterns, the Institute for Economics and Peace (2016)
provides descriptions of the main features of domestic and international terrorist
groups. Domestic groups actions are mostly motivated by anti-government senti-
ment, nationalism, separatism, racism, bigotry or anarchy. In the OECD area, the
most prominent domestic groups are the IRA in Northern Ireland, the Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna in Spain (ETA) and the PKK in Turkey. All the three organizations are
animated by nationalist or independence ideologies. Under the category of domestic
terror, the IEP includes also the home-grown terrorism, citing the attackers of the
London bombings occurred in 2005. Data analysis included in the same report high-
lights how PKK is the deadliest domestic terrorist groups, accounting for 529 deaths
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from 2000 to 2016. The recruitment to domestic groups is mostly influenced by friend
and family ties (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016, 48). Conversely, the re-
cruitment to international groups is driven by education and employment conditions.
IS is nowadays the most prominent international terrorist group.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
Social sciences account for a massive number of theories that aim at explaining human
nature by means of human behavior in several contexts and domains (Hull, 1943; Klein
et al., 1993; Endsley, 1995; Monroe and Maher, 1995; Hechter and Kanazawa, 1997;
Naylor et al., 2013). The study of crime and terrorism is no exception. For instance,
various theories have been developed, proposed and tested to explain why and how
individuals (or, eventually, collective organizations) engage in crime (Burgess and
Akers, 1966; Sutherland et al., 1992; Moffitt, 2003). Some of them have been partially
or completely falsified by empirical evidence (for instance the General Theory of Crime
proposed by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990)), while others are still debated and have
not led to comprehensive agreement. The difficulty of agreeing on specific theories to
explain social phenomena is strongly connected to the inherent complexity of human
nature. Theories generally provide simplified and restricted explanations of human
decisions and actions, failing to take into account the whole set of concurring and
intervening factors that may have an impact on an agent’s thoughts and actions.
This considered, the use of a theoretical framework as the backbone of this dissertation
should not be seen as an attempt to universally explain how jihadism behave and
why it behaves in certain given ways. I am fully aware that, as a portion of reality
is captured by the selected theories, other components are missing. However, it is
useful to frame the present work in relation to established theoretical and empirical
explanations so that these theories may offer insights to interpret and read the results
of the different analyses.
This work will then rely on two theoretical components: theories aiming at explaining
the spatio-temporal clustering of terrorism, and theories aiming at explaining terrorist
decision-making.
1.2.1 The Spatio-Temporal Concentration of Terrorism
The first documented application of the idea that crime is unequally distributed
across spatial units dates back to the work of Quetelet on crime in France, Belgium
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and Holland (Quetelet, 1831). Decades after, within the School of Chicago context,
Shaw et al. (1929) showed that crime was dramatically unequally distributed across
the neighborhoods of the city.
Following these two pioneering and seminal works, criminologists have widely pro-
vided further evidence on the spatial nature of crime and, specifically, on its ten-
dency towards clustering across some given areas. This stream of research produced
the development of a subfield within criminology, the so-called “criminology of place”
(Sherman et al., 1989). Furthermore, a law, named “law of crime concentration” has
been also proposed by Weisburd (2015). The “law of crime concentration” indeed
states that crime is densely distributed in a small number of micro-places (e.g., street
segments) in a city, and that this distribution is generally stable over time. Many
studies have then tested this proposition, providing evidence of its actual meaning-
fulness in different cities and contexts (Weisburd and Amram, 2014; Wheeler et al.,
2016; Favarin, 2018).
Besides the actual empirical corroborations of this law, and even before its official
formalization, a wide number of works have reasoned around the concept of the
non-random distribution of crime across places, applying also a variety of statistical
methods that became lately more and more sophisticated (Brown, 1982; Dutt and
Venugopal, 1983; Felson, 1987; Evans and Herbert, 1989; Gorr and Olligschlaeger,
2010; Murray et al., 2001; Ackerman and Murray, 2004; Harries, 2006; Nath, 2006).
The numerous empirical evidence towards crime concentration across space (and time)
went beyond the borders of academia, inspiring a great shift also in policing practices.
The diffusion of CompStat in the late 90s first marked a change towards resource al-
location of police departments in the United States, with data-informed decisions
working on the assumption that crime does not occur the same way in the same areas
of the city (Henry, 2002; Weisburd et al., 2003).
CompStat certainly changed the policing scenario, but eventually opened the path
towards more sophisticated and algorithmic supporting systems for the law enforce-
ment. The spread of AI companies brought predictive policing software into the
market (Perry, 2013; Dunham and Alpert, 2015; Bennett Moses and Chan, 2018).
These software simply make use of machine and statistical learning algorithms that
are able to identify hot-spot areas (i.e., areas in which crime tends to concentrate
heavily) to suggest to officers where to intervene. Besides the technical aspects of
these systems, they all rely on the accepted and confirmed fact that crime (although
not all crimes follow this law) clusters in certain areas and at certain times of the day.
Different explanations have been provided to justify these findings, with scholars
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testing well-known criminological theories such as social disorganization, crime op-
portunity and rational choice.
While criminology generally focused on predatory crimes to evaluate the “spatio-
temporal clustering” hypothesis, parallel fields as political science and international
studies reached similar consensus on a tightly-related matter: the spatial and tem-
poral dynamics of violent conflicts and terrorism. Although with many differences
(regarding unit of analyses and the nature and impact of the social phenomena),
scholars have empirically showed that political violence and terrorism tend to clus-
ter in certain areas and to behave in patterned ways. This can happen by means
of contagion and diffusion processes (Midlarsky, 1978; Pitcher et al., 1978; Hamil-
ton and Hamilton, 1983; Myers, 2000) bursts and micro-cycles, within the context of
near-repeat victimization (Behlendorf et al., 2012). For instance, the seminal work of
Midlarsky et al. (1980) highlighted the presence of contagion in international terror-
ism and the existence of autocorrelation processes within and between regions.
Additionally, terrorism, as crime, not only clusters in space but also exhibit patterned
dynamics of concentration in time. Besides the theoretical explanation and descrip-
tion that one should give to its decision making (which will be covered in the next
subsection), terrorism is localized in time and behaves through non-random timings
(Enders and Sandler, 2006; Medina and Hepner, 2008; Siebeneck et al., 2009; LaFree
et al., 2012; White et al., 2013; Tench et al., 2016).
Although criminology (as the social sciences in general) are often far away from pro-
viding universally accepted answers to explanations and even descriptions of social
phenomena, the spatio-temporal concentration of crime and terrorism has been con-
firmed and proved by a wide number of studies, spread over a century of research.
This finding represent a crucial frame for my work, given the nature of the data
and analysis that will be presented later on in the manuscript. All the three ana-
lytic chapters will combine either temporal or geographic (or even both) information
on terrorist events plotted by a sample of jihadist groups, thus relying on the con-
centration of terrorism over time and space as a strong component for interpreting
real-world dynamics of terrorist groups.
1.2.2 Strategic Terrorism
The definition of terrorism has been long debated and so are its origins. However,
there has been an agreed turning point in which terrorism started to become sys-
tematically formalized as to attract, train, educate individuals. This turning point is
tightly related to the essay “Mord und Freiheit - Murder and Freedom”, written by
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Heinzen (1853). In this essay, the German revolutionary argued that murder must
be turned into a science and that revolutionaries have to overcome the asymmetry
between the State warfare and resources by means of strategies characterized by high-
profile violence (Bessner and Stauch, 2010).
This call inspired many other ideologists of terrorism and anarchists, as Bakunin,
Zaichnevski, Recluse and Romanenko. These were all central contributors to the de-
velopment of the modern doctrine of terrorism, marked by the so-called “propaganda
of the deed”, introduced by Carlo Pisacane and afterwards made popular by Carlo
Cafiero and Errico Malatesta in the declaration to the Anarchist International in 1876
(Fleming, 1980; Linse, 1982; Garrison, 2004; Kassel, 2009).
Since then, and following the advances made by technology and communication, the-
orists of terrorism have proposed philosophies and developed schools of thought with
regard to terrorist actions and behavior. The first philosophy was rationalism. Ra-
tionalism posited that violence represented a mean to an end. A second competing
philosophy was expressionism. Expressionism, in turn, considered terrorist violence as
a form of individual expression, and resorting to terrorism meant an existential choice
(McCormick, 2003). These two different approaches towards terrorism developed over
time and inspired contemporary theories of decision making. Rationalism contributed
to the formalization of the “strategic theories”, while expressionism mostly influenced
“psychological theories”. Finally, a third contemporary frame is represented by “or-
ganizational theories”.
These three approaches are not mutually exclusive, but instead provide different in-
terpretations from distinct standpoints to read and understand terrorism. Given the
nature of my work, I will solely focus on strategic theories. The whole work will
rely around data and objectives that deal with the tangible actions of a sample of
jihadist groups, namely its terrorist attacks. Attacks comprise a number of different
characteristics and features that can reasonably fall under the umbrella of strategic
choices. As McCormick (2003) explained, a group’s choice of targets, tactics and tim-
ing together defines the group’s own “operating profile”. This is the reason behind
the decision to focus solely on strategic theories, as organizational theories focus on
the internal structure and the formal symbolism of each group as a way to read their
behavior, and psychological theories are more concerned with other non-rational con-
siderations covering motivations, individual drivers and personal traits.
Strategic theories regarding terrorist decision-making originate in the study of con-
flicts. Schelling (1980) posited that the parties engaging in a conflict are adaptive
strategic agents. This means that the parties try to find the most suitable ways to
20
1 BACKGROUND
win, ruling out the opponent, as in a game or a contest. This simple consideration
has been widely adopted by terrorism researchers. Scholars have then formalized ter-
rorism as an instrumental type of activity carried out to achieve a given set of long-
and short-run objectives (Corsi, 1981).
As noted by McCormick (2003), terrorist groups are then organizations that aim at
maximizing their expected political returns or minimizing the expected costs related
to a set of objectives.
Besides this adaptive and adversarial characteristic, the strategic frame assumes that
terrorist groups act with a collective rationality (Crenshaw, 1987; Sandler and Lapan,
1988; Lake, 2002; Sandler, 2003): a terrorist group is therefore a unique actor, that
exist “per se”. This is certainly a simplifying assumption, as organizational theories
explain, considering that terrorist groups can be structured in very different ways and
this would impact decision making processes (Crenshaw, 1987; Ganor, 2008; Piazza,
2009; Heger et al., 2012). However, at a general level, when considering historical
events and their multidimensional characteristics, the simplifying assumption of col-
lective rationality can hold and can be useful in interpreting and framing the life-cycle
or behaviour of a group (Enders et al., 1992, 2011; Enders and Sandler, 2006; Behlen-
dorf et al., 2012; Campedelli et al., 2019a).
Two alternative views constitute the collective rationality paradigm: a strong and a
weak alternative. The strong variant, derived from neoclassical economics, assumes
that there is no asymmetry between the real world and the group’s view, while the
weaker variant (also called “procedural”) states that these actors act rationally based
on their beliefs that, however, are asymmetric and incomplete (Simon, 1987). This
latter view has certainly found much more empirical evidence in literature (Bowen,
2004; Fussey, 2011).
A number of constraints severely limit the strategic decision making of a group, even
if there is a rational way of behaving behind an organization’s actions. These aspects
have an impact on the type of attacks (as the ultimate and visible step of a decision
making process) that a terrorist group will plot. Tangible and intangible constraints
have the power to deeply influence the frequency, severity and impact of a terrorist
events.
Drake (1998b), for instance, listed and described the constraints that lead to the final
selection of a target by a terrorist group. These constraints include ideology (group
dynamics, capabilities), strategy (protective measures) and tactics, as decision mak-
ing does not occur in a vacuum. The ideology helps in defining a set of potential
targets, as also showed by Asal et al. (2009). Furthermore, the need for support,
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their own capabilities and the security environment also play a role in determining
the boundaries for strategic actions. Support is fundamental, as terrorist groups in
general wish to benefit some portion of a given society, and therefore unintentionally
harming or damaging those who might represent future recruits or support providers
could have a very negative payoff for the group itself (Schwartz et al., 2009; Byman,
2013; Benigni and Carley, 2016).
Groups capabilities are then fundamental to assess the potential outcomes of the de-
cision making process of a given organization. Material resources and individual skills
are crucial in the actual computation of potential strategies: trivially, groups with a
higher number of affiliates, with higher material and economic resources and with a
wider set of technical capabilities will have much more options compared to smaller
and less powerful organizations.
McCormick (2003) reports Schelling words in defining the strategic approach as a
“cheap theory” and notes how the simplicity of this approach is both a strength and
a weakness. Certainly, such approach completely fails in really understanding the
way in which decisions are made within a group and leaves out other important com-
ponents for fully understanding terrorism. Nevertheless, the strategic frame helps in
unfolding some of the visible dynamics that data can reveal. Variations in combi-
nations of tactics, weapons and targets, for instance, could be better understood if
assuming (even partially) rational decision making processes. Temporal information
on over-time event characteristics may reveal very much regarding the group itself
(Martin and Perliger, 2012; Gilli and Gilli, 2014; Polo and Gleditsch, 2016). Long
periods of low or no activity might imply an insufficient level of resources. Conversely,
a long series of attacks against hard targets with sophisticated weapons would imply
exactly the opposite, providing further information on the current state of a group
and on its short- and long-term goals.
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2.1 Aim of the Work
Though terrorism has not been considered a core topic in classic criminology for a
long time, scholars have lately tried to apply, tailor or test renowned criminologi-
cal theories to the problem of political and terrorist violence (LaFree and Freilich,
2016), although its mechanisms are certainly different from most ordinary and or-
ganized crimes. Terrorism has the power of affecting thousands of lives with one
single action, with its consequences spanning also to the economy and the stability
of the political process of targeted countries. That considered, within the study of
criminal and deviant processes terrorism certainly plays a role in terms of impact
on humanity. As previously said, even though terrorism is a multifold creature that
relies on different ideologies and motivations, in the last decades jihadism has become
its main protagonist. Jihadism itself is not a unique, homogeneous concept, but yet
it possesses some specific features that distinguish it from other types of terror and
represents an actual threat to peace, development and security in many regions of
the world in spite of its declining trends in many parts of the world.
For this reason, the need for accurate and useful research is of indisputable value.
Nevertheless, research in terrorism is often of little help in solving problems. Sageman
(2014) highlighted how, despite years of government funding for research in terrorism,
the research itself is still too far away from solving concrete problems.
This issue is determined by the lack of empirical data and empirical studies: the au-
thor notes how the majority of research is still (poorly) interview-based or historical-
focused. Data on terrorism have been scarce for a long time: only recently few
institutions started to provide well-built databases for conducting high-level research
in the field. Furthermore, governments and intelligence agencies usually avoid shar-
ing information with academia for privacy and political motivations. In this context,
researchers should extract the best from the available. Having these aspects in mind,
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the primary aim of this work will be to build solid knowledge on the existing oper-
ational patterns and strategic choices of jihadism, also trying to forecast the actions
of the groups under analysis. In parallel, a second aim is, as previously highlighted,
to develop and present a novel methodological framework that integrates network
science and artificial intelligence.
This framework additionally seeks to demonstrate how complex but flexible models
can benefit research on terrorism. To pursue these aims, the dissertation will try to
answer the following research questions:
1. What are the recurrent patterns in the behavior of the considered jihadist
groups?
2. What are the relevant similarities and the significant differences in how these
terrorist groups act?
3. To what extent jihadist terrorism show memory-like processes when multi-
dimensional information on attacks is considered?
4. What can be the contribution of complex networks, mathematical modeling,
and artificial intelligence to the study of terrorism?
The research problems and related questions have implications both from the aca-
demic and policy standpoints. Identifying patterns and features related to the be-
havior of different jihadist terrorist organizations and predicting their strategies can
help in advancing the knowledge on future scenarios, providing policy-makers with
concrete insights for combating terror. Investigating the concept of “memory-like”
processes in terror behaviors can enhance the knowledge on how these groups act and
plan future attacks, highlighting possible strategies or recurring patterns, contrasting
the hypothesis that terror happens randomly and is intrinsically unpredictable.
Finally, the specific attention that will be dedicated to targets throughout the work
is of particular relevance considered that analyzing what entities jihadist groups attack
can shed light on potential consequences, damages, and impacts of terror events.
While certainly predicting tactics or employed weapons might be helpful, forecasting
targets is even more important also from an intelligence perspective. Agencies and law
enforcement seek to understand what terrorism will hit in the future: they potentially
care less about what type of weapon jihadists will use, as if they cannot forecast
against whom they will be using it, the effort is almost useless. Generally, weapons
and targets are inter-related (to exemplify, we can assume that it is almost impossible
that a group will attack a government building using stones), and if resources have
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to be efficiently allocated, then a good way to understand how to manage them is to
define which are the most probable targets that have to be protected.
In light of these aspects, this dissertation will focus on the world’s five most active
jihadist organizations (namely the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Afghan
Taliban, and Al Shabaab). The analytic part will be divided into three different
dimensions:
1. Presenting a technical framework originating from Markov chains to detect the
complex behavioral structure of jihadist groups and developing a coefficient to
measure similarity in the dynamic processes of weapon and target selection by
jihadist groups;
2. Investigating memory-processes and self-excitability in terrorist events via Hawkes
processes modeling;
3. Integrating dynamic meta-networks within Long Short-Term Memory Networks
with the aim to predict the most probable targets in the future, developing the
basis for a prediction model.
The outcomes may open new pathways towards the implementation of these tech-
niques to evaluate the risk of incidents, illuminating covered patterns and decision-
making processes to design effective prevention policies aimed at countering jihadism.
2.2 On the Need for Rethinking Research in Crim-
inology and Terrorism
The focus of this dissertation is not merely criminological. This aspect has to be taken
into consideration from the very first pages. The rapid advances in computational
methods and the need for scalable and efficient solutions for complex social problems
are calling for a revolution in the way social sciences are studied and addressed. A call
to which many have recently started to respond all over the world. Many universities
have now hybrid departments of quantitative social sciences, computational sociology
and research groups in which scientists from a variety of backgrounds work together
to solve societal issues. Nevertheless, still resistance from a wide part of the sociolog-
ical and criminological community exists towards the evolution of the field. This is
especially the case concerning the rise of machine learning and Artificial Intelligence
(AI), which are going to represent the mainstream approaches in a lot of disciplines
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at the moment (including health-care, finance, and industry-oriented research), but
still lie in a primitive phase of application in social sciences.
Resistance to innovations is typical in human societies, and the research com-
munity is, indeed, a mere subset of the greater set of humans living on the planet.
We should not be surprised then to realize how slow is the process of accepting and
exploiting this massive change in academia, too. Many reasons can lie behind this
resistance: the impression that machine learning algorithms are only black boxes that
are unable to provide theoretical interpretation for results, and the discontinuity that
algorithms mark not only with qualitative social sciences but also in relation to classi-
cal quantitative approaches, are among the explanatory factors of this reaction. While
social scientists using quantitative methods generally apply these techniques to test,
verify or falsify theories (therefore tweaking the data based on the specific problem,
without letting the numbers speak), machine learning and AI algorithms explicitly
look at the performance, rather than the explanation. Resistances are physiological,
then, but unlike the past, we are now facing a key turning point in history and science
we shall carefully consider.
My deep belief is that the future of social sciences on one side, as the future of
Artificial Intelligence (AI) on the other, have both to rely on a strong interdisciplinary
dialogue to make things work. The only difference is that while AI will not disappear
if social sciences will not be able to communicate with it, for social sciences the
potential cost is radically higher. On one side, AI will continue to grow and influence
our lives and if no control will be provided, outcomes may become harmful. On
the other side, traditional social sciences as intended in the past, where works were
mainly qualitative or ethnographic or, at most, softly quantitative, face the concrete
risk of becoming completely useless for policy purposes and real-world applications.
The ultimate end of this type of vision of social sciences will be of a futile academic
exercise with no concrete impacts. In parallel, as AI starts to become prominent
in the public sphere, we - as the criminology scientific community - cannot leave
the design and implementation of algorithms in the hands of engineers and computer
scientists alone. This especially in consideration of the risk of the unequal distribution
of towards more applied research in the hand of the computer science community as a
consequence of the hype that surrounds AI worldwide. We – as humanity – will need
a deep knowledge of social processes, dynamics and phenomena to avoid the risk of
biased AI systems, unintended consequences at scale and potential massive pitfalls in
the long run.
In light of this, I have devoted my dissertation to the goal of bringing together
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network science and AI to advance the knowledge on jihadism and to design possi-
ble applications that may be useful in the future out of the pure academic debate,
relying on the idea that terrorism research can benefit from advanced computational
techniques, and that AI shall devote more resources and efforts to tackle societal
problems, such as terrorism. This vision is related to the concept of responsibility.
As I intend it, research shall not be confined to departments and laboratories and
conferences, but should instead serve as much as possible (especially in this field) to
provide tools or answers to questions that deal with the wider human community.
Additionally, scholars in areas which are changing more rapidly than in the past - as
happens to the vast realm of criminology and social sciences - should be afraid of the
consequences of this shift only if they will decide to keep themselves away from it,
without getting involved.
The prominent methodological shape of this work does not mean, of course, that
research on terrorism and criminology shall only be a matter of data and computa-
tional models. Many past attempts of applying algorithms and computational tech-
niques to terrorism and other social and criminal phenomena by computer scientists,
statisticians and mathematicians have been completely useless because of the lack
of conceptual and theoretical knowledge on the analyzed phenomenon. Integration,
interdisciplinarity, and cohesion are three keywords that shall guide the “new deal”
of social sciences.
Too many times research in criminology and terrorism has been a mere “replica-
tion” of past methodologies, without investing adequate resources in novel approaches.
This, of course, avoided to take the risk for possible failures but at the same time
prevented scholars from trying to push the border a little bit further. Furthermore, if
scholars will continue to use theories and theoretical frameworks as chains to which
the scientific community has to pay a perpetual debt, they will only limit the path
of science towards knowledge and innovation. Too many times I have seen or heard
colleagues and researchers worried about the theoretical framework to use instead
of focusing on the right research questions. This, to me, has always appeared as a
gigantic problem. Being worried about what legacy of the past should act as the
cornerstone of a new research and not investing time and resources to try to create
something new in order to respond to meaningful and relevant questions is, in my
perspective, a sign of somehow diverted research. For guaranteeing a role to social
sciences in the real world of tomorrow, I do believe this process has to be changed.
Hence, this humble work explicitly aims at pointing in that direction.
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3 Case Studies and Data
3.1 Jihadist Terrorism: Concepts and Actors
As outlined in the previous chapter, there exist different categories of terrorism. Re-
ligious terrorism in one of these categories, and within this category stands Jihadism.
There are other forms of religious terrorism (e.g. Christian or Jewish terrorism) but
it is indubitable that, in the last decades, jihadism accounts for the large majority of
attacks, deaths, damages and tangible consequences. Its existence has deeply influ-
enced the recent history and still have a dramatic impact on the security and safety
of many countries and people today. The following subparagraphs briefly overview ji-
hadism as a typology of terrorism, focusing then on the IS, Boko Haram, the Taliban,
Al Qaeda, and Al Shabaab to introduce their history, goals and nature.
3.1.1 Defining Jihadism
The prominent role acquired by jihadism is proportional to its complexity: Islamist
terrorism is rooted in history and involves a multitude of religious, social, economic
and political factors. From a philological point of view, Jihad means “to strive”
in Arabic. The word has a different origin compared to what it communicates to-
day. Jihad, indeed, has a primary spiritual meaning, while the idea of the “jihad
by the sword” was developed afterward. The concept of “jihad by the sword” was
defended by radical groups that used it as the main tool to legitimate Islamist ter-
rorism (Springer et al., 2009). In the last decades, after realizing the prominence of
Islamist terrorism, researchers and scholars have started to investigate the origins of
the contemporary jihadist ideology to understand how it changed and spread all over
the world.
The multifold and interconnected events of the Twentieth century have surely
influenced if not fueled the expansion of jihadism. Colonialism, the establishment
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of Israel in 1948, and the influence of the United States after World War II are
among the main external key factors. Besides external factors, internal factors to
the Middle East also had an impact on the evolution of the problem. Springer et al.
(2009) points out that also the presence of secular regimes (e.g. Egypt), corruption,
unemployment, failed economies and the Arab loss against Israel in 1967 have led to
the Islamist insurgency. Moreover, influencing personalities like Sayyid Qutb built
intellectual and ideological theories to support the concept of “Global Jihad” (Nettler,
1996). Original members of Al Qaeda and many leaders like al Zawahiri relied on his
theories and ideas (Perry and Negrin, 2008) and, consequently, Global Jihad became
the most relevant doctrine in Jihadist terrorism. In this context, Al Qaeda acted as
the leader of a worldwide number of Islamist networks and organizations, encouraging
all the others to embrace the idea of “holy war”. Since 9/11 and the events of Madrid
(2004) and London (2005) a lot has happened. In more than fifteen years, Jihadism
has partially changed its face, even becoming more determined and merciless. The rise
of the Islamic State and the birth and reinforcement of many other Islamist terrorist
groups have shaken the world dozens of times. Attacks in Western countries have
increased and Islamist terrorism has shifted towards a more decentralized and loose
structure. Lone wolves and self-radicalized individuals have joined the idea of jihad,
making attempts to predict and anticipate the attacks almost impossible.
In this scenario, four terrorist organizations have played a key role. In 2015,
the actions of the IS, Boko Haram, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al Qaeda have
accounted for 17,721 deaths all over the world (Institute for Economics and Peace,
2016). Two years after, in 2017, Al Shabaab substituted Al Qaeda in the list of the
four deadliest groups worldwide provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace
(2018): the Somali group, with the Islamic State, the Taliban, and Boko Haram
were alone responsible for 10,632 deaths from terrorist events. These single aggregate
figures stress the tremendous impact that these five jihadist organizations have on
society.
3.1.2 The Islamic State
In the last years, the world has experienced the radical and dramatic actions of the
IS. While during the 2000s Al Qaeda was considered the main terrorist actor in the
global scenario, since 2007 the IS has slowly but constantly overcome all the rivals
and acquired the role of most critical terrorist threat for many countries in the world.
The origins of IS dates back to 2000 in a militant group called Jamaat al-Tawhid
wal-Jihad (JTJ), founded and led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Hashim, 2014). JTJ was
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one of the groups fighting against the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In 2004, the JTJ
joined Al Qaeda and changed its name in Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (Fishman, 2016).
Hashim (2014) reports that the goals of the group were mainly focused on the removal
of the aggressor from the territories of Iraq, on waging Jihad to liberate Muslim
territories from infidels and establish a caliphate ruled by Sharia. Subsequently, in
2006, some divergences between al-Zarqawi and the central structure of Al Qaeda and
the final death of the leader of AQI, induced to the attempt to create the prototype of
the current IS. The chosen name was Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), and the organization
control was given to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. The project failed due to the lack of
resources and by 2008 Iraq experienced a relatively peaceful period. Nevertheless,
between 2010 and 2013, the ISI came again to the attention of the world. Its leader
started to explicitly call for the creation of a caliphate, and the group changed again its
name in “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS). The violent victories in the territories
of Iraq and Syria gave favorable conditions to al-Baghdadi for the establishment of
the caliphate. In 2014, ISIS changes definitely its name in “Islamic State” (IS).
The anomalous nature of this terrorist organization has been emphasized by many.
Cronin (2015) sustained that the IS cannot be described as a terrorist group, stressing
the differences with Al Qaeda. It is indisputable that IS has many features that
distinguish it from all the other terrorist groups of the world. Firstly, it has established
a caliphate (Jabareen, 2015). Secondly, the IS could count on a number of members,
affiliates, and fighters much higher than any other group. Thirdly, the IS can rely
on economic, communication and military resources that no one else possesses in the
terrorism scenario (Stergiou, 2016). With regard to this, studies show how the IS
relies on the power of the internet to recruit members and to spread its propaganda
more than any other group (Farwell, 2014; Klausen, 2015; Mahood and Rane, 2017).
Data returns an impressive snapshot of the human flows that go from the Western
countries to Iraq and Syria to join the caliphate. The IS benefits from the so-called
foreign fighters too. Hegghammer (2013) defines a foreign fighter as an agent that “a.
has joined, and operates within the confines of an insurgency; b. lacks citizenship of
the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions; c. lacks affiliation to an official
military organization; d. is unpaid”. Estimates tell that until 2015, between 27,000
and 31,000 individuals have joined the IS, traveling from 86 countries (Soufan Group,
2015). They first become human capital for terrorist groups (Benmelech and Klor,
2018). Battlefield experiences in Syria and Iraq enhance their military capabilities
and increase links and relations with other terrorists. Then, a part of these foreign
fighters, after an experience in the Middle East, goes back to the European countries.
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Sometimes, returning foreign fighters put into practice what they have learned in the
war zones, with the specific intent to carry out individual or group terrorist attacks
(Hegghammer, 2013). Vidino (2014) points out that foreign fighters that depart from
Europe have different ages, origins, social and economic backgrounds: this finding
makes it difficult to develop tailored policies since no defined profiles exist.
The IS exploited all these elements to become the world’s deadliest terrorist group.
In 2015, IS plotted attacks in 252 cities and its members were responsible for a total
of 6,141 deaths (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). In, 2016 the number of
casualties rose up to 9,132 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017). The primary
goal of the IS is to create an area of Islamic rule. Although in the last two years the
group has been almost defeated and has lost many territories, unlike all the other
groups it has succeeded in its aim. The leader is still al-Baghdadi and the group is
still considered the deadliest worldwide (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018).
3.1.3 The Taliban
Despite Kleiner (2000) simplistically defines its members as “warriors”, the Taliban is
an Islamist fundamentalist terrorist group based in Afghanistan composed by Pashtun
tribesmen and Mujahedeen. These Mujahedeen participated in the resistance against
the Soviet Union invasion of the country in the 1980s. The group ruled Afghanistan
from 1996 to 2001. In 2001, the Taliban have been defeated by a NATO coalition
led by the US. In 2013, the NATO coalition reduced its presence in Afghanistan and
this provoked an increase in the terrorist activity of the Taliban group (Institute for
Economics and Peace, 2016). The origins of the Taliban go back to the Soviet invasion
and the subsequent fall of the pro-Soviet government in 1989 (Goodson, 2001; Barfield,
2010; Hyman, 2016). The Mujahedeen groups started to fight against each other and
the country was fragmented in many regions. In this scenario, some former fighters
formed a group led by the Mullah Omar, with the final aim to “restore peace, disarm
the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character of
Afghanistan” (Rashid, 2002). The group was called “the Taliban” and rapidly gained
popularity and local legitimacy. This escalation led the group to conquer Kandahar
in 1994 and Kabul in 1996 (Barfield, 2010).
Besides the other historical events that brought the Taliban to re-enforce their terror
activity (which is not the very purpose of this work), analyzing their strategies and
targets is important to understand their activities. Johnson (2013) stresses how the
Taliban proved to be a highly adaptive group. Their tactics have evolved over time:
the long tradition of conflicts has helped the members of the Taliban to learn and
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employ different strategies. Despite a low technological level, their strategies are
rather sophisticated. The control of the territory through different methods (e.g.:
the institution of shadow governments in rural areas, as noted by Johnson) and the
battlefield tactical behaviors demonstrate their skills. In this scenario, the current
first aim of the Taliban is to overthrow the Afghan government. For this reason, in
the last years the Taliban have mostly targeted police forces (Institute for Economics
and Peace, 2016). Moreover, it is relevant to note how since the US invasion in
2003, the Taliban have highly increased the use of suicide bombings (Johnson, 2013).
The Taliban killed 4,502 people in 2015 (deadliest year ever, +29% if compared with
2015) and 3,583 in 2016 Institute for Economics and Peace (2016, 2017). Concerning
economy revenues, the Taliban rely on opium and heroin smuggling as the first funding
source for their activities (Thruelsen, 2010; Piazza, 2012).
3.1.4 Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda is the Islamist terrorist organization responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The
dawn of Al Qaeda dates to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan when its founding
leader Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam were collaborating in the conflict.
In 1988, while the conflict was ending, bin Laden and Azzam founded Al Qaeda in
Pakistan. After the assassination of Azzam perpetrated by bin Laden himself, the
Saudi-Arabian born terrorist became soon one of the leaders of the Global Jihad Net-
work. After the first phase where the organization strived for the internal jihad (the
attempt to conquer the countries with Muslim populations in Middle East, Central
Asia, the Indian Subcontinent, and Southeast Asia), Al Qaeda turned to the external
jihad. This shift happened across 1997 and 1998 (Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010). One
of the main motives of this strategic choice was the intent to stop the Western (and
specifically the American) influence in that area of the world (Migaux, 2007). Since
that moment, US citizens and building became the very target of the terrorist activ-
ity. Some successful attacks (among the other, the attacks against US embassies in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam) preceded the 9/11 attacks which are considered the most
devastating and lethal terrorist actions of modern history.
After the death of bin Laden in 2013, the organization has renovated itself to better
achieve its goals. Nowadays, Al Qaeda is a global organization, decentralized and
franchised around a central control group. Currently, Al Qaeda’s main affiliates are
Al Shabaab, Al Nusrah Front, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb, Abdullah Azzam Brigades and Al Qaeda in the Indian Con-
tinent (Byman, 2014). Zehr (2017) develops the concept of “Al Qaeda phenomenon”
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to describe that process that has led to the worldwide proliferation of terrorist orga-
nizations similar to Al Qaeda. According to the author, Al Qaeda had the power to
inspire the IS and many others to join the jihad. As mentioned, a relevant aspect of
Al Qaeda is the connection that the organization has with many other groups, relying
on the ideology of the Global Jihad. With the rise of the IS, the terrorist narrative
has mainly concentrated on these two entities to understand differences, similarities
and possible evolution in the relations between the two. Abu Musab al Zarqawi was
helped by Al Qaeda in the foundation of the JTJ, but after his death and with the
expansion of the IS, the two organizations started a feud. In fact, there have been
clashes between the IS, Al Qaeda and other groups like Al Nusrah. Holbrook (2015)
(2015) notes that Al Qaeda sought to present the group as a moderate alternative
to the IS, but the events of the last years demonstrated that the IS managed to be-
come the leading force in the Jihadist terrorist scenario. Despite the loss of power, in
2015 Al Qaeda was responsible for 1,620 deaths (-17% if compared to 2014) and 368
incidents, while in 2016 the jihadist group has killed 1,349 individuals (Institute for
Economics and Peace, 2016, 2017).
3.1.5 Boko Haram
Boko Haram is a Nigerian terrorist group which has first come to the attention of
its country chronicles in the early 2000s (Onuoha, 2010). The name means “Western
education is forbidden”. Its main goal is to establish an Islamic caliphate in Nigeria.
The group has partially succeeded in his goal, imposing the Sharia law in some of the
states of Nigeria. Its operations mainly concentrate in Nigeria - the state of Borno
is the epicenter of the terror - and in adjoining African countries like Burkina Faso
and Cameroon (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). Several scholars have tried
to analyze the context in which the terrorist organization has developed. The group
was born in the north of Nigeria, and it is currently the major security issue for the
Nigerian government (de Montclos, 2015; Abubakar, 2017).
Due to its limited geographical range of action, Boko Haram has not been directly
considered a priority for Western institutions and academia. Nevertheless, it poses
great challenges for the stability of the area threatened by its presence. According to
many scholars (Onuoha, 2010; Loimeier, 2012; Akinola, 2015; Iyekekpolo, 2016), the
expansion of Boko Haram in Nigeria is caused by multiple factors that are indepen-
dent of the mere religious aspect. These factors are the extreme Nigerian poverty, the
weak efforts of the government in countering the terrorist threat and the grievance
of large local areas against the institutions. According to these authors, economic
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conditions and political opportunities have fuelled the Boko Haram expansion. More-
over, Abubakar (2017) includes also the corruption of the government and the failure
of the northern elites in implementing Sharia as important causes of the rise of Boko
Haram.
Despite the first phase in which Boko Haram targeted Nigerian security forces and
mainly applied “hit and run” strategies, in the last years the group has started to
carry out attacks also against religious and educational institutions and civilians (Re-
gens et al., 2016). The strategies have also changed: the group started to act to
occupy and conquer territories, increasing the brutality of the attacks (Weeraratne,
2017). The terrorist group was responsible for 5,478 death in 2015 with an 18% de-
crease if compared with 2014 when Boko Haram was recorded as the deadliest group
of the world (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). In 2016 the number of deaths
continued to decrease (1,079) due to the defeats inflicted by Nigerian military forces.
Institute for Economics and Peace (2017) also reports how these military defeats led
to the separation of three factions within Boko Haram in late 2016: a violent, an
Islamic State-aligned and an Al Qaeda-aligned one.
3.1.6 Al Shabaab
Harakata al-Shabaab Mujahideen, mostly known as Al Shabaab, is a jihadist terror-
ist organization that first appeared in the area of Mogadishu, Somalia, in the early
2000s (Hansen, 2013). Initially, the group was an urban militia aiming at defend-
ing the Islamic Courts Union in the capital of Somalia. Since then, Al Shabaab has
gained importance in the country and started to control an increasing number of
rural territories and cities. In 2010, the group attracted the attention of the interna-
tional community because of the “World Cup bombings” in Kampala (Anderson and
McKnight, 2015). In the last years, the group evolved and expanded across different
territories. As noted by Mueller (2018) while the group covered a marginal role in So-
malia in the early stage of its existence, Al Shabaab is now one of the most relevant
players in the process of armed opposition against the nascent Somali government
(allies included). This transition has also affected the geographic scope of attacks,
which has been expanded in the last years, spanning over different adjoining countries.
While the political discourse tried to paint the group as in the middle of a gradual
receding process, scholars have demonstrated its resistance and resilience, claiming
that Al Shabaab benefits of more legitimization if compared to the federal government
of Somalia (Lind et al., 2017). After a longstanding informal relation, since 2012 Al
Shabaab is officially considered part of the Al Qaeda network (Joosse et al., 2015).
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The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a regional peacekeeping mission
that is operated by the African Union under the consent of the United Nations, is
one of the actors that better contrast the role of Al Shabaab in the region. AMISOM
forces have taken over strategic locations and deprived Al Shabaab of resources and
physical territories but, as pointed out by Cannon and Ruto Pkalya (2017), the group
kept maintaining capabilities and clear strategic goals, also exploiting the absence of
a strong and effective statehood.
Cannon and Ruto Pkalya, additionally, argue that the group has evolved towards a
universal/abstract organization. This classification is based on the multi-casualty and
indiscriminate nature of its attacks. Attempts to classify the group have been done
also by other scholars. However, no universal agreement on the organizational model
or typology that Al Shabaab represents. Ingiriis (2018) tried to enhance the knowl-
edge on the group exploring the relationship between it and the twentieth-century
anti-colonial Somali movement of the Dervishes, highlighting some imitation in the
way Al Shabaab operates. Tar and Mustapha (2017) argued that the success of the
group is partially explained by the cooperation and alliances it has consolidated with
local warlords. The authors even try to categorize Al Shabaab itself as a warlord
group, due to the activities it has carried out in Somalia, including racketeering and
plundering. The group has presumably killed over 4,000 individuals since it was born
in 2006 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017).
3.2 Data
3.2.1 The Global Terrorism Database
The analyses in this work rely on data drawn from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD), developed by LaFree and Dugan. The GTD is the most comprehensive and
detailed open access dataset on terrorist events at global scale.1 The GTD originates
from data collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS): researchers
at PGIS were trained to include information on terrorist events from 1970 to 1997
and in 2006 the START Consortium received funding to continue the data collection
and update the dataset (LaFree and Dugan, 2007; LaFree, 2010).
1While writing this dissertation, the GTD manager has announced that the funding from the
State Department has been cut, as no follow-on contract has been granted after the expiration of
the previous one, in May 2018. This means that, at this moment, the START research center has
no funding to complete collection of 2018 data, nor are they able to publish data beyond 2018.
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Data collection continued to date, and START releases an updated version of the
dataset every year. The dataset includes now data on more than 180,000 events.
Information is gathered from different open sources, and events have to meet specific
criteria to be included in the database. These criteria are divided into two different
levels. The first level criteria are three and have all to be verified. These mandatory
ones are related to the intentionality and the violence (or immediate threat of violence)
of the incident and the subnational nature of terrorist actors. The second level criteria
are three and the condition is that at least two of them are respected. Second level
criteria relate to (1) the specific political, economic, religious or social goal of each
act, (2) the evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey messages to
larger audiences than the immediate victims, (3) the context of action which has to
be outside of legitimate warfare activities. Finally, although an event respects these
two levels and is included in the dataset, an additional filtering mechanism (variable
doubter) is introduced to control for conflicting information or acts that may not be
of exclusive terrorist nature (START, 2017b).
In this work, I have focused on the five most active jihadist groups in terms of
plotted attacks from 1970 to 2016. Since each event in the GTD may have up to
three perpetrators cooperating in a single attack, I have calculated the cumulative
sum of all the appearances of each group even though the attack was executed by
one actor or more. Moreover, I have decided to merge all the attacks perpetrated
by all the factions belonging to the Al Qaeda network that in the dataset were la-
beled as separate, creating a single “Al Qaeda” category. The factions that were
combined are: Al-Qaida, Al-Qaida in Iraq,2 Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia, Al-Qaida in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaida in Yemen, Al Qaida in Lebanon, Al-Qaida
in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, Islambouli Brigades of
al-Qaida, Secret Organization of al-Qaida in Europe, Al-Qaida Organization for Ji-
had in Sweden, Al-Qaida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division, Jadid Al-Qaida
Banglades (JAQB), Al-Qaida Kurdish Battalions.
This process identified the Taliban, IS, Boko Haram, Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda as
the most active groups present in the dataset. After group selection, I have removed
2Al Qaeda in Iraq represents the seed of the Islamic State, given that the group then evolved
changing its name in “Islamic State in Iraq”. One may thus dispute the decision to fold the group
into the broader “Al Qaeda” network. This decision, however, is motivated by two reasons. First,
Al Qaeda in Iraq has been a formal affiliate of the Al Qaeda network, and it would have then been
conceptually wrong to exclude it based on retrospective knowledge about its history. Second, the
GTD reports attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State in Iraq, thus clearly distinguishing between
the two different groups.
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all the attacks that were of labeled as of doubtful terrorist nature (relying on the
doubter variable). This led to a reduced amount of attacks for each group (Table
3.1).
Group Original N Cleaned N Attack
Freq.
First Attack Last Attack
Taliban 6,607 5,633 0.71 4/20/1995 12/31/2016
Islamic State 4,343 3,562 2.63 4/18/2013 12/31/2016
Boko Haram 2,090 1,901 0.70 7/27/2009 12/31/2016
Al Shabaab 2,689 1,695 0.50 11/2/2007 12/30/2016
Al Qaeda 2,058 1,506 0.17 12/29/1992 12/25/2016
Table 3.1: Number of attacks (original and cleaned) for each of the selected groups
Similarly to the doubtful event, for what concerns attacks for which the perpetra-
tor was not reported, I decided to exclude them avoiding heuristic techniques based
on probabilistic methods to estimate the likely perpetrator of the event. The ob-
jective was to rely solely on reliable and verified information. Estimating the likely
perpetrator is possible, however in absence of ground truth (i.e., the real perpetrator),
it would have been impossible to verify the correctness of the response. This would
have constituted a risk of bias for the whole methodological architecture of the work.
While it is reasonably possible that some attacks lack their perpetrator, I considered
safer to only use events with certified perpetrators.
Given the relevance of the temporal dimension for the aims of the analyses, I
have instead treated events with no precise date reported (at daily unit detail) in two
different ways. If the additional variable approxdate was available, I imputed data
relying on the information included there. However, if approxdate was not precise
enough to derive any type of imputation, I filled missing data using the median date
based on each month’s distribution. If, for instance, in February 2008 there were 9
attacks on days 1, 3, 3, 5, 9, 14, 23, 26, 26, then the median value for the missing
dates corresponding to that month would be 9. When the number of attacks in a
specific month is even, then I take the average of the two median ones and input
the mean value rounded up if the two dates are different, exact otherwise (e.g. if in
another month of another year there were 4 attacks on days 3, 5, 6, 8, the median
in this case will be (5+6)/2=5.5∼6) Additionally, I have employed data on attack
types (in this work referred as “tactics”), weapons, targets, and targeted countries.
In the GTD, each event may have information on multiple tactics, weapons, and
targets: in this analysis I have kept all available information, without dropping any
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variable or a specific category, not to alter the distribution of events and their specific
characteristics (Table 3.2).
Group Targeted Countries Tactics Weapons Targets
Taliban 2 (Afghanistan) 9 9 23
Islamic State 21 (Iraq) 10 8 23
Boko Haram 6 (Nigeria) 8 7 21
Al Shabaab 7 (Somalia) 9 7 22
Al Qaeda 31 (Yemen) 9 9 24
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of Attack Variables Per Terrorist Group 8Most targeted countries
between parentheses).
It is worth to outline that the GTD provides different levels of details for both
weapon and target features. Weapons are labeled on two different levels of detail.
Variable weaptype records the general type of weapon that terrorists used in the attack
(e.g. Firearms), while variable weapsubtype gives a more detailed and specific type
of information related to the weapons used in the event (e.g.: Automated weapon).
Targets are instead labeled on four different levels of detail. Variable targtype is
the most general one, providing a broad class to which the specific target belongs
(e.g. Government), targsubtype gives further specification, introducing additional
information (e.g. Government building/facility/office). Variable corp identifies the
corporate entity or government agency that was targeted (e.g.: Spanish government)
and variable “target” labels the specific person, building or installation that was
victimized.
In the present work, I have used in both cases the most general type of categoriza-
tion (i.e.: variables targtype and weaptype): this decision was driven by the fact that
using a finer-grained level of detail would have led to over-specification, eventually
compromising the generalization of results and models. Nonetheless, in order to build
more meaningful models, in the case of events where targtype was equal to “other”,
I have used the variable targsubtype instead. The residual label “other” includes
heterogeneous targets that become more informative if analyzed as separate objects
(examples of targsubtype variables are Fire Fighters and Ambulance).
3.2.2 Limitations
The GTD is a fundamental open access resource for researchers interested in the study
of terrorist events. Nonetheless, this work comes with several limitations intrinsically
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related to the data or to the choices made in processing the information contained in
the database.
Firstly, the GTD presents a limitation that is unsolvable: in fact, all events that
occurred in 1993 are missing. As done in previous studies (Santifort et al., 2013), I
did not estimate the number events of 1993: I have instead treated them as missing.
Albeit four of the five jihadist groups started to plot attacks long after 1993, this lack
of information might have biased the statistical analyses for the Taliban.
Secondly, another structural limitation of the dataset as a whole relates to the
potential presence of unmeasured events or attacks with no reported perpetrator that
are therefore excluded from the analyses. Given that this dataset is built on open
access data it can be that attacks, especially low magnitude ones, are not recorded
by press agencies or newspapers. Alternatively, events may not be attributed to
a specific group due to a tactical or strategical ambiguity that makes it extremely
difficult to create a link to a specific subject. These excluded attacks, that can be
labeled as “false negatives” pose the risk of constructing biased models that fail to
capture real-world dynamics. For this reason, in my future work I hope to be able
to test the goodness, fitness, and reliability of the models via statistical techniques
that would eventually overcome this inherent limitation of these data. One poten-
tial technique would involve the inclusion of random noise data generated by some
stylized probability distributions, in order to assess the magnitude of the effects of
potential biases explained by unmeasured events. For what concerns attacks with an
unattributed perpetrator that might have been instead plotted by one of the groups
under analyses, probabilistic methods derived from unsupervised learning techniques
may be a feasible way to estimate likely perpetrators. While keeping this in mind, it
is worth to point out three things. First, given the digitalization of information that
caused an increasing availability of news coming from all the corners of the planet,
it is reasonable to think that these problematic events have been reduced in the last
two decades, therefore only marginally influencing the present analyses. Second, the
groups that I have included in my sample have been under the spotlight due to their
high-frequency and high-magnitude activities worldwide. These activities have often
led to high-casualty attacks and worldwide attention. Third, jihadist groups generally
publicly claim their attacks, further reducing the risk of false negatives. For this rea-
son, it is hard to think that the number of unmeasured attacks for such organizations
is that high to disqualify the results of this thesis. Nonetheless, given my future aim
to potentially expand my work to other groups or contexts for which these two last
caveats may not hold, the problem of unmeasured attacks represents an issue to be
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tackled seriously.
Thirdly, my own decision to concentrate on countries for the geographical dimen-
sion of terrorist events might pose some serious limitations to the utility of the models
from the practical point of view. While from the research standpoint, such a macro
perspective has a respectable value, policy-makers and analysts might be interested in
finer-grained spatial configurations. In fact, countries may be too general spatial ap-
proximations and models relying on this abstraction could not provide useful insights
for intelligence purposes. A model that correctly predicts attacks in Afghanistan, for
instance, does not help suggest where to precisely allocate resources. Afghanistan is
a wide country, and data show that the distribution of terrorist events is not equal
across provinces. It is thus necessary to take into account that, from the perspective
of applied and policy-oriented research, future work will have to address this issue
and that limited inferences should be made relying on the geographical component
of the analyses. Hopefully, the database will be able to support the improvement of
the models from the geographical point of view, given that events are geocoded and
more detailed spatial resolution is available for most of the attacks.
Fourthly, and related to the third point, the choice operated by me to use the
most general level of categorization for Weapons and Targets certainly preserves
the integrity of the information, avoid excessive sparsity and noise, but again lim-
its the potential application of the work for intelligence aims. Certain categories
(e.g., “Firearms” as a weapon or “Private Citizens and Property” as a target) are
too general and may hide relevant levels of information that can hide further micro-
patterns in terms of specific weapons, tactics or targets. What if, within the general
“Private Citizens and Property” category stands a certain patterned distribution of
multiple different subcategories? The reader must keep this aspect in mind when
reading the description of the methodological setup and the results of the different
analyses made throughout the work.
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4 Stochastic Matrices of
Terrorism:
Complexity and Heterogeneity
of Jihadist Behavior
Preliminary Note The present chapter reports part of the analyses of the research
article “Pairwise similarity of jihadist groups in target and weapon transitions” pub-
lished in the Journal of Computational Social Science in May 2019, with Mihovil
Bartulovic and Kathleen M. Carley as co-authors (DOI: 10.1007/s42001-019-00046-
8).
4.1 Introduction
Terrorism and its multi-fold complex dimensions are increasingly studied from differ-
ent perspectives, attracting scholars from several scientific fields. Advanced quantita-
tive techniques, derived from mathematical and statistical sciences, have been applied
to increase the knowledge of how this phenomenon evolves and occurs. Although al-
most all social phenomena spark interest in the scientific community, terrorism -
especially in the last decades - has been capable of fostering unprecedented attention
due to how it has shocked recent contemporary history. From 1970 to 2016, the Mid-
dle East, North Africa, South Asia and Western Europe were the regions with the
highest number of attacks (START, 2017a). However, data reveal the global relevance
of the issue, considering that in the last four decades terror events have occurred in
more than 200 countries in the world. Indeed, the terrorist threat has pushed scien-
tists to provide help through research to contrast the phenomenon. Complex systems,
statistics, security studies are few among the several communities from which major
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applied contributions have been made to the study of terrorism.
In the attempt to innovate and advance the knowledge on jihadist dynamics from a
network science perspective, the present study seeks to explore the behavioral dynam-
ics of the world’s most active jihadist groups to shed lights on the existing recurring
patterns in terms of operational choices and quantify the extent to which these groups
show similar or dissimilar tactical choices in their attack sequences. In light of this,
I will introduce a novel framework based on Markov chains that will use super-states
and stochastic transition matrices to analyze the complexity of jihadist event se-
quences and propose a pairwise coefficient that maps the similarity of jihadist groups
in terms of transitions between targets, weapons and targets and weapons combined.
The study will use open access data and will create transition networks and related
network trails treating attacks as ordered state sequences. The relevance of investigat-
ing the nature of state sequences is strongly related to the inherent nature of terrorism
itself. As a matter of fact, the complex changes of tactical and operational decisions
by terrorist groups makes it extremely difficult to predict and eventually prevent at-
tacks and consequent damages. While bounded by limited resources and manpower,
terrorists usually have at their disposal many potential scenarios to maximize the
utility of their actions. It is thus crucial to improve the knowledge of transitions
between different states to detect regularities and irregularities in the behavior of
jihadist groups.
This study is an exploration in this direction and opens the path for future re-
search. Concerning results, on one side, the creation of N -dimensional super-state
transition networks underlines the complex repertoire of combination and sequential
patterns existing for all the five groups in all the three scenarios. On the other side,
the stability of several pairwise similarities across different transition networks testi-
fies how certain groups actually share (or do not share at all) very common dynamic
behaviors. Furthermore, groups that are similar in terms of weapon transitions but
very dissimilar in target transitions demonstrate how there is not always a strong con-
nection between the two dimensions, and that the same terrorist goal can be reached
by different means, and vice versa.
The rest of the study is organized as follows: the next section presents the Data
and the processing techniques applied to structure the information for the purposes
of the chapter. The third section will focus on stochastic transition matrices and
their applicability to research on terrorism dynamics. It will specifically introduce
the basic concepts behind Markov chains and present the N -dimensional super-states
framework, also illustrating the quantitative results. The fourth section will instead
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present Normalized Trail Similarity. The rationale and mathematical formalization
will serve to better interpret the outcomes of the analyses commented in the same
section. Finally, the last section will provide final remarks with a focus on policy and
intelligence implications and highlight potential future research paths.
4.2 Data Processing
This section aims at presenting the data and the operations carried out to manipulate
the data for the aim of the work.
The data used in this chapter are a reduced version of the entire history of attacks
present for each group in the GTD. For Al Qaeda and the Taliban, very few attacks
were recorded from 1992 to 2001. Hence, to avoid noise and too strong assumptions on
the presence of dependencies between events years distant from each other, attacks for
Al Qaeda and the Taliban plotted prior to 2001 have been excluded. Table 4.1 shows
the descriptive statistics of the reduced data, and Figure 4.1 displays the distribution
of events at the monthly unit for all the groups.
Group Cleaned N Attack Frequency First Last
Taliban 5,629 1.04 1/7/01 12/31/16
Islamic State 3,562 2.63 4/18/13 12/31/16
Boko Haram 1,901 0.70 7/27/09 12/31/16
Al Shabaab 1,695 0.47 11/2/07 12/30/16
Al Qaeda 1,502 0.26 09/11/01 12/25/16
Table 4.1: Number of Attacks (Original and Cleaned) for Each of the Selected Groups
Formally, for each group gi is given a sequence of terror events Agi = (a1, ..., an)
and a sequence D = (d1, ..., dn), representing temporally ordered discrete days. These
two sequences are inherently related because the mapping f : A→ D, which connects
every event with a unique time-stamp, is always verified. Elements in A are ordered
based on D, therefore all the events are ordered by the time-stamp they are associated
to, and this order goes from the most distant to the least distant with reference to
the present time.1 Additionally, we define T = {t1, ..., tk} as the set of possible target
1It is worth to specify that in the analyses, events will be ordered temporally but without taking
into account the actual delta between attacks. This means that there is no difference between two
attacks plotted within a range of four days and other two attacks plotted within a range of five
months. Additionally, when two or more attacks are plotted on the same day, we order them by
the eventid variable included in the original dataset, assuming that the information coded in the
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Figure 4.1: Monthly Time Series of Attacks per Each Group (Jan 2001-Dec 2016)
types and W = {w1, ..., wl} as the set potential weapons. Within this frame, we can
thus formalize an event in the following compact format:
agi (d, t, w) 0 < t ≤ 3 ; 0 < w ≤ 4 (4.1)
The format above posits that an event plotted by group gi is abstractly defined
as a combination of three elements: the day it has occurred (temporal element), the
targets that have been attacked and the weapons that have been employed. In fact,
each event might have been directed to up to three targets simultaneously and might
variable provides a more robust ordering criterion than pure randomly distribution.
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have been carried out using up to four weapon types as denoted in Equation 4.1.
This further poses the problem of setting up the state spaces for the three classes
of analyses I am interested in, namely the analysis of weapons, targets and targets
and weapons combined. The state space of a chain, S, is defined as the set of values
each element of Xd of the process can take. To exemplify, S(Tgi) is the state space of
the existing combination of targets (i.e., states) that gi can take, and |S(Tgi)| is the
cardinality of the set, namely the number of states that it contains.
As mentioned above, the fact that each attack may include multiple targets and
weapons dramatically increases the possible combinations of selected targets and
weapons to include in the analysis. In fact, in the worst-case scenario, Al Qaeda
has attacked twenty-four types of targets during its existence and employed nine
types of weapons. To better depict the extremely wide range of possibilities arising
from this problem, it is useful to express it by applying basic combinatorics. I first
deal with the two single-entity classes, namely weapons and targets, hence excluding
for the moment the case of targets and weapons combined. In both cases, combina-
tions of multiple objects (up to three in case of targets and four in case of weapons)
are possible, repetitions are plausible (therefore have to be considered), and order
matters. This means that in a given combination of three targets, there may be two
identical targets and a third different one. Additionally, the order in which these
targets or weapons are included in the dataset is important, assuming a hierarchic
criterion (descending in terms of importance of the specific feature). Thus, two hy-
pothetical combinations of elements (x, y, z) and (y, z, x) have to be treated as
different. Applying these rules, and knowing that our combinations can lie in a finite
range, the equations that yield the theoretical cardinality of the two state spaces are
the following:
Theoretical|S(W)gi|=
4∑
r=1
wr = 9 + 92 + 93 + 94 = 7, 380 (4.2)
Theoretical|S(T)gi|=
3∑
r=1
tr = 24 + 242 + 243 = 14, 424 (4.3)
These two equations already highlight the huge amount of possible combinations
for the two simplest trails and this already showcases that we need a more practical
way to tackle such data. Additionally, the number further increases when considering
the third type of trails. Indeed, Theoretical|S(T,W)gi| aims at mapping the trajec-
tories of groups behavior when targets and weapons are considered together. In this
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particular case, we are dealing with a simpler probabilistic problem. As an example,
we should think as two sets of finite elements A = {a1, a2, a3} and B = {b1, b2}. Our
particular problem is finding the number of possible combinations of unique pairs of
elements, and each pair must contain one element from set A and one element from
set B. Thus, we are not interested in finding unique pairs such as (a2, a2) or (b1, b2).
Given these constraints, it is straightforward to verify that the number of potential
unique pairs in our ad hoc example is given by the product of the number of elements
in A and the elements in B. Therefore, going back to the main case:
Theoretical|S(T,W)gi|=
(
3∑
r=1
tr
)(
4∑
r=1
wr
)
= 14, 424× 7, 380 = 106, 449, 120
Applying the calculation to our third trail leads to multiplying 14,424 by 7,380.
The final result is 106,449,120. Considering more than 106 million combinations
would have led to a very high expense of computational resources. Additionally,
considering all potential combinations might slow down the computation of the Nor-
malized Transition Coefficient. Therefore, to simplify this task, we have coded and
considered only the combinations (for all trails) existing in the dataset. The only
existing rule, indeed, was that that specific combination of targets or weapons was
present in at least one of the events of at least one group. The decision of not con-
sidering all potential combinations might be contrasted by one’s critique, saying that
only considering recorded combinations is a way to artificially bound the extremely
wide range of options in the hand of terrorist organizations (especially if considering
that the organizations in analyses have – or had – availability of many resources in
economic and operational terms).
In spite of this, the analysis focuses on the past, hence concentrating on the uni-
verse of existing combinations without paying attention to potential future unexplored
combinations. This justifies my choice. That considered, applying this reduction led
to sensibly smaller numbers. The first state space |S(W)gi| is limited to a total of 55
states, |S(T)gi| is bounded by a total of 200 states, and |S(T,W)gi| has 703 states.
In the case of |S(W)gi| it means that only 0.71% of weapon combinations have been
found in the data, while for |S(T)gi| the percentage is 1.38%. Finally, for |S(T,W)gi|
the number reduces further sensibly: data yields the 0.0006% of total potential combi-
nations of targets and weapons. Figure 4.2 visually presents the distribution of most
common states (i.e., combinations) for target, weapons and both combined across
each group and Table 4.2 guides the reader in decoding the abbreviations used in the
plots and the text.
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Figure 4.2: Histograms of 5 Most Common States from Each of the Jihadist Groups’ Trails
Figure 4.2 shows how in terms of weapons (first column, in blue), the Islamic
State has a sensibly higher preference for the use of Explosives, Bombings, Dynamite
(E/B/D) in its attacks. E/B/D accounts for almost 60% of the weapons used in each
event. A similar finding is displayed for Al Qaeda, while the Taliban, Boko Haram
and Al Shabaab tend to diversify more and to have less stronger preferences. Notably,
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Abbreviation Type Full Name
E/B/D Weapon Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
Fi Weapon Firearm
Un Weapon & Target Unknown
In Weapon Incendiary
Me Weapon Melee
Po Target Police
PC&P Target Private Citizen & Propriety
GG Target Government (General)
Bu Target Business
Mi Target Military
RF/I Target Religious Figures/Institutions
T/NSM Target Terrorists/Non-State Militia
Table 4.2: List of abbreviations of targets and weapons used in Figure 4.2
Boko Haram is the only group that uses more Firearms (Fi) than Explosives in its
attacks.
For what concerns targets, the Islamic State again shows a very strong preference
for a particular type (i.e., Private Citizen and Property, PC&P). This also applies to
Boko Haram. Both groups tend to hit PC&P in almost half of their events. Taliban,
Al Shabaab, and Al Qaeda exhibit less polarized distributions. It is worth to mention
how the Taliban is the only jihadist organization that prefers to target Police rather
than PC&P.
Finally, in the combined scenario, distributions of the five most common combi-
nations are more homogeneous for all groups but the Islamic State. In this last case,
the group led by al-Baghdadi further demonstrates to have a very clear tendency to
hit PC&P using E/B/D (∼ 30% of attacks). Although with different proportions,
this combination is the most common one also for Al Qaeda. Boko Haram and al
Shabaab tend instead to target PC&P using Firearms, while the Taliban use Firearms
to attack Police.
4.3 Stochastic Transition Matrices
Markov chains are stochastic classes of models named after their inventor, the Russian
mathematician Andrey Markov.2 Markov chains are designed for handling sequence
2For a comprehensive review of Markov chains see Norris (1998) and Revuz (2008).
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data, where sequences can map objects or entities as events, locations, characteris-
tics, abstract states: they are thus extremely fit for the problems of unfolding jihadist
dynamics via the analysis of sequences of terrorist attacks. These models have gained
extreme popularity during the Twentieth century, due to their applicability to a va-
riety of scientific and industrial domains. Within the realm of social sciences, for
instance, they have been employed in economics (Judge and Swanson, 1962; Bicken-
bach and Bode, 2003; Le Gallo, 2004), finance (Kijima, 2016), sociology (Sorensen,
1978; Heckathorn, 2002), political science (Martin and Quinn, 2002; Jackman, 2004)
and, also, criminology (Holland and McGarvey, 1984; Stander et al., 1989; Pettiway
et al., 1994).
To introduce the concepts that will be used for modeling terrorist activity and
behavior throughout this part of the chapter, a brief introduction to stochastic tran-
sition matrices and Markov chains is required. The following subsection will specifi-
cally deal with this task. Following, the results of the analysis will be showcased and
commented.
4.3.1 Mathematical Framework
4.3.1.1 A Very Short Introduction to Markov Chains
In this first introduction, I will use the notation used for weapons in the previous
section: the reader shall keep in mind that the same equations and formulas have
to be applied for targets and targets and weapons combined. Given a sequence of
attacks:
A0, A1, ..., Ak (4.4)
and a state space S(W) of potential values that the various Ak can take, then the
sequence is a Markov chain iff the Markov property holds.3 The Markov property is
indeed formulated in mathematical notation as follows:
P(At+1 = w|At = wt, At−1 = wt−1, ..., A0 = w0) =
P (At+1 = w|At = wt)
(4.5)
Equation 4.5 means that in a Markov process the distribution of At+1 only depends on
At only, and does not take into account previous time units. This is often referred as
3In this chapter I will refer to Markov chains limited to the discrete-time case. The data at my
disposal are, in fact, discrete and therefore I will not cover the mathematics behind continuous-time
Markov chains.
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the “memorylessness” nature of Markov processes. The property has to be valid for
all t=1,2,3 and for all states w0, w1, ..., wt. To compactly map the list of all possible
states in the state space S(W), a transition matrix P(W) = pi,j is created. P(W) is
a square matrix of dimension |S(W)|×|S(W)| and each row should sum to 1:
|S(W)|∑
j=1
pij =
|S(W)|∑
j=1
P(At+1 = j|At = i) =
|S(W)|∑
j=1
P{At=i}(At+1 = j) = 1
(4.6)
To exemplify, a hypothetical transition matrix P(W)ij where the state space |S(W)|=
{w1, w2, w3, w4, w5} = 5 is given. Visually, the matrix takes the form:
P(W)ij =

. p q . .
p q . . .
p r . . s
. . p s r
. . . p q
 (4.7)
where . denotes zero-entries for simplicity, p is the probability associated to the
entry ij, q is a probability equal to (1− p), r is a probability equal to (1− p− s) and,
trivially, s is a probability equal to (1−p−r). The case above only regards single-step
transitions between i and j, however, Markov chains allow also to formalize t-step
transitions. If, for instance, there is a need to quantitatively describe the probability
of going from state i to state j in two steps, using Partition Theorem of matrices, the
2-step transition matrix P2(W)ij is obtained via:
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P(A2 = j|A0 = i) = P(A2 = j) =
|S(W)|∑
k=1
Pi(A2 = j|A1 = k)P(A1 = k) =
|S(W)|∑
k=1
Pi(A2 = j|A1 = k,A0 = i)P(A1 = k|A0 = i) =
|S(W)|∑
k=1
Pi(A2 = j|A1 = k)P(A1 = k|A0 = i) =
|S(W)|∑
k=1
pkjpik =
|S(W)|∑
k=1
pikpkj = P
2(W)ij
(4.8)
Following this procedure, the general case to obtain a t-th step Markov chain and
create the related Pt(W)ij transition matrix is:
P(At = j|A0 = i) = P(An+t = j|An = i) = Pt(W)ij ∀(t) (4.9)
A sample transition network of weapons derived from a toy stochastic transition
matrix is depicted in Figure 4.3. It is worth to note how for any state, the sum of the
probability of the out-links is equal to 1. This brief primer on the basics of Markov
chains served to introduce further machinery behind the analyses.
0.59
0.45
0.95
0.35
0.06
0.77
Explosives
Firearms
Incendiary
Chemical
0.23
0.05
0.55
Figure 4.3: Sample Transition Network with Transition Probabilities - Weapons
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4.3.1.2 Super-States of N-Dimension
So far, only Markov chains mapping the t-step transitions between single states have
been addressed. However, for the purposes of the analysis of terrorism dynamics, it
is relevant to understand whether, within the data, typical cycles are present and, if
so, what is the knowledge associated with them. Going back to the case of the state
space seen in Equation 4.7, I now propose the matrix A(W)ij in which the entries
are not anymore probabilities but, instead, absolute values mapping the number of
times that there has been a transition from a state i to a state j:
A(W)ij =

. w1,2 w1,3 . .
w2,1 w2,2 . . .
w3,1 w3,2 . . w3,5
. . w4,3 w4,4 w4,5
. . . w5,4 w5,5
 (4.10)
where, again, . denotes zeros. At this point, to detect recurring patterns occurring
in attack sequences is it useful to create a new augmented state space S(W)2 of
dimension 2. Given that wij 6= 0, then I define a 2-dimension super-state as:
Θi→j =: (wi → wj) (4.11)
in which wi is called the “1d-sender” 1ds and wj is called the “1d-receiver” 1dr.
The new super state now incorporates the single-step transition between the previous
original state wi to wj. This gives birth to a new squared adjacency matrix A2(W)ij
of order two where the state space is equal to:
|S(W)2|=
∑
wij ∀ wij 6= 0 (4.12)
After the creation of the adjacency matrix, the related stochastic transition matrix
P2(W)ij is obtained simply by row-normalization so that the sum of the entries of each
row-vector is equal to 1. To help the reader who might not be comfortable with the
mathematics shown above, it is useful to think about the following example. Given an
existing link in the adjacency matrix A(W)ij between “Firearms” and “Explosives”,
in the augmented matrix A2(W)ij, thus there will exist a new state:
ΘFirearms→Explosives (4.13)
In the present example, “Firearms” is the sender and “Explosives” is the receiver. I
have thus now obtained a new information space with super-states of dimension 2: to
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further investigate cycles, I have iterated the operation above up to super-states of
dimension 5. The procedure is not exactly identical as we increase the dimensionality,
and needs a bit of additional explanation. Imagine a hypothetical adjacency matrix
of order 2 A2(W)ij:
A2(W)ij =
Θi→j Θi→k Θj→l Θj→j Θl→i

Θi→j . . w(Θi→j,Θj→l) w(Θi→j,Θj→j) .
Θi→k . . . . .
Θj→l . . . . w(Θj→l,Θl→i)
Θj→j . . w(Θj→j,Θj→l) w(Θj→j,Θj→j) .
Θl→i w(Θl→i,Θi→j) . . . .
(4.14)
Then, it is worth to specify that the new matrix is populated based on some con-
ditions. So, for any given pair of super-nodes Θi→ j and Θj → k, mapping the
super-states of dimension two:
w(Θi→j,Θj→k) 6= 0↔ 1dr(Θi→j) = 1ds(Θj → k)
∧ ∃ w [1ds(Θi→ j)→ [1dr(Θi→ j) = 1ds(Θj → k)] → 1dr(Θj → k)]
(4.15)
The equation means that a transition edge w between Θi→ j and Θj → k will exist
iff (1) the 1d receiver of Θi→ j is equal to the 1d sender of Θj → k and (2) there
is at least one 3-d chain that connects the 1d sender of Θi→ j, the two equal states
1drΘi→ j and 1dsΘj → k that are collapsed in a single entity, and the 1d receiver
of Θj → k. This process leads to the creation of a new adjacency matrix containing
super-states of dimension 3, A3(W)ij, from which it is easily derivable a stochastic
matrix P3(W)ij. The state space of the new matrix is given by:
|S(W)3|=
∑
w(Θi→j,Θj→k) ∀w 6= 0 (4.16)
This procedure allows us to create 3-dimensional superstates in the form Θi→j→k
where information regarding the sequence across states i, j, k is incorporated. In this
superstate, i is the 1d sender, and j and k are the 2d receivers (2dr). At the same
time, we can consider another 3-dimensional superstate Θj→k→m. If we hypothesize
the existence of a link between the two, intending to further obtain a 4-dimensional
superstate, we have to check again for the basic condition expressed in Equation
4.15. In the second sequence, j and k are called the 2d senders (2ds), and m is the
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1d receiver. This considered, as the first fundamental condition the transition may
exist if:
2dr(Θi→ j → k) = 2ds(Θj → k → m) (4.17)
Furthermore, if this is verified, there must exist at least one transition such that:
w [1ds(Θi→ j → k)→
[2dr(Θi→ j → k) = 2ds(Θj → k → m)]→
1dr(Θj → k → m)
(4.18)
This condition, if verified, lead to the creation of a new 4-dimensional superstate that,
relying on the example, takes the form:
Θi→j→k→m (4.19)
This new super-state, in a real-world case, could be seen as a chain of four weapons
taken from our original S(W), such that it would potentially look like the following:
ΘFirearms→Explosives→Chemical→Incendiary (4.20)
To obtain further augmented super-states, it is sufficient to slightly modify the con-
dition that I have described to create the matrix of order 2, in order to generalize
it to other multidimensional cases. I define Θ
′
N−1 and Θ
′′
N−1 as two arbitrary super
states of dimension |N −1|. Imagining a N -dimension matrix where N is the number
of states that we want to include in the creation of the super-state ΘN , which is to
say that N is the length of the sequence of states that we consider, then the entries
of the matrix AN(W)ij can be different from 0 if:
|N − 1|ds(Θ′N−1) = |N − 1|ds(Θ
′
N−1) (4.21)
and, additionally, there exist at least one transition such that:
1ds(Θ
′
N−1)→
[
|N − 1|ds(Θ′N−1) = |N − 1|ds(Θ
′
N−1)
]
→ 1dr(Θ′′N−1) (4.22)
A visual depiction of the process that lead to the creation of a 4d-super state starting
from two separate 2d super-states is provided in Figure 4.4.
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1d Sender 1d Receiver 1d Sender 1d Receiver
1d Sender
i j j k
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2d Sender
1d Receiver
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2d Sender
1d Sender
i j k m
3d Sender
Figure 4.4: Visual Depiction of the Creation of 4-dimensional Super-states
4.3.2 Super-States and the Heterogeneity of Jihadist Behav-
ior
After the introduction of the mathematical concepts that led to the derivation of the
super-states stochastic transition matrices for each group with regards to weapons,
targets and targets and weapons combined, it is necessary to analyze and interpret
what these new sets of information tells us about how jihadist behave. As anticipated
throughout the previous subsection, the intent is to capture inherent recurring trends,
e.g. cycles, that can better picture the behavior of the groups in the sample. Hoffman
(1993) showed that, besides differences in the lethality of attacks between the 1970s
and 1980s, the majority of terrorist organizations remain stable in their operational
choices, drawing from the same consistent repertoire of weapons and tactics. Merari
(1999), comparing terrorist violence with conventional conflicts and wars, noted that
that terrorism has not changed in the course of a century in terms of weaponry and
modes of operation. This view is shared also by Dolnik (2007).
While many scholars agree on the recurrent and persistent regularity of terror-
ist behavior, Gill et al. (2013) addressed the problem focusing on the concepts of
“creativity” and “innovation”, drawing upon the existing literature on industrial psy-
chology. They have qualitatively focused on specific case studies, demonstrating how
the conversion of a new creative idea into an innovation is a process that requires
time. Authors have proposed a new framework that, according to the authors, could
better indicate to policymakers the specific innovation-drivers sub-units of a terrorist
organization.
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Data can be treacherous when trying to analyze the extent to which terrorist
groups show homo or heterogeneity of operational behavior in their attack patterns.
Aggregate descriptive statistics may reveal very strong preferences towards certain
types of weapons or targets, while obscuring other more complex patterns that can
provide much more useful insights, also from a policy point of view. With this regard,
complex networks can be of help. Imagine, for instance, the case of two attacks, A1
and A2, where the employed weapons are (Explosives, Explosives, Explosives) in one
the former, and (Explosives) in the latter case. A first superficial intuition may lead
to consider the two operational characteristics as identical and aggregate statistics
would suggest that Explosives account for the 100% of the weapons used in the
attacks. However, while in both attacks the type of weapons is the same, the first
one shows a much higher logistic capacity, and may be seen as “more complex”.
Looking for heterogeneity solely in relation to drastic changes in terms of opera-
tional choices (e.g., shift from Explosives to Chemical weapons) is a fallacy that does
not take into consideration other underlying logistic mechanisms. These mechanisms
might be the expression of the power, strength or more general goals of a group.
Furthermore, terrorists might not really need to change their operational choices if
certain stylized types of actions are part of long-range strategies or demonstrate to be
effective for the organization. The same type of reasoning can be applied to targets,
although in the literature there is a more pronounced consensus towards the idea of
higher variability of target types over time (Brandt and Sandler, 2010; Santifort et al.,
2013).
In light of this debate, what can be drawn from the construction of super-states
of weapons, targets, and both combined? What are the insights on the complexity of
jihadist behavior, when approaching the question from a complex network perspective,
taking into account the sequential nature of attacks?
Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 help in picturing the evolution of the transition networks
across the different N -dimensions of super-states.4 The reader shall keep in mind the
figures previously showed in Table 3.2: the number of employed weapons for each
group oscillates from 7 to 9, while the number of targets falls in the range 21-24.
What is presented below is the product of looking at the combinations of these small
sets of features over-time.
Figure 4.5 first displays the trend in the number of states of the state space of
weapons when increasing the dimension of the super-states. The trend is positive for
all the groups, with some differences. While all groups start with a similar number of
4A Super-state of Dimension 1 is simply a single state related to a single event.
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Figure 4.5: N of States in the State Space of Weapons per Group across N-Dimension Stochastic
Matrices
states in the 1d-case (ranging from 23 to 34), the differences become more prominent
as the dimension is increased. Taliban appears to be the group that, in its history, has
experimented overall a higher number of higher-dimensional super-states of weapons.
The differences emerge quite clearly from the 4d and 5d scenarios. Conversely, Al
Qaeda shows the lowest attitude towards heterogeneity in weaponry. The picture in
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Figure 4.6: N of States in the State Space of Targets per Group across N-Dimension Stochastic
Matrices
Figure 4.6 slightly changes only when focusing on individual trends, with Boko Haram,
for instance, being the least prone to expand his repertoire of cycle-combinations.
Nonetheless, overall, the trend is still positive for all groups, with various levels of
steepness in the passage from 4d to 5d super-states, and with the Taliban again
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showing by far the widest state space.
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Figure 4.7: N of States in the State Space of Targets and Weapons per Group across N-Dimension
Stochastic Matrices
Finally, the most comprehensive scenario, namely the combined case of targets and
weapons, is visually depicted in Figure 4.7. The patterns revealed by the previous
Figures here assume more defined shapes. Each group again shows a positive trend,
while the curves tend to flatten for three groups (Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al Shabaab)
after the 3d dimension. The increase is less evident from the fourth to the fifth step
also for the Islamic State and the Taliban. However, the absolute differences between
the two and the rest of the sample are evident, with the Taliban dominating in terms
of heterogeneity of combinations. It is worth to note that the flattening pattern means
that, increasing the dimension of the super-states, the matrices will start to become
less populated and the conditions for the creation of super-states listed in Equations
4.21 and 4.22 become more and more challenging to be respected. In other words,
this means that the matrix will slowly become smaller and smaller: indeed, when
|D|= |A|, the matrix becomes of trivial dimension 1 × 1.
For what concerns the heterogeneity of terrorist behavior with regard to opera-
tional choices, it is worth to note that the numbers of the existing super-states are in
the order of thousands. Starting from the very few options of weapons and targets
seen in the descriptive statistics of Table 3.2, the jihadist groups demonstrate a com-
plex operational repertoire. How they select combinations of targets and weapons
over time gives much more information on their actual nature, compared mere ag-
gregate statistical distributions. While innovation may pertain to other aspects of
the operational context (Crenshaw, 2010), heterogeneity is certainly a component
of terrorism complexity that captures the not directly observable inherent nature of
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jihadism.
Another indication can be drawn from the previous plots: the higher the number
of attacks, the higher the heterogeneity in operational choices. The reader shall keep
this in mind as the difference between the absolute and the relative standpoint for
comparing sequences will be better entailed in subchapter 4.4.
However, considering only the dimension of the matrix is limiting. In fact, as the
dimension of the super-states changes, the topology of the resulting network evolves
too. Figures 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 illustrates this process in terms of density. Increasing the
dimension of the super-states leads to a dramatic decrease in network density.
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Figure 4.8: Network Density Evolution of the Stochastic Transition Matrix of Weapons Across
Groups
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Figure 4.9: Network Density Evolution of the Stochastic Transition Matrix of Targets Across Groups
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Figure 4.10: Network Density Evolution of the Stochastic Transition Matrix of Targets and Weapons
Across Groups
The differences that were displayed and commented in Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 are
attenuated when comparing the density trends. Network density is a global metric
that captures the extent to which the nodes (in this case, the super-states) in a
graph are connected. The value lies in the range 0-1, with 0 indicating a completely
disconnected network and 1 a completely connected one.
Overall, the clearest pattern regards the change between 1d and 2d super-states.
The density of the network decreases steeply and remains almost constant from the
2d to the 5d case, converging to values very close to zero for all the groups in the
sample and in relation to all the three different dimensions: weapons, targets, and
targets and weapons combined. What does this mean in practical terms? For better
understanding terrorism, this finding has to be coupled with the increasing trend
in matrix dimension when super-states are augmented. The number of super-states
becomes considerably high when the dimension is increased, but the density of the
network almost collapses right after the creation of the 2d super-states. This means
that the network becomes extremely sparse and for a given cycle it will become easier
to predict the next, as the number of transitions per super-state will be lower.
Figures 4.11 and 4.15 shows the 1d and 5d Boko Haram super-state transition
networks from a hierarchical layout standpoint for targets.5 The top node is the most
central node of the network (in binary terms, i.e., the node with the highest number
of transitions)6: it should be noted how the single-step transitions are fewer for the
5Figures A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4 and A.5 in Appendix A provide a further visual example of evolution
from 1- to 5-d super-states with a circular layout.
6For the 1d case the top node is “Firearms”, for the 5d case the top node is the super-state
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5d case, meaning that starting from the top node, a very low number of other super-
states are directly accessible, while the number is much higher in the 1d case. This
means that increasing the dimension of the super-states provides a more complex
framework in terms of the absolute number of super-states, but in the meanwhile
creates a less blurry picture.
What emerges from this analysis can enrich the debate on the stability of ter-
rorist behaviors. Notwithstanding the claims regarding the tendency of terrorists
to repeat the behaviors without changing their operational characteristics over time
and attacks, the framework of Markov chains and super-states provides insight on
inherent patterns that aggregate statistics are not able to capture. The original data
on the number of weapons employed and attacked targets described low heterogene-
ity. Nonetheless, processing the data in order to take into account combinations
of weapons and targets and, consequently, super-states, highlighted a very different
scenario. For research and policy purposes, it should be relevant to investigate how
regularities occur over time and how regularities emerge, are formed and interact with
more anomalous behaviors. In light of this, Markov chains and super-states can be
useful in detecting rich dynamics and predict potential scenarios.
Figure 4.11: Boko Haram - Transition Network Hierarchical Layout of Targets (1-dimensional Super-
States Case)
“Firearms → Firearms → Firearms → Firearms → Firearms”.
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Figure 4.12: Boko Haram - Transition Network Hierarchical Layout of Targets (2-dimensional Super-
States Case)
Figure 4.13: Boko Haram - Transition Network Hierarchical Layout of Targets (3-dimensional Super-
States Case)
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Figure 4.14: Boko Haram - Transition Network Hierarchical Layout of Targets (4-dimensional Super-
States Case)
Figure 4.15: Boko Haram - Transition Network Hierarchical Layout of Targets (5-dimensional Super-
States Case)
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In general, while the groups in the sample tend to rely consistently on the same
weapons and to constantly attack the same type of targets, their attacks demon-
strate to be particularly heterogeneous and complex when combinations and sub-
sequences are considered. Patterns exist, but they are many and, generally, relying
on 1-dimensional sources of information dramatically increases the state space and
decreases the possibility to understand what will come next. The challenge, for re-
search and intelligence purposes, would be to understand the right pay-off in terms of
super-states dimensionality. The 1d case is, as mentioned above, too fragmented to
reliably work as it involves too many transition possibilities, while 5 (or even higher)-
dimensional cases risks transforming the heterogeneity of terrorism in a trivial set
of sub-sequences that are only self-connected through self-loops. Future work will
better consider this trade-off. Furthermore, it will be interesting to replicate the
analysis using more detailed sub-categories of weapons and targets, similarly to what
Jackson and Frelinger (2008) have done, as the choice would highly likely increase
the complexity of the three scenarios. While keeping this in mind, I will next intro-
duce another alternative method to capture behavioral patterns in state transitions
in terms of pairwise similarity between groups.
4.4 Normalized Transition Similarity
4.4.1 Rationale and Formalization
From the ordinary frame of Markov chains and transition networks, we can derive the
concept of “network trail”. Network trails are two-mode directed networks in which
the behavior of source nodes is temporally ordered with respect to target nodes. Ques-
tions such as “How many times these two entities have moved in the same direction?”,
“How many times these two entities were in the same place together?”, “Is there a
mimicry dynamic between the two entities?” can be answered using trails. Trails
have been used in health care, biology and scientific co-authorship networks domains
(Vittori et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2010; Merrill et al., 2015) (Figure 4.16).
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Τ1ρ Τ2ρ Τ3ρ Τ4ρ
Figure 4.16: Two Sample Trails of Different Length
If we consider the formal definition of an event provided in Equation 4.1, the three
types of network trails ψ I will consider in the analysis are the following:
• ψgi (d, w): a time-ordered trail of weapons for group gi
• ψgi (d, t): a time-ordered trail of targets for group gi
• ψgi (d, t, w): a time-ordered trail of targets and weapons for group gi
Having set up the information framework of the work, we have developed the
Normalized Transition Similarity (NTS) coefficient. To recall, a transition is a single-
step change of state in the ordered sequence of attacks. For example, in the case of
time-ordered sequence of targets ψgi (d, t), it is a single-step change in targets group
gi selected in two sequential attacks. To start to familiarize with the concept of
transition similarity, we introduce a simple statistic that only takes into account the
absolute frequency of shared transitions between two entities g1 and g2 (i.e., groups,
in this specific experiment). This figure, for instance, is included in the dynamic
network analysis software ORA (Carley, 2014), and it is calculated as:
Trcommon =
∑
i,j
min [Φg1 (si → sj) ,Φg2 (si → sj)] (4.23)
where si and sj are two distinct generic states and Φgk denotes the number of
transitions between states si and sj in the trail of group gk. The Equation 4.23 gives us
the number of common transitions between two trails expressed as the minimum sum
of all single link paths (between hypothetical si and sj) shared by two groups. This
type of descriptive statistic can be used to evaluate the absolute frequency of shared
transitions. However, it can be highly biased when analyzing trails of significantly
different dimensions, as in this case (Table 4.3).
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Group Trail Length
Taliban 5,628
Islamic State 3,561
Al Qaeda 1,501
Al Shabaab 1,694
Boko Haram 1,900
Table 4.3: Trail Length per Jihadist Group
For instance, when calculating transitions for five groups it is expected that the
groups with very long trails will share more common transitions in absolute terms.
However, this does not mean that the highly active pair of groups share more than the
other. For this specific reason, I propose a new coefficient of transition which normal-
izes the absolute frequencies and allows us to make pairwise comparisons to evaluate
the extent to which each group is similar to another in terms of trails dynamics. This
coefficient is named Normalized Transition Similarity and it is calculated as:
NTS (g1, g2) =
∑
i,j min [Φg1 (si → sj) ,Φg2 (si → sj)]
max (|Ag1|, |Ag2|)− 1
(4.24)
NTS normalizes the number of times that each entity pair travels the same single link
by the number of links of the longest trail in each pair (which is equal to the total
number of states minus 1). Potential outcomes are synthesized in Equation 4.25.
NTS (gm, gn) :
0 if
∑
i,j min [Φg1 (si → sj) ,Φg2 (si → sj)] = 0
1 if
∑
i,j min [Φg1 (si → sj) ,Φg2 (si → sj)] = max (|Ag1|, |Ag2|)− 1
x otherwise
(4.25)
where x can be a continuous value in the range 0 < x < 1. Once this coefficient
is calculated, to actually rescale values to take into account the relative differences
between outcomes of the considered pairs, a further normalization can be performed.
So, for groups g1 and g2 the final value would be calculated as:
NTS (g1, g2)scaled =
NTS (g1, g2)
maxm,n∈GNTS (gm, gn)
(4.26)
with G representing the set of groups in analysis (five in our case). To further explain
how NTS works Figure 4.17 provides a visual representation of Equations 4.24 and
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4.26.
It is worth mentioning that NTS, while allowing for intra-sample pairwise comparison,
cannot be used to compare pairs belonging to different samples. In the case of two
sets A and B in which an entity (e.g. a terrorist group) g ∈ A∧B, NTS(g, xA) cannot
be compared with NTS(g, xB), where xA and xB are two given entities belonging to
sets A and B.
max
Figure 4.17: Depiction of NTS Across Three Short Sequences
4.4.2 Results
This section will showcase and explain the findings of the analysis in the following
subsections: one for each trail type, with a conclusive subsection for summing up the
main results.
4.4.2.1 Trails of Weapons ψgi (d, w)
This first family of trails seeks to understand and investigate potential patterns in how
groups change their weapons for plotting terrorist attacks. Weapons can be extremely
different, and each type of weapon can denote a distinct and meaningful aspect of
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the consequences of an event and the power, strength, and resources of a group.
Data shows that the number of unique weapon combinations is similar for all groups
(ranging from a minimum of 23 to a maximum of 34 combinations). When focusing
on unique transitions, the picture slightly changes. In fact, Boko Haram shows nearly
double unique transitions compared to Al Shabaab (188 vs 99), demonstrating how the
former group seems less predictable and stable in its operational choices. Finally, the
third column further highlights evident differences between groups: the top identical
subsequence of weapons for the Islamic State is significantly longer than the longest
subsequences associated with all the other groups (Table 4.4).
N Unique
Weapons
Combinations
N Unique
Transitions
Longest Id.
Subsequence
Taliban 34 180 21
Islamic State 33 157 110
Boko Haram 29 188 15
Al Shabaab 23 99 12
Al Qaeda 25 100 30
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of Transition Networks of Weapons Per Terrorist Group.
Table 4.5 presents the detailed outcomes of the NTS. Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab
appear to be the most similar groups according to NTS, while their absolute number
of shared transitions was not particularly relevant when looking at the mere sum.
Al Shabaab and Boko Haram are the second-most similar pair, while in transition
count they were the third less similar pair. Interestingly, Al Shabaab demonstrates
a high degree of trail similarity with two different groups. In general, the differences
between rankings highlight how NTS calculation sensibly changes the initial results.
In terms of ranking (which is a measure that should be handled carefully because
we do not control for relative quantitative differences), only one pair remained in
the same position. Another finding is that, although they have the longest trails,
therefore increasing the relative probability of sharing transitions, the Taliban and
the Islamic State are only the fourth most similar pair (0.68).
4.4.2.2 Trails of Targets ψgi (d, t)
The second considered trail network regards selected targets. The Taliban, also due
to their longer history and sequence of events, shows the highest number of unique
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Pair
Shared
Trans
(Count)
Count
Rank
NTS
scaled
NTS
NTS
Rank
Rank
Diff
Al Qaeda & Al Shabaab 1,150 6 0.68 1.00 1 5
Al Shabaab & Boko Haram 1,022 8 0.54 0.79 2 6
Al Qaeda & Boko Haram 891 9 0.47 0.69 3 6
Taliban & IS 2,585 1 0.46 0.68 4 -3
Al Shabaab & IS 1,398 3 0.38 0.56 5 -2
Taliban & Al Shabaab 1,736 2 0.31 0.45 6 -4
Al Qaeda & IS 1,058 7 0.29 0.43 7 0
Taliban & Boko Haram 1,383 4 0.25 0.36 8 -4
Boko Haram & IS 836 10 0.23 0.34 9 1
Taliban & Al Qaeda 1,212 5 0.22 0.32 10 -5
Table 4.5: NTS Results for Weapon Trails
targets and transitions. Specifically, in terms of the unique transition case, their total
is more than three times the Al Qaeda’s one, which across all groups seems to be
more homogeneous, with the shortest event history overall (Table 4.6).
N Unique
Target
Combinations
N Unique
Transitions
Longest Id.
Subsequence
Taliban 118 988 26
Islamic State 91 752 99
Boko Haram 65 427 29
Al Shabaab 89 638 11
Al Qaeda 92 301 10
Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics of Transition Networks of Targets Per Terrorist Group.
Also in the target scenario, Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab prove to be the most
similar groups (Table 4.7). Stability holds also for the less similar pair, namely
the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Conversely, while Boko Haram and the Islamic State
differed significantly in the previous analyses on weapons, here they are ranked high
(fourth position). This denotes how, actually, a certain degree of similarity in a
specific behavioral dimension does not imply automatically that groups are similar
overall. This might suggest how, although employing and applying different methods
and resources, both groups seem to have similar strategies with respect to targets.
Similarly, while the Taliban and Al Shabaab were not particularly close in terms of
single link transitions of weapons, they show high similarity in the choice of new
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targets.
Pair
Shared
Trans
(Count)
Count
Rank
NTS
scaled
NTS
NTS
Rank
Rank
Diff
Al Qaeda & Al Shabaab 1,011 8 0.60 1.00 1 7
Al Shabaab & Boko Haram 999 9 0.53 0.88 2 7
Taliban & IS 2,518 1 0.45 0.75 3 -2
Boko Haram & IS 1,555 4 0.43 0.71 4 0
Al Qaeda & Boko Haram 763 10 0.40 0.67 5 5
Al Shabaab & IS 1,360 6 0.37 0.62 6 0
Taliban & Al Shabaab 1,784 2 0.32 0.53 7 -5
Al Qaeda & IS 1,070 7 0.29 0.49 8 -1
Taliban & Boko Haram 1,601 3 0.28 0.48 9 -6
Taliban & Al Qaeda 1,363 5 0.24 0.41 10 -5
Table 4.7: NTS Results for Target Trails
4.4.2.3 Trails of Targets and Weapons ψgi (d, t, w)
The final type of trail analysis integrates both the previously considered dimensions
of terror events: weapons and targets. It relies on a much vaster quantity of possible
combinations and its nature makes it potentially more informative than the previ-
ous two. In terms of basic information, while all sequences of identical combinations
diminished in length in this case, the Islamic State is the only one that actually
shows a very long sequence (identical to the target one). Overall, conversely, groups
demonstrated their tendency to change combinations very frequently. Al Shabaab,
for instance, has the longest sequence of only four consecutive identical combinations.
The Taliban (followed by the Islamic State) is again the group with the largest be-
havioral repertoire, both in terms of unique targets and weapons states and unique
transitions (Table 4.8).
In the combined setting, the Taliban and the Islamic State are found to be the
most similar groups (Table 4.9). Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab, which were ranked first
in the previous cases, are now ranked second (yet performing a result almost identical
to the highest one). Al Shabaab appears to be very similar also to Boko Haram (third
highest NTS value), while the Nigerian group seems to be significantly dissimilar not
only to the Taliban but also to the Islamic State. It is interesting to note that the
two pairs that yielded the second and third highest results in the NTS computation
had a very low shared transition count. In terms of extreme dissimilarity, the Taliban
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N Unique
Trgt and Wpn
Combinations
N Unique
Transitions
Longest Id.
Subsequence
Taliban 363 2,102 20
Islamic State 280 1,376 99
Boko Haram 220 1,034 14
Al Shabaab 218 1,048 4
Al Qaeda 214 896 10
Table 4.8: Descriptive Statistics of Transition Networks of Weapons and Targets Per Terrorist Group.
and Al Qaeda are detected as the most dissimilar pair also when weapons and targets
are considered together.
Pair
Shared
Trans
(Count)
Count
Rank
NTS
scaled
NTS
NTS
Rank
Rank
Diff
Taliban & IS 2,037 1 0.36 1.00 1 0
Al Qaeda & Al Shabaab 604 9 0.36 0.99 2 7
Al Shabaab & Boko Haram 624 8 0.33 0.91 3 5
Taliban & Al Shabaab 1,385 2 0.25 0.68 4 -2
Al Shabaab & IS 813 5 0.22 0.62 5 0
Al Qaeda & Boko Haram 405 10 0.21 0.59 6 4
Taliban & Boko Haram 1,066 3 0.19 0.52 7 -4
Boko Haram & IS 688 6 0.19 0.52 8 -2
Al Qaeda & IS 672 7 0.18 0.51 9 -2
Taliban & Al Qaeda 999 4 0.18 0.49 10 -6
Table 4.9: NTS Results for Target—Weapons Trails
4.4.2.4 Summary of Results
NTS was developed to correct potential biases in the simple absolute count of common
transitions between two groups, controlling for the maximum probability of having
a perfect identical pattern given two state sequences. Figures ??, 4.19 and 4.19
display - for each trail - the scatter plots of the simple count of shared transitions and
the unscaled NTS. Correlation values indicate how simple count is biased and NTS
provides different outcomes. In the target+weapon scenario, only the pair with the
highest count is also the pair with the highest NTS.
The comparative analysis indicates that the results across trails are generally
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Figure 4.18: Scatter Plot: Simple Transition Count vs NTS (unscaled) for Weapon Trails (Pearson’s
correlation=0.056. Coefficient Statistically Significant at 99% Level.)
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Figure 4.19: Scatter Plot: Simple Transition Count vs NTS (unscaled) for Target Trails (Pearson’s
correlation=-0.154. Coefficient Statistically Significant at 99% Level.)
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Figure 4.20: Scatter Plot: Simple Transition Count vs NTS (unscaled) for Target - Weapon Trails
(Pearson’s correlation=0.327. Coefficient Statistically Significant at 99% Level.)
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stable. Indeed, three pairs out of ten perform standard deviation values of ranking
lower than one position, as shown by Table 4.10 and Figure 4.21. Particularly, Al
Qaeda and Al Shabaab are found to be the most similar groups overall, with a mean
rank of 1.33: it is interesting to detect this stable similarity, considered that Al
Shabaab officially became part of the Al Qaeda global network in 2012. Al Shabaab
and Boko Haram are the second most similar pair. Regarding most dissimilar groups,
a certain degree of stability is also shown, especially in the case of the Taliban and Al
Qaeda: the pair is always ranked tenth. Little variance is exhibited by the Taliban
and Boko Haram and Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. The latter pair deals with
two groups that have been referenced by many as the old and the new paradigm
of Islamic terrorism in the world. They do not show any particular evidence of
similarity. This may propose that, besides other evident differences that span from
the structural organization to the geographic scope of the operations, they also follow
distinct behavioral trajectories.
Weapon Target
Target+
Weapon
Mean
R
St.
Dev.
Pair
scaled
NTS
NTS
Rank
scaled
NTS
NTS
Rank
scaled
NTS
NTS
Rank
Al Qaeda & Al Shabaab 1.00 1 1.00 1 0.99 2 1.33 0.58
Al Shabaab & Boko Haram 0.79 2 0.88 2 0.91 3 2.33 0.58
Al Qaeda & Boko Haram 0.69 3 0.67 5 0.59 6 4.67 1.53
Taliban & IS 0.68 4 0.75 3 1.00 1 2.67 1.53
Al Shabaab & IS 0.56 5 0.62 6 0.62 5 5.33 0.58
Taliban & Al Shabaab 0.45 6 0.53 7 0.68 4 5.67 1.53
Al Qaeda & IS 0.43 7 0.49 8 0.51 9 8.00 1.00
Taliban & Boko Haram 0.36 8 0.48 9 0.52 7 8.00 1.00
Boko Haram & IS 0.34 9 0.71 4 0.52 8 7.00 2.65
Taliban & Al Qaeda 0.32 10 0.41 10 0.49 10 10.00 0.00
St. Dev. 0.22 0.19 0.20
Table 4.10: Summary of NTS Results (R indicates Ranking Position)
Another relevant case regards Boko Haram and the Islamic State: the Nigerian
organization is affiliated to the group led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, but their simi-
larity scores are particularly low. In fact, in the case of weapons and weapons and
targets combined these groups rank among the last positions. However, in the target-
only case, these differences vanish. This case is further proof of the fact that similar
strategies of target selection can be coupled with distinct dynamic choices in terms
of weapons.
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Figure 4.21: 3D Scatterplot of Scaled NTS for Group Pairs (size is scaled by the inverse of the mean
R - Bigger points mean better mean ranking across trails)
Finally, to ensure that the coefficient is not biased by the skewness of the original
length of the time series and the consequent temporal distribution of events, I have
conducted a sensitivity analysis. This sensitivity analysis has been conducted creating
two shorter time series: one taking into account events that happened from January
2007 to December 2016, and the other one considering only events that happened from
January 2012 on. Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients have been calculated
to evaluate the extent to which limiting the time span would affect both the NTS
coefficients and the related rankings. Table 4.11 shows that the results remain stable
for all trails in both scenarios, thus suggesting that the initial choice to include all
the events present in the dataset has not conducted to misleading outcomes.
Trail
2007 censoring
N=13,794
2012 censoring
N=11,743
Pearson’r
R
Spearman’s
Rho
Pearson’r
R
Spearman’s
Rho
Weapon 0.98* 0.98* 0.81* 0.86*
Target 0.89* 0.85* 0.84* 0.85*
Target+Weapon 0.99* 0.99* 0.92* 0.92*
Table 4.11: Sensitivity Test - NTS Values and Rankings Comparison Across 2007- and 2012- Cen-
sored Sequences. (*) Indicates that the Coefficient is Significant at 99.9% Level.
76
4 STOCHASTIC MATRICES OF TERRORISM
4.5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this study, I have proposed a two-fold structure for the quantitative study of ter-
rorist attack sequences. First, relying on the well-established framework of Markov
chains, I have introduced the concept of “super-states” for analyzing patterns in the
sequence of jihadist attacks, focusing on three scenarios: sequences of weapons, se-
quences of targets and sequences of targets and weapons combined. The aim was
to contribute to the debate regarding the nature and complexity of terrorist oper-
ational choices. The literature is divided into two main areas: most scholars agree
upon the view of terrorists as “repetitive”, stable and consistent in their operational
processes, while others highlight their originality and diversity caused by technology
advancements and shifts in objectives over time.
Starting from simple 1-dimensional states, I have created stochastic transition
matrices up to the 5-dimensional case, to assess the general behavior of the networks
and the complexity of combinations present in the data. The results indicate that,
while drawing from relatively small sets of weapons and targets, the five groups show
a highly complex repertoire of combinations in all the three considered scenarios.
Nonetheless, as complexity in absolute terms (i.e., the number of existing super-
states) increases, the number of accessible nodes per each super-state decreases, thus
potentially reducing the challenges of predicting future behaviors. Hence, sequential
heterogeneity can be studied to gain data-driven knowledge on how terrorists behave,
going beyond the binary representation of terrorists as either repetitive or innovative.
A final result concerns the fact that data show almost identical patterns for all the
groups, potentially opening the way for generalized inferences on jihadism.
Second, I have proposed a novel coefficient, Normalized Transition Similarity
(NTS), and compared the results of the analyses across groups and trails. NTS eval-
uates the behavioral pairwise similarity of single-link transitions between different
states (again in the context of attacked targets, employed weapons and the combi-
nation of the two in each attack). It specifically uses the simple count of common
transitions controlled by the potential maximum probability of perfect similarity given
two random sequences associated with two considered jihadist organizations. The re-
sults showed that, across the three different networks, some stable similarities hold.
Particularly, Al Qaeda & Al Shabaab (which are formally affiliated, since the former
has become part of the global network in 2012) and Al Shabaab & Boko Haram are
respectively ranked as the most similar pairs in two contexts out of three. At the same
time, some other pairs confirm to be consistently dissimilar regardless of the transi-
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tion networks that are considered. This is especially the case of Al Qaeda & Taliban.
A final interesting result emerges looking at Boko Haram & Islamic State, which are
very different when weapons and targets & weapons are considered but appear to be
quite similar when only targets are included in the computation. This may suggest
that, regardless of the proposed target, two groups may try to attack it using dis-
tinct dynamic strategies (in this case intended as weapons), thus providing potential
interpretation on the scale of resources of the considered jihadist organizations.
The relevance of this exploratory analysis lies in the attempt to extract synthetic
informative indications from the complex and heterogeneous behavioral dimensions
of the most active jihadist groups in the global scenario. While detecting and as-
sessing contextual differences between terror actors is valuable, it is also relevant to
investigate how, if and to what extent they are similar to each other, especially when
considering “state changes”. Indeed, “state changes” may be fundamental sources
of information for researchers and intelligence analysts, because in the frequent and
apparently chaotic evolution of these behaviors lie the extreme difficulty of predicting,
forecasting and countering terrorism as a violent act.
Although this is an exploratory work, it poses several policy implications. From a
practical point of view, N -dimension super-states networks and similarity measures
that take into account dynamic behaviors can be used by analysts to improve profiling
of terrorist groups (especially if applying this methodology to larger samples involving
higher number of groups) going beyond more static information, regarding for instance
ideology, area of action, organizational structure. Furthermore, this general analytic
approach can help inform countering strategies based on recurring sub-sequences or
common state-changes. Terrorist events can be extremely harmful to societies, but
every attack can be very different in scale compared with a previous or future one.
For this reason, it is in the interest of institutions to understand how terrorists change
their strategies and tactics. Combining additional information on attack magnitude
or effects, transition networks and trails would be helpful in informing analysts and
policymakers on the drivers of terrorist tactical patterns, facilitating alert tools and
investigating the nature of successful (or unsuccessful) violent campaigns. With this
regard, this two-fold framework is flexible in highlighting relevant evolution in groups’
behavior, both for single groups and in a comparative fashion. This flexibility can
be exploited in different manners, focusing on specific time windows for reducing the
noisy effects of events that are distant in time or concentrating on precise dimensions
of terrorist attacks.
Besides the outcomes presented in this article, the study has certainly several
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limitations, which call for further work that can improve research and policy applica-
tions. First, the analyses do not consider the temporal delta that occurs between two
events. Given that terrorism is temporally clustered (Porter and White, 2012; White
et al., 2013), and that the considered sequences are long and unequally distributed
across time, not taking into account the delta that separates two events may lead
to biased results that overestimate transition similarity. It would be useful to break
up sequences that are more aligned to the temporal elements, considering that two
events that are consecutively ordered in the original sequence may be far apart in the
temporal scale, and it would be thus very risky to infer any kind of rational relation
between the two.
A second layer of limitations comes from the fact that the NTS only considers
single-link transitions when one-dimensional transition networks are analyzed. How-
ever, to investigate more complex patterns it would be valuable to apply the same
mathematical construction of N -dimensional super-states to transition networks to
understand if results are stable and hold when more complex information are em-
ployed.
A third layer of limitations is given by the fact that NTS can only assess pairwise
similarity, without instead providing a global coefficient that can be applied without
normalization to the whole sample, thus making it harder to interpret the results.
A fourth and final layer of limitations comes instead from the restricted sample of
groups. Although working on a limited number of entities can provide more detailed
insights, increasing the number of sequences to work with can control for false-positive
patterns that may seem similar only due to the restricted number of pairs.
All these limitations are potentially solvable in the future, and this first ex-
ploratory study aims at opening the path towards the use of transition networks
for terrorism research, showing the potential of this method that conceptually goes
beyond the ordinary use cases derived from classic social network analysis.
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5 Hawkes Processes of Jihadism
5.1 Introduction
One of the aims of this dissertation is to exploit the memory-like processes of terrorism
to set up algorithmic architectures that can learn from these dynamics and provide
reasonable and satisfactory predictions on future event characteristics. This chapter
has, therefore, the primary goal to prove the existence of memory like processes in
the considered sample of jihadist groups via the application of Hawkes processes.
Hawkes processes (Hawkes, 1971) are a specialized class of stochastic point pro-
cesses that have gained wide success in many disciplines in the last decades. Their
main feature is their self-excitability. Self-excitability posits that the occurrence of an
event has a positive impact on the probability of occurrence of future ones. Technical
details will be given in the following sections. Hawkes processes are thus a well-
established class of models to verify whether certain events naturally cluster in time
(and also space, when spatio-temporal modeling is applied) and to test the presence
of memory-like processes, especially if comparing model diagnostics with homoge-
neous Poisson processes (Daley and Vere-Jones, 2006). In fact, Poisson processes are
point processes for which the distribution of future inter-arrival times depends only
on relevant information about the current time, but not on information from further
in the past, while the self-excitability of Hawkes processes makes them intrinsically
non-Markovian, creating dependencies between the past, the present, and the future.
Given the success demonstrated by this modeling technique for both criminal and
terrorist events, I will analyze two Hawkes models for each group, taking into account
the streams of events that occurred in the two most attacked countries per each or-
ganization, filtering by the most popular target attacked in each country. Testing the
presence of memory is fundamental, considering that this is the dominating assump-
tion connected to the methodological setup of the third and last analytic chapter on
the use of deep learning architectures to predict jihadist future targets. Estimation
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diagnostics will thus be compared with baseline Homogeneous Poisson models, and
detailed comments on the outcome will be provided. The rest of the chapter is out-
lined as follows: the “Background” section will provide a review of the main literature
on the application of Hawkes process, with a focus on crime-, security- and terrorism-
related problems. The “Mathematical Framework” section will describe in detail the
mathematics behind Hawkes processes and the specific methodology applied in the
present work. The “Experiments” section will then thoroughly present the results of
the models, with a specific focus on each group. Finally, general indications arising
from these analyses, potential implications, future research paths will be presented in
the “Discussion and Future Work” section.
5.2 Related Work
The application of Hawkes processes spans across several domains. Their modeling
flexibility has captured the attention of almost all areas in which event and sequence
data are relevant sources of information for researchers and scientists. Besides research
from the foundational and theoretical standpoints (Daley and Vere-Jones, 2006; Bacry
et al., 2012; Eichler et al., 2017) , some of the fields in which Hawkes processes are
applied are finance (Chavez-Demoulin and McGill, 2012; Hawkes, 2018), geophysics
(Ogata, 1988; Tu¨rkyilmaz et al., 2013), computational social science (Kobayashi and
Lambiotte, 2016) and neuroscience (Reynaud-Bouret et al., 2013; Gerhard et al., 2017)
(for a more comprehensive review, see Reinhart (2018)). However, the progressive
and increasing use of quantitative measurements on a variety of social phenomena
in research has started to make Hawkes processes (and point processes in general)
more popular also in criminology (Mohler et al., 2011; Mohler, 2013) (Mohler 2011,
Hegemann 2012, Mohler 2013) and terrorism research (Porter and White, 2012; Lewis
et al., 2012; Tench et al., 2016) . Besides the availability of data and the shift towards
statistical approaches in the social sciences, Hawkes processes have been successful
due to the well-known clustering mechanisms of certain types of crimes and violent
phenomena in space and time: the temporal concentration of crime as a scientific
finding has indeed long preceded the diffusion and application of Hawkes models in
criminology.(Midlarsky, 1978; Midlarsky et al., 1980; Holden, 1986; Freeman et al.,
1996; Braithwaite and Li, 2007; Weisburd et al., 2009; Weisburd, 2015).
For what concerns urban crimes Mohler et al. (2011) tested the clustering dynam-
ics of crime using self-exciting point processes on residential burglary data of the city
of Los Angeles. They have considered offenses that occurred in the San Fernando
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Valley in the years 2004 and 2005 and fitted an unmarked model (i.e., a model in
which each event is considered as equal, without any qualitative information regard-
ing impact, damage, etc.) with a non-parametric estimation. Their study has been
among the first ones to introduce and present the potential of Hawkes processes for
the study and prediction of crime, emphasizing the similarities between earthquakes
and repeated offenses.
In a further attempt to advance the methodology and expand the types of criminal
phenomena to be analyzed, Mohler (2013) studied property and violent crimes in
Chicago and terrorist attacks and casualties in Northern Ireland, Israel, and Iraq.
He tested a particular type of Hawkes process with a background rate driven by a
log Gaussian Cox process, proposing a Metropolis adjusted Langevin algorithm for
learning the model parameters. The work clearly shows the number of events to be
associated with the background rate and the component connected to the Hawkes
specification, calling for additional research that may embed also spatial components.
The same author continued his research on Chicago expanding the methodological
framework via the application of Marked Hawkes processes to yield accurate hot-
spot maps to be used to tackle gun violence. The shift towards marked Hawkes
processes was performed to take into account potential triggering and precursory
offenses. The model is developed using an Expectation-Maximization algorithm (Veen
and Schoenberg, 2008) and shows better performance compared to other types of hot-
spot prediction techniques.
For what pertains terrorism, Northern Ireland and Iraq have been two countries
of particular interest for research on Hawkes processes Indeed, Tench et al. (2016)
have conducted a study using data on Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) attacks
carried out by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) during “The Troubles”
in Northern Ireland, also integrating information on counter-attacks plotted by the
British Security Forces. The integration of these two sources of events led to the
development of a multivariate Hawkes process in the attempt to understand whether
besides past-dependencies between attacks also inter-dependencies among the two
event sequences exist. The authors showed indeed how counter-terrorism operations
lead to subsequent spikes of terrorist violence. Lewis et al. (2012) have instead focused
on reported deaths of civilians in Iraq, proposing and comparing three adjustments
for non-stationarity of the background rate. The study proved the best performance
of models including self-exciting components with respect to both stationary and
non-stationary homogeneous Poisson processes, thus demonstrating the presence of
memory dynamics and the violation of the Markovian assumption.
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Furthermore, White et al. (2013) concentrated their research on three Southeast
Asian countries, namely Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Their work aimed
at developing interpretable metrics for risk, resilience, and volatility of terrorist ac-
tivity. Through the use of self-exciting point process models, they have computed
measures of risk of daily expected terrorist attacks, additional attacks caused by
every single attack and number of days with low risk.
Maintaining the focus on Indonesia, retrieving data on the daily number of attacks
in the period 1994-2007, Porter and White (2012)formalized a dynamic model using a
shot noise process for explaining the self-excitability of terrorism. Using a power-law
distribution and a shot noise derived parameters, they achieved the best performance
in modeling the daily number of attacks. As for most of the other works described
in this section, relevant evidence is given to the promises of Hawkes and self-exciting
point processes for gaining practical and useful knowledge on terrorism, going beyond
the borders of academic research.
5.3 Mathematical Framework
5.3.1 Introducing Homogeneous Poisson and Hawkes Point
Processes
Before describing in detail the nature of Hawkes processes, it is necessary to introduce
some preliminary mathematical concepts. Given a point process (ti)i∈N∗ , then its
associated counting process is defined as:
N(t) =
∑
i∈N∗
1ti≤t (5.1)
with ti being the times in which the phenomenon under analysis occurs and 1ti being
the indicator function that is equal to 1 if ti ≤ t and 0 otherwise. Having introduced
the concept of counting process, it is worth also to provide definitions for duration
and history. The duration process associated with (ti)i∈N∗ is defined by:
∀i ∈ N∗, δti = ti − ti−1 (5.2)
while the history of events up to a given time t is given by:
H(t) =: ti|ti < t (5.3)
84
5 HAWKES PROCESSES OF JIHADISM
At this point, the conditional intensity function λ(t) associated to the process, de-
pendent on H(t) is formalized as:
λ (t|H(t)) = lim
h→0
E(N(t+ h)−N(t)|H(t))
h
(5.4)
Following this equation, λ is the expected number of events that should occur at each
time unit t. This quantity will always depend upon H(t). The selected history will
then act as a sort of filter of each model: given a complete sequence of events and an
artificially-reduced one, the intensity will vary accordingly.
This initial background allows making the first important distinction in the realm
of point processes, namely the distinction between Homogeneous Poisson and Hawkes
processes. Understanding the difference between these two mathematical entities is
crucial to understand the implications of this work. A point process is said to be a
Homogeneous Poisson process if the intensity is positive, fixed and constant:
λ = µ (5.5)
More formally, a Poisson process with constant rate λ is a point process formalized
as:
P (N(t+ h)−N(t) = 1|H) = λh+ o(h) (5.6)
P (N(t+ h)−N(t) > 1|H) = λo(h) (5.7)
Equations 5.6 and 5.7 indicate that the intensity does not depend on the history of
the process itself, with the probability of an event happening in (t, t+h] being indeed
independent of the filtering given by H and duration δti independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) according to an exponential distribution parametrized by λ. In
other words, Poisson processes are memoryless: their nature is intrinsically Marko-
vian. However, in the real world, many phenomena do not respect the assumption
of constant probability in fixed time windows and independence from the past. With
this regard, a Hawkes process is an alternative class of model with different properties:
it revolves around the idea of “self-excitability”, which means that the occurrence of
an event has an impact (generally, assumed positive) on the occurrence of another
event in the future.
In light of this, given the background rate µ, which is the average rate of event
occurrence per time unit; k0 defined as the increase rate of events following a past
one (the higher the value, the more reactive the process is to future events), and
ω, the decay parameter that maps the extent to which the probability of an events
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decreases after a spike, then for a given set of unique times ti, Hawkes (1971) defines
the intensity function of a self-exciting process as:
λ(t) = µ+ k0
∫ t
−∞
g(t− ti)dZ(u) = µ+ k0
∑
t>ti
g (t− ti) (5.8)
where Z is the normal counting measure and the response function g is an exponential
kernel in the form:
g(t) = ωe−ωt (5.9)
The equation of the intensity function would then read as:
λ(t) = µ+ k0
∑
t>ti
g
(
ωe−ωt
)
(5.10)
Given that ω appears in the exponent, then the higher its value, the lower the temporal
effect an event has on future ones. Additionally, Lewis et al. (2012) notes that w−1
gives the average time length over which a spike in the rate of events occur. As
pointed out by Lewis et al. (2012), a point process N(t) is said to be self-excitating
iff:
Cov [N(t1, t2), N(t2, t3)] > 0 ∀ t1 < t2 < t3 (5.11)
which means that if an event occurs, another one is more likely to happen locally in
time (but also space). In the case of homogeneous Poisson processes, in fact, this is
not true, as
Cov [N(t1, t2), N(t2, t3)] = 0 ∀ t1 < t2 < t3 (5.12)
5.3.2 Estimation of the Parameters and Model Comparison
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) has been performed to learn the parameters
µ, k0 and ω of each Hawkes process model. MLE aims at finding the parameters that
maximize the log-likelihood function. As noted by Tench (2018), for a set of event
times {ti}Ni=1, log-likelihood is calculated as:
lnL ({ti} ;µ; k0;ω) =
N∑
i=1
log(λ(ti))−
∫ T
0
λ(t)dt (5.13)
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Following Tench (2018), the integral of the second term can be simplified as:∫ T
0
λ(t)dt =
∫ T
0
µ+ k0
∑
ti<t
ωe−ω(t−ti)dt
= µT + k0
∑
i
∫ T
0
ωe−ω(t−ti)1t>tidt
= µT + k0
∑
i
∫ T
ti
ωe−ω(t−ti)dt
= µT + k0
∑
i
∫ T
ti
ωe−ω(t−ti)dt
= µT + k0
∑
i
[−e−ω(t−ti)]T
ti
= µT + k0
∑
i
[
1− e−ω(T−ti)]
(5.14)
Substituting this final equation in the original one, provides the complete form of the
log-likelihood computed as:
lnL =
N∑
i=1
log
µ+ k0 ∑
ti>tj
ωe−ω(ti−tj)
+ k0 (e−ω(T−ti) − 1)
− µT (5.15)
To obtain the maximization of the log-likelihood function, I relied on the Nelder-Mead
(Nelder and Mead, 1965) method available in the R package ptproc. The algorithm
in the package works to minimize the function, thus it searches for the minimization
of −lnL. The Nelder-Mead approach is a heuristic optimization technique that uses
the geometric concept of a simplex, a special case of polytop with n+1 vertices in n
dimensions. The algorithm starts generating a random simplex, and at every iteration
it proceeds to reshape and move it, iteratively one vertex at a time, trying to settle
in an optimal region of the search space. Specifically, given a n-dimensional space, a
simplex consists of n+1 points x1, x2, ..., xn+1 and the algorithm tries to minimize a
function f(x) via several steps during each iteration. During the “Ordering” phase,
all points are sorted in order to set the value of f for the first point as the lowest, and
the one of the last as the highest. The indices of the worst, second-worst and best
points be h, s, l. In the “Centroid Computation” phase, the algorithm considers all
points but the worst one (xh), and calculate their centroid as:
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c =
1
n
∑
i 6=h
xi (5.16)
After this step, comes the “Transformation” phase, which consists of Reflection, Ex-
pansion, Contraction and Shrink Contraction. During the Reflection the algorithm
computes the reflected point as:
xr = c+ α(c− xh) (5.17)
where α is the reflection parameter, and xr is a point on the line that connects c and
xh, but sufficiently away from it. This step aims at move the simplex in a direction
away from the sub-optimal region around xh. If after this step, f(xs) < f(xr) ≤ f(xl),
the algorithm substitutes xh with xr and proceeds to the Expansion step. If then the
reflected point xr is better than the current best (f(xr) > f(xl, the algorithm moves
in the direction of xr from c. The expanded point is then defined as:
xe = c+ γ(xr − c) (5.18)
where γ is here an expansion parameter (usually set at a value of 2). At this point,
the algorithm replace xh with the best point between xe and xr. In case the reflection
point was worse than xs (the second worst point), the algorithm contracts the simplex.
The contraction point is then defined as:
xc = c+ β(xh − c) (5.19)
with β being the contraction parameter. If f(xc) > f(xh), it means that the con-
tracted point is actually better than the current worst, and the algorithm then replaces
xh with xc in the simplex. In case this the relation above is not satisfied, the algo-
rithm moves to the Shrink Contraction step. During this step, the algorithm only
keeps the best point (xl and re-define the other with respect to it, so that the new
point is defined as:
xj = xl + δ(xj − xl) (5.20)
where δ is the shrinkage parameter. The algorithm finally terminates if (1) a pre-set
number of iterations is reached, or (2) the simplex reaches a limit of minimum size,
or (3) the current best solution reaches some acceptable limit. In the present work,
a default limit of 500 iterations for each model has been selected.
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Once the parameters have been estimated, it is necessary to check whether the
model actually fits the real data. Following the approaches used in other articles,
residual analysis and a consequent Kolmorogv-Smirnov test (Massey, 1951) have been
performed. Given a set of event times {ti} associated to an Hawkes point process
with intensity λ, the residuals for each i are computed through:
τi =
∫ ti
0
λ(t)dt (5.21)
Following these residuals should be distributed as a stationary process with unit rate,
therefore it can be proved that they are also exponentially distributed via:
Yi = τi − τi−1 =
∫ ti
0
λ(t)dt−
∫ ti−1
0
λ(t)dt
=
∫ ti
ti−1
λ(t)dt
=
∫ ti
ti−1
µ+ k0
∑
tj<t
ωe−ω(t−tj)dt
= µ (ti − ti−1) + k0
∫ ti
ti−1
∑
tj<t
ωe−w(t−tj)dt
= µ (ti − ti−1) + k0
i−1∑
j=1
∫ ti
ti−1
ωe−w(t−tj)dt
= µ (ti − ti−1) + k0
i−1∑
j=1
[−e−ω(t−tj)]ti
ti−1
= µ (ti − ti−1) + k0
i−1∑
j=1
[
e−ω(ti−1−tj) − e−ω(ti−tj)]
(5.22)
This would thus mean that Ui are uniform random variables:
Ui = 1− exp−Yi
= 1− exp
[
−
(
µ(ti − ti−1) + k0
i−1∑
j=1
[
e−ω(ti−1−tj) − e−ω(ti−tj)])] (5.23)
It follows that to check whether the Hawkes process fits the data, it can be verified
if Ui actually belong to a uniform distribution. Applying the same approach of
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Tench et al. (2016), I have then performed Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. This very
common test compares the value of a test statistic to a given critical value Dσ. The
KS test statistic is computed as:
Dn = max
k
(∣∣∣∣Uk − k − 1N ,
∣∣∣∣ kN − Uk
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣) (5.24)
and the model is found to be fitting to the data if Dn < Dσ. Finally, to provide
further evidence that the data under analyses are modeled correctly through a Hawkes
process, I have compared the Hawkes models with baseline Homogeneous Poisson
processes. To do so, I have compared the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike,
1974) value of Hawkes and homogeneous Poisson in each model. Between the two,
the best model to be chosen is the one with the lowest AIC, calculated as:
AIC = 2k − 2lnL (5.25)
with k being the number of parameters of the model and lnL being the MLE.
5.3.3 The Present Study
The present study aims at deepening the knowledge on jihadist dynamics applying
Hawkes processes to evaluate self-excitability given certain attacks characteristics,
and particularly targets. This methodological choice is motivated also by the need
for providing empirical results on memory processes that can justify the architecture
of the last analytic chapter on neural networks for predictive purposes. Showing the
presence of past-dependency in the attack sequences with specific characteristics is
a valuable way to suggest that further patterns can be learned when focusing on
historical data. In this chapter, I have decided to perform a double-filter. First,
for each group, the attacks that occurred in the two most targeted countries will be
kept. Secondly, only the attacks with the two most popular targets will be selected
(target frequency per each group and country is displayed in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4
and 5.5).1 Given the necessity to provide unique time stamps to correctly run the
models, when multiple attacks occurred in the same day, a number x sampled from
a random uniform distribution (x ∼ U(0, 1]) has been added in order to keep all the
1In this chapter, I have only taken into account the first target type, without considering also the
potential other two. This decision reduces the level of detail of the information, but still guarantees
a solid proof of concept for the aims of the work. As done in the other chapters, I have used the
most general level of information out of the four different available when considering targets.
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attacks and maintain relevant information that can better explain the intensity of a
terrorist wave of attacks. The analyses have been performed relying on R package
ptproc (Peng, 2003), and on a private Pythonanywhere website kindly provided by
Stephen Tench and originating from his doctoral dissertation work (Tench, 2018). As
anticipated above, the models work with exponential kernels and the Nelder-Mead
algorithm (Nelder and Mead, 1965) will be used for MLE optimization to learn the
parameters of each model.
Iraq Syria
Target N % Target N %
Private Citizens & Prop. 1476 49.02% Private Citizens & Prop. 202 51.53%
Police 487 16.17% Terrorists/N. St. Militia 41 10.46%
Military 223 7.41% Military 33 8.42%
Business 182 6.04% Business 27 6.89%
Terrorists/N.S.Militia 144 4.78% Journalists & Media 19 4.85%
Government (General) 126 4.18% Police 16 4.08%
Unknown 104 3.45% Religious Fig./Inst. 15 3.83%
Others 269 8.93% Others 39 9.95%
Total 3011 100% Total 392 100%
Table 5.1: Target Type Frequency (Highest in Red) for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
Afghanistan Pakistan
Target N % Target N %
Police 2185 39.09% Private Citizens & Prop. 23 46.94%
Private Citizens & Prop. 1238 22.15% Military 5 10.20%
Government (General) 850 15.21% Police 5 10.20%
Military 287 5.14% Educational Institution 4 8.16%
Business 201 3.60% Government (General) 3 6.12%
Unknown 184 3.29% Business 2 4.08%
Educational Institution 135 2.42% Terrorists/N. St. Militia 2 4.08%
Others 509 9.11% Unknown 2 4.08%
Total 5589 100.00% Others 3 6.20%
Total 49 100.00%
Table 5.2: Target Type Frequency (Highest in Red) for the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan
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Yemen Iraq
Target N % Target N %
Government (General) 145 24.62% Private Citizens & Prop. 233 40.10%
Police 119 20.20% Police 123 21.17%
Private Citizens & Prop. 81 13.75% Government (General) 62 10.67%
Military 68 11.54% Business 46 7.92%
Terrorists/N. St. Militia 50 8.49% Terrorists/N. St. Militia 29 4.99%
Utilities 37 6.28% Military 18 3.10%
Government (Diplomatic) 20 3.40% Religious Fig./Inst. 17 2.93%
Business 19 3.23% Others 53 9.12%
Others 50 8.48% Total 581 100.00%
Total 589 100.00%
Table 5.3: Target Type Frequency (Highest in Red) for Al Qaeda in Yemen and Iraq
Nigeria Cameroon
Target N % Target N %
Private Citizens & Prop. 946 49.68% Private Citizens & Prop. 131 65.50%
Police 228 11.97% Religious Fig./Inst. 16 8.00%
Religious Fig./Inst. 152 7.98% Unknown 12 6.00%
Government (General) 138 7.25% Police 11 5.50%
Business 99 5.20% Business 8 4.00%
Educational Institution 86 4.52% Military 7 3.50%
Military 68 3.57% Others 15 7.50%
Others 187 9.82% Total 200 100%
Total 1904 100%
Table 5.4: Target Type Frequency (Highest in Red) for Boko Haram in Nigeria and Cameroon
Somalia Kenya
Target N % Target N %
Private Citizens & Prop. 427 30.48% Police 99 34.26%
Government (General) 342 24.41% Private Citizens & Prop. 55 19.03%
Military 165 11.78% Business 47 16.26%
Police 107 7.64% Religious Fig./Inst. 16 5.54%
Business 95 6.78% Government (General) 15 5.19%
Journalists & Media 44 3.14% Transportation 15 5.19%
Government (Diplomatic) 34 2.43% Military 10 3.46%
Unknown 31 2.21% NGO 8 2.77%
Airports & Aircraft 27 1.93% Others 24 8.30%
Others 129 9.20% Total 289 100.00%
Total 1401 100.00%
Table 5.5: Target Type Frequency (Highest in Red) for Al Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya
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5.4 Experiments
5.4.1 The Islamic State
The two most targeted countries from attacks carried out by the Islamic State are Iraq
and Syria. However, the comparison is disproportionate given that Iraq accounted
for more than 3,000 incidents, while Syria only accounts for less than 400. The
first attack ever recorded in the GTD and assigned to the Islamic State was dated
April 18, 2013. This testifies the extremely intense activity of the IS in the temporal
frame under analysis. Besides pure event counting, the IS has carried out attacks in
Iraq on 933 unique days, while in Syria days were 228. When focusing on the most
popular targets, the Islamic State preferred to hit Private Citizens and Property in
both countries (49.02% of all attacks in Iraq and 51.53% in Syria). The results of the
models for both countries are reported in Table 5.6.
Parameters Iraq Syria
µ 0.562 0.090
k 0.495 0.424
ω 3.908 2.497
KS Test Stat 0.035* 0.032*
KS 95% Sig. Level 0.095 0.095
KS 99% Sig. Level 0.114 0.0114
Hawkes AIC 1283.852† 934.330†
H. Poisson AIC 2634.031 1147.258
Table 5.6: Univariate Hawkes Estimates for Islamic State Models (Iraq and Syria). † Indicates which
Model Between Hawkes and H. Poisson better Explains the Process. * Indicates 95% significance of
the KS Statistic, ** Indicates 99%.
Firstly, the results of the AIC tests (values are lower for the Hawkes process
compared to the Homogeneous Poisson) suggest that a certain degree of self-excitation
is present in both the countries and that, therefore, there exist some memory-like
dynamics in the way in which the Islamic State behaves when considering Private
Citizens and Property as targets. A second order of results regards the interpretation
of the parameters. The parameter µ describes the average number of events at each
time step: Iraq has a much higher average number of attacks per day compared to
Syria. The jump factors k instead suggest that in both countries the reactivity of
the process at each event is almost similar.2 Thirdly, the inverse of the parameter ω
2k is bounded in the range (0, 1], with higher values indicating higher reactivity.
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provides information on the average length of periods in which higher rates of events
occur. In the case of Iraq, the length is shorter (0.25 days) than the length in Syria
(0.4 days), testifying the very high frequency of attacks in both geographical contexts,
which represents a distinguishing characteristic of the Islamic State. This is visually
shown also by Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, where for both groups the event streams and
the estimated conditional intensities λ are displayed.
Figure 5.1: IS KS Plot - Iraq Figure 5.2: IS KS Plot - Syria
Figure 5.3: IS Inter-arrival
Times - Iraq
Figure 5.4: IS Inter-arrival
Times - Syria
The KS test statistic gives qualitative information regarding the goodness of fit
of the models at the level of confidence of 95%. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show that most
of the points are falling on the red solid line (Dashed lines represent 95% confidence
boundaries). Inter-arrival times are displayed in Figure 5.3 and 5.4. The first-order
differences follow an exponential decay: the model thus represents the data well.
For both countries, most attacks occur within two days, further demonstrating the
extreme frequency of violence carried out by the Islamic State.
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Figure 5.5: Event Stream of Islamic State in Iraq
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Figure 5.6: Conditional Intensity λ of Islamic State Attacks in Iraq
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Figure 5.7: Event Stream of Islamic State in Syria
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Figure 5.8: Conditional Intensity λ of Islamic State Attacks in Syria
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5.4.2 The Taliban
The Taliban, during their very long history of terrorism, has only attacked two coun-
tries: Afghanistan and, marginally, Pakistan. In fact, out of a total of 5,638 attacks,
only 49 have targeted Pakistan. The first recorded event in the dataset occurred in
Afghanistan in April 1995. In terms of days, the Taliban have carried out terrorist at-
tacks in Afghanistan on 2,522 unique days and in Pakistan on 47. For what concerns
targets, in Afghanistan the Taliban has targeted Police in 39.09% of the attacks, tes-
tifying their strategy against the State and institutions. In Pakistan, instead, Private
Citizens and Property have been attacked in 46.94% of the cases. Model results are
shown in Table 5.7.
Parameters Afghanistan Pakistan
µ 0.023 0.002
k 0.942 0.615
ω 0.083 0.011
KS Test Stat 0.048 0.121*
KS 95% Sig. Level 0.029 0.283
KS 99% Sig. Level 0.034 0.339
Hawkes AIC 5325.685† 269.912
H. Poisson AIC 7915.538 265†
Table 5.7: Univariate Hawkes Estimates for Taliban Models (Afghanistan and Pakistan). † Indi-
cates which Model Between Hawkes and H. Poisson better Explains the Process. * Indicates 95%
significance of the KS Statistic, ** Indicates 99%.
The results for the Taliban are not as good as the ones obtained with the Islamic
State. While the AIC statistic indicates that, for Afghanistan, the Hawkes model
better captures the dynamics of the data, for Pakistan the Homogeneous Poisson
process seems to have a better fit (although AIC values are very similar). This can
be probably explained by the very low number of attacks considered for Pakistan (i.e.,
23) and by their distribution in the considered time frame. The KS test provides again
contrasting results: while the Pakistan model reaches a 95% significance level, the
Afghanistan one fails the test. The outcomes of the KS tests are graphically provided
in Figures 5.9 and 5.10. In the case of Afghanistan, the points remain within the
confidence boundaries except for a deviation in the bottom-left of the plot.
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Figure 5.9: Taliban KS Plot -
Afghanistan
Figure 5.10: Taliban KS Plot -
Pakistan
Figure 5.11: Taliban Inter-arrival
Times - Afghanistan
Figure 5.12: Taliban Inter-arrival
Times - Pakistan
In spite of the limitations addressed in the previous lines, it is however worth
to provide some context via parameter interpretation. Parameter µ shows that, on
average, Afghanistan tended to experience a higher number of attacks per single day
(0.023 vs 0.002). The jump factor k is very close to the limit of 1 in Afghanistan
(0.942), testifying the very high level of excitability and eventually escalation. For
the Pakistan case, the value is still high (0.615). Finally, ω−1 gives information on
the average number of days over which self-excited events persist: in the case of
Afghanistan, this time window lasts 12 days, while the period is much longer for
Pakistan (90 days): this is discrepancy in the results between the two countries is
obviously motivated by the sizeable difference in absolute numbers of attacks and
consequent distribution. These aspects can be seen in Figures 5.13, 5.14, 5.15, 5.16.
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Figure 5.13: Event Stream of Taliban in Afghanistan
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Figure 5.14: Conditional Intensity λ of Taliban Attacks in Afghanistan
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Figure 5.15: Event Stream of Taliban in Pakistan
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Figure 5.16: Conditional Intensity λ of Taliban Attacks in Pakistan
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5.4.3 Al Qaeda
Relying on the concept of “Al Qaeda Network”, as done in the other chapters of
the work, also in this section a single category for the Al Qaeda group has been
created in the first phase, merging together all the smaller groups and fraction that
constitute the network (except for Al Shabaab which constitutes a group per se).
The most targeted countries are Yemen (589) and Iraq (581). The first attack in
Yemen has been carried out in 2005, while Al Qaeda appeared in Iraq in 2004. In
Yemen, Al Qaeda in Yemen and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are the two
organizations responsible for all the attacks, in collaboration with other terrorist
groups, as the Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State. In Iraq, Al Qaeda has been
present through the attacks of Al Qaeda in Iraq and Al Qaeda Kurdish Battalions.
In Yemen, from 2005 to 2016, attacks occurred in 461 unique days, while in Iraq
202. Shifting the focus on the most popular targets, Al Qaeda in Yemen mostly hit
Government (General) buildings and/or personalities (24.62% of the events), while in
Iraq the organization mainly attacked Private Citizens and Property (40.1%). Besides
descriptive statistics, the results of the Hawkes models are reported in Table 5.8.
Parameters Yemen Iraq
µ 0.032 0.024
k 0.477 0.687
ω 0.039 3.957
KS Test Stat 0.075* 0.067*
KS 95% Sig. Level 0.112 0.089
KS 99% Sig. Level 0.135 0.107
Hawkes AIC 1076.844† 552.252†
H. Poisson AIC 1091.252 1626.547
Table 5.8: Univariate Hawkes Estimates for Al Qaeda Models (Yemen and Iraq). † Indicates which
Model Between Hawkes and H. Poisson better Explains the Process. * Indicates 95% significance of
the KS Statistic, ** Indicates 99%.
For both countries, the models indicate that a self-exciting component is present
in the data under analysis. Indeed, AIC values for Yemen and Iraq are lower for
Hawkes models compared to Homogeneous Poisson. Furthermore, also the KS tests
are both significant at 95%, thus suggesting that the Hawkes specification is capable
of capturing the mechanics of terrorist attacks against Government in Yemen and
Private Citizens and Property in Iraq. The goodness derived from the KS test is
visually represented in Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18. Additionally, Figures 5.19 and
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5.20 show that in both countries the inter-arrival times are dispersed following an
exponential distribution, further demonstrating the goodness of the Hawkes models.
The exponential decay is steeper in the Iraq case, with the majority of inter-arrival
times being between 0 and 1 day, while in Yemen the exponent is smoother.
Figure 5.17: Al Qaeda KS Plot -
Yemen
Figure 5.18: Al Qaeda KS Plot -
Iraq
Figure 5.19: Al Qaeda Inter-arrival
Times - Yemen
Figure 5.20: Al Qaeda Inter-arrival
Times - Iraq
Learned parameters provide additional information on the dynamics of terrorist
events plotted by Al Qaeda in Yemen and Syria against Government and Private
Citizens respectively. The average expected number of attacks per day (µ) is higher
in Yemen (0.032 against 0.024), while k suggests that the process is more reactive
in Iraq. Finally, the inverse of the estimated ω parameters are extremely different.
In Yemen, the average number of days in which self-excitability persists is 25, while
in Iraq it lasts for less than a day. This, also considering the graphical depiction in
Figure 5.22 and Figure 5.24, indicates that self-excitability is higher in Yemen.
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Figure 5.21: Event Stream of Al Qaeda in Yemen
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Figure 5.22: Conditional Intensity λ of Al Qaeda Attacks in Yemen
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Figure 5.23: Event Stream of Al Qaeda in Iraq
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Figure 5.24: Conditional Intensity λ of Al Qaeda Attacks in Iraq
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5.4.4 Boko Haram
The jihadist group Boko Haram’s first attack included in the GTD dates back to
2009. Since then, six countries have been targeted: Nigeria and Cameroon, with
respectively 1,904 and 200 terror events, are the most hit countries. Nigeria is the
country where the group was born and accounts for the vast majority of attacks
perpetrated by Boko Haram, with 982 days with at least one event between 2009
and 2016. The adjoining country Cameroon has been certainly affected by a smaller
number of terrorist attacks, though having experienced them for 148 unique days from
2013 to 2016. As for most of the other groups, also Boko Haram showed a preference
towards Private Citizens and Property as targets. In Nigeria and Cameroon, 49.68%
and 65.5% of attacks respectively were carried out against this category. The results
of the models are reported in Table 5.9.
Parameters Nigeria Cameroon
µ 0.037 0.075
k 0.883 0.252
ω 0.136 2.343
KS Test Stat 0.093 0.077*
KS 95% Sig. Level 0.044 0.118
KS 99% Sig. Level 0.052 0.142
Hawkes AIC 3327.452† 798.694†
H. Poisson AIC 3857.419 848.176
Table 5.9: Univariate Hawkes Estimates for Boko Haram Models (Nigeria and Cameroon). † Indi-
cates which Model Between Hawkes and H. Poisson better Explains the Process. * Indicates 95%
significance of the KS Statistic, ** Indicates 99%.
While for both models the AIC statistic suggests that the Hawkes model provides a
better fit compared against a homogeneous Poisson model, the Nigeria model fails the
KS test (the Cameroon model, instead, is accepted with 95% confidence). Inspecting
the KS plot for Nigeria (Figure 5.25, the points deviates from the 95% confidence
boundaries for a large part of the graph (it is worth to recall that a perfect fit would
imply a perfect overlap on the solid red line that has an inclination of 45). The KS
test is known to be very demanding (Lallouache and Challet, 2014), but there might
be different explanations regarding the negative result for the Nigerian case. The
most probable is that the models should be fitted using a different type of decay
kernel (e.g. Power-law, Rayleigh). Another concurrent explanation is the presence of
non-stationarity in the data.
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Figure 5.25: Boko Haram KS Plot -
Nigeria
Figure 5.26: Boko Haram KS Plot -
Cameroon
Figure 5.27: Boko Haram Inter-arrival
Times - Nigeria
Figure 5.28: Boko Haram Inter-arrival
Times - Cameroon
In spite of the limitations shown by the models, in both cases at least a certain degree
of evidence is provided for the presence of memory and self-excitability (considering
the AIC tests). In the considered time spans (which are different), µ parameter is
higher for Cameroon than for Nigeria, while the jump factor k highlights the much
higher reactivity of the self-excitation for the Nigerian model. Finally, ω−1 values
extremely differ in the two distinct scenarios: the length of self-excitation windows
lasts around 7 days in Nigeria, while in Cameroon the duration is less than a day
(0.41), showing the very different nature of the two processes.
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Figure 5.29: Event Stream of Boko Haram in Nigeria
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Figure 5.30: Conditional Intensity λ of Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria
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Figure 5.31: Event Stream of Boko Haram in Cameroon
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Figure 5.32: Conditional Intensity λ of Boko Haram Attacks in Cameroon
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5.4.5 Al Shabaab
Back in 2007, the first attack claimed by Al Shabaab hit Somalia, which is indeed
the country of origin of the group and the most targeted one. After Somalia comes to
Kenya (that experienced the first attack only a few months after the first Al Shabaab
attack overall). Until 2016, Somalia has been hit by 1,401 attacks (in 963 unique
days), while Kenya accounted for a total of 289 (in 228 unique days). Concerning
targets, Al Shabaab mostly hit Private Citizens and Property in Somalia (30.48%)
and, similarly to the Taliban in Afghanistan, Police in Kenya (34.26% out of the total
number of events). The results of the two separate Hawkes models are showcased in
Table 5.10.
Parameters Somalia Kenya
µ 0.023 0.004
k 0.861 0.982
ω 0.041 0.005
KS Test Stat 0.479 0.134*
KS 95% Sig. Level 0.061 0.136
KS 99% Sig. Level 0.074 0.163
Hawkes AIC 2501.592† 806.725†
H. Poisson AIC 2781.596 820.594
Table 5.10: Univariate Hawkes Estimates for Al Shabaab Models (Somalia and Kenya). † Indi-
cates which Model Between Hawkes and H. Poisson better Explains the Process. * Indicates 95%
significance of the KS Statistic, ** Indicates 99%.
The models of Al Shabaab provide distinct outcomes. In the Somalian case,
in spite of the AIC statistic being preferable for the Hawkes case compared to the
Homogeneous Poisson, the KS test is largely failed. Visually, this is testified by the
KS plot in Figure 5.33. The points largely deviate from the significance boundaries.
Again, this can be explained by a wrong choice in the type of decay kernel being
non-exponential in the natural representation of the data. These results partially
confirm some of the results found in Tench (2018), where a considerable number of
models, although with different data and methodology, did not pass the KS test, yet
performing better than the Poisson baseline case.
Nonetheless, for what concerns Kenya, the Hawkes better captures the dynamics
found in the data: the KS statistic is significant at 95% confidence level, and the
distribution of inter-arrival times fits well an exponential distribution (while this was
not the case for the Somalian case, as shown in Figures 5.35 and 5.36).
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Figure 5.33: Al Shabaab KS Plot -
Somalia
Figure 5.34: Al Shabaab KS Plot -
Kenya
Figure 5.35: Al Shabaab Inter-arrival
Times - Somalia
Figure 5.36: Al Shabaab Inter-arrival
Times - Kenya
Inspecting the parameters, the average expected number µ is way higher for Soma-
lia, testifying higher frequency in the number of attacks (which was indeed foreseeable
given the large difference in the absolute number of attacks and the almost similar
duration of the period under analysis). However, the k parameter shows that the
process is much more reactive in the Kenyan case. Yet, both values are very high
and quite close to the bounded limit of 1 (set to avoid the process being explosive).
Finally, the average number of days over which a series of self-exciting attacks last is
also quite different for the two scenarios: 24.39 days in Somalia, while 200 days for
the Kenyan case. This last result might be influenced by the relatively low frequency
of attacks in the first three years included in the analysis.
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Figure 5.37: Event Stream of Al Shabaab in Somalia
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Figure 5.38: Conditional Intensity λ of Al Shabaab Attacks in Somalia
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Figure 5.39: Event Stream of Al Shabaab in Kenya
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Figure 5.40: Conditional Intensity λ of Al Shabaab Attacks in Kenya
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5.4.6 Summary of the Results
To synthesize the outcomes of the ten different models (two per each terrorist group),
Table 5.11 provides a summary of the results beyond parameter estimation and in-
terpretation, to assess whether this proposed modeling technique has been suitable
for the data at my disposal.
Group
Country/Target 1 Country/Target 2
AIC selection KS Test AIC selection KS Test
Islamic State Hawkes Yes Hawkes Yes
Taliban Hawkes No Poisson Yes
Al Qaeda Hawkes Yes Hawkes Yes
Boko Haram Hawkes No Hawkes Yes
Al Shabaab Hawkes No Hawkes Yes
Table 5.11: Summary of Results for Model Selection and Goodness of Fit
The results indicate that, in nine cases out of ten, Hawkes point processes seem
to better capture the inherent nature of the data. The only case in which the Ho-
mogeneous Poisson process (considered as the null baseline alternative) has a better
AIC statistic is the model on Taliban attacks in Pakistan against Private Citizens
and Property. As explained in the dedicated subsection, this can be due to the very
low number of attacks considered (23, making it the model with the lowest number
of points under analysis) and its distribution over time, which is particularly sparse
over a long period.
When focusing on KS tests, three models have been problematic, namely the Taliban
in Afghanistan, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabaab in Somalia, while the other
seven passed the test with a 95% level of significance. It is worth to note that the mod-
els which failed the test are all referring to sequences with a relatively high number
of events (respectively 2184 for Taliban/Afghanistan, 946 for Boko Haram/Nigeria
and 485 for Somalia). As anticipated in the chapter, this can be driven by the decay
function not being exponential avoiding, therefore, an acceptable fit for the models.
Different solutions can be tested to better investigate the causes and motivations be-
hind these results, and some of them will be proposed in the last section. However,
the summary of results provides encouraging evidence that, in the vast majority of
the cases, the processes exhibit memory-dynamics, suggesting once again how jihadist
attacks do not happen at random but, instead, are clustered in time.
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5.5 Discussion and Future Work
Hawkes processes are a particular type of stochastic processes that have gained wide
success in many different research areas. Named after Alan G. Hawkes, these types of
processes have been applied in the analysis of earthquakes, financial markets, brain
activity and, lately, crime and political violence. Indeed, in the last years, several
scholars have modeled the spatio-temporal dynamics of either gang violence or terror-
ism exploiting the properties of this particular point process. The success of Hawkes
processes resides in the capability of capturing the behaviors of many real-world phe-
nomena. Earthquakes, stock selling and buying, bank defaults, crimes, and terrorist
attacks naturally cluster in time and space and, moreover, events are self-exciting,
meaning that the occurrence of an earthquake is likely to have a positive impact on
the probability of the occurrence of an aftershock in the near future: Hawkes processes
are exactly created to capture these dynamics.
Building upon the recent relevant scientific production at the intersection between
criminology and statistical modeling, in this chapter I have applied Hawkes processes
to test the presence of memory-dynamics and self-excitability in the data. Given that
Hawkes processes are a non-Markovian extension of Poisson processes (Laub et al.,
2015), they exhibit memory, which is a fundamental concept for the entire architecture
of my dissertation. Going beyond the existing literature, instead of simply analyzing
terrorist events, I have focused on a subset of events per each group, considering only
the two most attacked countries and the most popular targets for each group.
This choice is motivated by three factors. First, the desire to investigate dynamics
at a higher level of detail, discriminating events based on their characteristics, since,
as testified by the results of the previous chapter, jihadism can be extremely hetero-
geneous in its behavior. Indeed, while a process of pure events can exhibit memory
dynamics, when focusing on event characteristics via data disaggregation, these dy-
namics may vanish. Second, testing Hawkes processes on sequences of events related
to specific targets is not only relevant for the structure of this research work but can
also provide further indications in terms of counter-terrorism policies. Discriminat-
ing between attacks of different nature (or magnitude) can be of help in determining
different strategies of risk mitigation, providing guidance on resource allocation for
counter-terrorism campaigns. Third, the necessity to conceptually connect this chap-
ter with the previous one on trails and transition networks and, foremost, with the
last one on deep neural networks, relying on the concept of “memory”. While these
analyses have given insights on the behavior of jihadist groups, still many improve-
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ments can be added. There are several pathways for future work, starting from the
outcomes of this chapter.
First, to solve the issues found in the problematic models, it would be interesting
to explore Hawkes models fitted with alternative kernels. Theoretical and applied
research has been done (especially in finance, see for instance Hardiman et al. (2013)
and Zhang (2016)) as long as programming frameworks and packages have been de-
veloped (Xu, 2018) to take into account different potential modeling specifications of
kernel functions and it will thus be interesting to evaluate if these developments can
contribute to a better explanation of these data.
Second, integrating temporal information on events with further information could
enrich the models and results. To do so, Marked Hawkes processes should be de-
ployed. This particular class of Hawkes processes allows associating to each event
a particular feature (for a detailed theoretical and mathematical explanation, see
for example Daley and Vere-Jones (2006)). They have been used in several areas,
including information diffusion (Chen and Tan, 2018), finance (Lee and Seo, 2017),
energy conservation research (Li and Zha, 2015) and also crime (Mohler, 2014). Their
statistical characteristics would enable us to discriminate between different types of
events with the same characteristics (or belonging to the same filtered subset, e.g.,
the subset of attacks directed against a particular target) but with different mag-
nitude, consequences and impact. Associating a so-called “mark” to each event to
capture the damages that the attack has provoked (in terms of human losses, for
instance) could help in addressing further research questions, trying to investigate
whether high-impact attacks can lead to higher self-excitability, or not. Third, in-
vestigating the relation (possibly also in terms of causality) between multiple point
processes would be crucial in depicting the nature of more complex dynamics. Tench
et al. (2016) have already tested a multidimensional model taking into account ter-
rorist and counter-terrorist activities. For the data at my disposal, different options
could be viable. One option could be investigating the dynamics between attacks in
adjoining countries or, even better, provinces. Another option, instead, would be the
analysis of multidimensional processes of attacks directed against different types of
targets. Multivariate Hawkes processes can better explain and capture the natural
dynamics of the data: however, they can also reveal causality. Many works have de-
veloped methods to infer causality (in different terms) from multidimensional Hawkes
processes (Xu et al., 2016; Etesami et al., 2016; Achab et al., 2017): being able of dis-
covering causal structures in terrorism domain would represent a crucial advancement
both in terms of research and policy.
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6 Deep Learning and Terrorism:
Long Short-Term Memory
Networks for Jihadist
Target Forecasting
6.1 Introduction
Network science in terrorism research has been mostly applied to map the relations
between individuals belonging to the same terrorist group, to highlight their organi-
zational structure and eventually provide suggestions on how to disrupt them (Krebs,
2002; Farley, 2003; Adler, 2007; Moon and Carley, 2007; Keller et al., 2010; Gerdes,
2015; Malm et al., 2016). This work, conversely, does not deal with networks of indi-
viduals: ironically, individuals are not even included among the several entities that
will be considered. Indeed, the concept of meta-networks of terrorism which has been
fundamental also in Chapter 4, will constitute the cornerstone of this chapter too.
In this case, meta-networks will consider different dimensions of terrorist attacks and
map relations among these dimensions and consider the evolution of these relations
over-time. Specifically, given the five groups under analysis, each jihadist organiza-
tion will be associated with a meta-network, mapping the history of its attacks during
its existence in this meta-relational way. The dimensions of the meta-networks will
be locations (intended as countries in which the group operates, i.e., where it plots
attacks), employed weapons, tactics and attacked targets. My intuition is that, by
using the information retrieved from all the events perpetrated by the jihadist groups,
it will be possible to extract deep knowledge on how these terrorists behave and even
predict and forecast their future actions. Indeed, while research on terrorist events,
both at explanatory and predictive level, is of no certain novelty (meaning that re-
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search on terrorist events is not innovative per se), the innovative element here is
represented by the way in which attacks are conceptualized and treated.
Classic research on terrorist events has treated attacks as independent of one
another (with some exceptions if attacks were physically connected, as in the case
of 9/11). However, terrorist events may be connected in different ways. Besides
pure physical relations, namely attacks that were plotted together as part of a wider
strategy, as again in the case of 9/11, events can be related by hidden connections
that can be conceptualized in a network-based fashion. To exemplify, we can think
about the case of three hypothetical terrorist attacks: A, B, C. Attack A and C share
the same target type, attack B and C share the same weapon type, attack A and B
share the same location. These are all abstract relations that may be gathered from
the original information set: having extensive data of this type for long sequences
of attacks allow to re-create these hybrid meta-networks (hybrid because they map
relations that are not only of different type but also of different intrinsic nature:
physical versus abstract), and these hybrid meta-networks can monitor and possibly
detect patterns that would remain hidden if information were treated in the classic
way.
The concept of mutual dependency and the multiple inter-relations that this ap-
proach allows to consider are essential to grasp a deeper understanding of terrorism
as a complex social phenomenon. It is a conceptual mistake to think that terror
events are not connected even at this “deeper” level. In a dynamic meta-network
environment, recurring regularities are easily detectable, for instance. Additionally,
networks allow controlling for anomalies, helping to answer questions such as “how
close an organization is to change its behavior?” or “how diverse is a group’s terror
strategy?”. These are all information that can be crucial for research and policy pur-
poses. Furthermore, this approach helps in extracting new knowledge from existing
data that have been already analyzed and unfolded in many ways by scholars.
The fundamental seed of this part of the work starts from a single question. This
question is: “Does terrorism have memory?”. As it is posed the question may cause
confusion in the reader. The previous chapter already demonstrates that memory,
intended as the existing time-dependent structure between events, is found in jihadist
dynamics. This finding is in line with previous literature on the topic.
The proven fact that terrorism does not happen randomly is already an important
step towards a better understanding of the phenomenon. In fact, knowing that attacks
are clustered over time is relevant to the intelligence community to design counter-
plans or response activities after major incidents. However, still a lot is missing. This
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is why the question has to be posed again. Besides the fact that events are clustered
in time and are not independent one of another, we should investigate if some specific
dynamics show patterns and schemes which can be related to a multidimensional
concept of “memory”. The idea is that, besides the analysis of mere events, we shall
focus on specific dimensions of attacks (i.e. countries, tactics, weapons, and targets,
in this case) to understand if the analysis of how these features are distributed over
time follow specific interrelated pathways and properties.
Memory is hence defined as the situation in which, given a considerably long
sequence of events, events hold a specific interconnected temporal structure that can
be learned by a model and can be useful in predicting the future. If terrorism has a
memory, and, besides events, features hold specific interconnected behaviors, then we
can employ models that have some “memory” dimensions to make predictions about
the future. The question is relevant, and if it does not appear to be so, it is my
fault because it means I was not clear enough in explaining the whole reasoning. For
the sake of simplicity, the reader may just think about the concept of memory as a
deeper extension of the concept of spatio-temporal concentration of terrorist events.
“Deeper” means that memory will consider multiple dimensions of terrorism assuming
non-randomness across them, thus distinguishing events based on their characteristics
instead of treating them as all equal.
The whole investigation poses further interesting theoretical questions. If memory
existed, understanding why it exists would be of indisputable value. Does it exist
because terrorists are rational agents? Does it exist because each terror group has
some specific expertise and tends to demonstrate it through the repetition of certain
actions over time? I will not directly answer these questions, but the reader shall keep
them in mind as it advances in the chapter, because the dissertation will indirectly
look at them as potential future work.
The investigation on memory and interdependence will be directed towards the
integration of network science and deep learning for forecasting future terrorist tar-
gets.
The chapter develops as follows: the next section will be dedicated to the back-
ground of the analyses, presenting related work and explaining why it is relevant to
address the problem of forecasting terrorist targets.
The third section will thoroughly describe the methodological framework, starting
from the concept of “dynamic meta-network” up to the description of Long Short-
Term Memory network, a class of deep learning algorithms designed for handling
sequence and time-series data.
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The fourth section will investigate the properties of the graph-derived time series
of jihadist groups, specifically dealing with stationarity, randomness and temporal
dynamics of targets hit by the jihadist groups.
The fifth section will present the results of the model in detail, also providing a
summary of the performance of the deep learning models.1
The sixth section will deal with the problems of weak and rare signals in terrorism
research, trying to propose a potential solution to avoid the risk of missing crucial
events when applying computational methods for prediction and forecasting.
Finally, the seventh section will discuss the main results and implications of the
study, also outlining potential research directions for the future.
6.2 Background
6.2.1 Related Work
Humans have been fascinated with the idea of predicting and forecasting the future
for centuries. In Ancient Rome, haruspices2 could supposedly give instructions about
future events, gathering information from the entrails of sacrificed animals. A long
time has passed since then: during the centuries, divination has been replaced by
more empirical and scientific methods, but the attention and efforts towards the pre-
diction of the future have even increased.
Nowadays, the science of prediction covers almost every academic and scientific disci-
pline. What particularly strikes scientists is the idea of forecasting human behavior,
as a way to better understand how individuals think, act and make decisions in a
wide set of distinct realms (Pentland and Liu, 1999; Armstrong, 2001; Subrahmanian
and Kumar, 2017). Hundreds of research groups around the world are working ev-
ery day to disentangle and illuminate the mysterious nature of humans, with an eye
directed to the future, focusing on specific aspects and contexts. Scholars have tried
to predict human behavior in terms of political voting (Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1984;
Kou and Sobel, 2004; Fowler and Dawes, 2008), consumer choices (Goel et al., 2010),
social media activity (Ruths and Pfeffer, 2014) and health conditions (De Choudhury
et al., 2013; Choudhury et al., 2013).
1Further details on model results can be found in Annex B.
2An haruspex was a person trained to practice the divination activity of “haruspicy”. The concept
derives from the Etruscan religion. Forms of divination have been found even earlier in history, as
in the case of Babylonians.
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In this frame, as already noted in this dissertation, the increasing access to large
datasets and the progress made in mathematical and statistical modeling have played
a central role in the growing interest of the scientific community towards the inves-
tigation of future human dynamics. Specifically, two methodological areas (that are
getting closer every day) have gained popularity and demonstrated their potential in
the effort to better predict what humans (or communities made by humans) will likely
do in the future: network science (Bo¨rner et al., 2007; Baraba´si, 2011) and artificial
intelligence (Russell and Norvig, 2010; Nilsson, 2014).
However, mankind not only chooses between Republicans and Democrats, Socialists
and Conservatives, not only purchase clothes and book hotels online, and not only
post holiday pictures, romantic songs and newspaper articles on their social media
accounts. In fact, humans also commit crimes. Under the word “crime” resides a
tremendously heterogeneous world of actions that span from very low levels of sever-
ity (e.g., traffic misdemeanors) to atrocious forms of violence (e.g., genocides). It is
not within the scope of this work to dive into conceptual and theoretical discussions
regarding the limited generalizability of the definition of certain crimes, and into the
dependencies between political and social contexts and the subsequent inclusion or
exclusion of certain acts into the set of criminal activities. It is instead worth to
reason about the implications that this extreme heterogeneity of actions have for
empirical and quantitative research: the higher the complexity, the higher the diffi-
culty to extract patterns of common behaviors, the higher the need for research to
investigate the criminal behavior of members of the humankind. Also in this case,
network science and artificial intelligence have been employed - with various degrees
of intensity - as precious methodological and technical frames. The beyond-research
implications of crime prediction are intrinsically related to the pragmatic importance
of providing policy-makers with tools or instructions to eventually prevent and reduce
crime. Studying how crime occurs naturally leads to the attempt to anticipate it as
much as possible to design and deploy efficient strategies for reducing the real and
perceived insecurity of human societies.
For what concerns the study of crime, network science has on one side helped in better
understanding how criminals interact with each other, merging together the flexibility
of networks as mathematical representations of reality and well-established crimino-
logical theoretical frameworks (Papachristos, 2014). In organized crime studies, for
instance, social network analysis has proved to be able to highlight how criminal
groups work and are structured (Mainas, 2012; Calderoni et al., 2014; Smith and Pa-
pachristos, 2016; Calderoni et al., 2017) and as a tool for assisting intelligence analysts
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in tasks such as link prediction when information is noisy or incomplete (Berlusconi
et al., 2016).
On the other side, scholars in the last decades have tested the potential benefits of
statistical modeling and machine learning for predicting - among the others - future
crime locations, time, characteristics, recidivism risk (Nagin and Tremblay, 2005;
Weisburd et al., 2009; Neuilly et al., 2011; Favarin, 2018). Beyond classical quanti-
tative methods, statistical and machine learning, two interrelated dimensions within
the broader field of Artificial Intelligence, have achieved a growing popularity also due
to the public debate that has spread from the United States regarding the use - and
misuse - of mathematical and computer models for predictive policing purposes and
criminal justice risk assessment models (Shapiro, 2017; Berk, 2019). The practical
application of such models and the flaws detected within them (as low fairness, bias,
feedback loops) have called the scientific community not only to invest in the develop-
ment and deployment of sophisticated methods for predicting and forecasting criminal
activities, but even to extensively reason about the future perspectives posed by data
and algorithms for criminology (Berk, 2008; Brennan and Oliver, 2013; Ozkan, 2019)
and the ethical, legal, and political consequences of corrupted predictive systems for
human society itself (Saunders et al., 2016; Yeung, 2018; Hannah-Moffat, 2018; Berk
et al., 2018; PAI, 2019). While, on one hand, researchers have focused on the impli-
cations (both in terms of potential and threats) posed by the novel applications of
these methods within the realm of criminology, on the other hand scientists (espe-
cially coming from fields as statistics, computer science, physics and mathematics)
have either developed or tested new algorithms for the study of crime or experimented
the use of new types of data gathered from the digital footprints that every human
leaves every day on the internet.
With regard to the former aspect, machine and deep learning have experienced a
rise in their popularity and applicability on several problems as recidivism prediction
and spatio-temporal modeling (Kang and Kang, 2017; Zeng et al., 2017; Wang et al.,
2017; Aglietti et al., 2018; Stec and Klabjan, 2018; Marchant et al., 2018; Stalidis
et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2018; Balocchi and Jensen, 2019). For what concerns the
latter, instead, scientists have started to use massive information gathered from un-
conventional sources as mobile tools, social media activity and even satellite images
for predicting or forecasting future crimes (Wang et al., 2012; Bogomolov et al., 2014;
Chen et al., 2015; Najjar et al., 2018).
As a specific type of crime, terrorism is no exception in reference to the attempts of
the scientific community to predict or forecast it. All the works that are being pub-
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lished today adjacent to this topic can be somehow traced back to the seminal works
of Lewis Fry Richardson, an English mathematician, psychologist, and physicist that
made invaluable contributions to the study of meteorology and conflicts (Richardson
et al., 1960; Richardson, 1960; Hess, 1995). He is indeed considered the father of the
mathematical study of conflicts and wars. The statistical attempts to inspect the
nature of adversarial actions between countries (that are, trivially, made by humans)
still inspires scientists nowadays (Cederman, 2003; Schrodt, 2006; Clauset et al., 2007;
Clauset and Woodard, 2013; White, 2013). Conflicts and wars are different from ter-
rorism in the strict sense (in wars there can be terrorism, and terrorism is certainly a
conflictual type of behavior, but the phenomena cannot be considered as equivalent)
and the academic community has different views with regard to the strengths and the
future perspectives of mathematical modeling of conflicts and wars (Ward et al., 2013;
Cederman and Weidmann, 2017): nonetheless, the legacy of Richardson’s vision has
spread over, also inspiring and influencing the quantitative study of terrorism events.
The intersection between new data and new methods has then allowed the researcher
to concentrate not only on predicting terrorist attacks but also on studying human
relations and predicting their nature regarding terrorist violence. Social network
analysis in the first phase (Krebs, 2002; Fellman, 2008; Mainas, 2012; Fellman and
Wright, 2014; Malm et al., 2016) and consequently more sophisticated approaches
from the fields of complex networks and multi-agent systems (Latora and Marchiori,
2004; Moon and Carley, 2007; Keller et al., 2010; Desmarais and Cranmer, 2013; Fell-
man and Wright, 2014; Campedelli et al., 2019b; Skillicorn et al., 2019) have showed
promising directions and highlighted patterns that could only be discovered through
the mathematical study of physical and abstract connections between individuals,
groups, entities, countries as fundamental components for explaining terrorism.
The contributions that quantitative methods have made for studying and predict-
ing terrorism come from a variety of sub-fields related to computational sciences
(Subrahmanian, 2012), and have forced scholars to start to think about the new chal-
lenges that counter-terrorism can take, exploiting this revolution (Thuraisingham,
2003; Ganor, 2019). Particularly, in the last years, fragmented attempts have tested
the performance of machine and deep learning algorithms on issues related to terror-
ism. However, less scientific production can be found in comparison with studies that
address other types of crimes. Among the methods applied for these purposes are
Hidden Markov models, Random Forests, Artificial Neural Networks, Support Vector
Machines (Sun et al., 2003; Raghavan et al., 2013; Ding et al., 2017; Kang and Kang,
2017).
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In spite of these signs of progress, to the best of my knowledge, still no studies inves-
tigate the potential of the integration between network science and artificial intelli-
gence for the study of terrorism. While foundational research has already addressed
the problem of learning graph representations through machine or deep learning algo-
rithms (Tian et al., 2014; Henaff et al., 2015; Jain et al., 2015; Cao et al., 2016; Monti
et al., 2017; Huang and Carley, 2019), terrorism has not yet been investigated via
the exploitation of these two scientific realms for prediction or forecasting purposes.
Notably, only a recent study by Liu et al. (2016) addressed the problem of predict-
ing the next location of an attack plotted by the whole set of groups present in the
Global Terrorism Database using deep learning architectures that take into account
spatio-temporal dimensions. The authors proposed the definition of a Spatial Tempo-
ral Recurrent Neural Network (STRNN) as an alternative to classic Recurrent Neural
Networks (RNN): STRNN would be able to incorporate time interval information
via time-specific transition matrices and geographic transition matrices for mapping
distances between locations of attacks. According to the authors, this alternative ar-
chitecture was necessary to overcome the limitation of RNN in modeling continuous
time intervals. Besides the elegant and sophisticated mathematical architecture of
the model, and its ability to perform well on this problem, the authors (as typically
happens when scholars from other fields dive into the terrorism/crime realm) do not
point out how they treated and cleaned the data at their disposal. In fact, they claim
to consider all the groups included in the GTD: however, the number is on a scale
of thousands, with a vast majority of actors that have plotted either one or very few
attacks. This leaves unanswered questions about how this problem has been solved
in practice, before running the experiments.
This work, as anticipated in earlier chapters of this dissertations, aims at placing itself
in the focal point of integration between network science and deep learning, exploiting
my criminological background to set up a reasonable and grounded information space
that relies on the assumed existence of memory and interdependence between terrorist
events which, in turn, are concepts framed within the theories on the spatio-temporal
concentration of crime and violence and the rational decision-making processes of
terrorist groups.
6.2.2 Why Terrorist Targets?
Terrorist target selection has been a long-standing feature of interest for scientific
research (Sandler and Lapan, 1988; Wilkinson, 1990; Hoffman, 1993; Drake, 1998a;
Eyerman, 1998; Clarke and Newman, 2006; Krueger and Laitin, 2008; Asal et al.,
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2009; Pizam, 2010; Toft et al., 2010; Brandt and Sandler, 2010; Santifort et al., 2013;
Hastings and Chan, 2013; Asal and Hastings, 2015; Morris, 2015; Abrahms et al.,
2018). Indeed, its importance is related to the fact that shining a light on them
can help in designing prevention policies and allocating resources to protect sensible
and potential future targets (Clarke and Newman, 2006; Bier et al., 2007). Targets
have been studied from different perspectives in the literature. Among the many
approaches, Sandler and Lapan (1988) have first relied on a game-theoretic formal
model assuming rational behavior of agents to demonstrate that when intelligence
sharing is not linked to deterrence coordination between different countries, policies
for protecting likely targets become of little help or, even worst, completely useless.
Shifting from formal modeling to data-driven analyses, other scholars have applied
Bayesian models to detect dynamics and key-points of terrorist target selection pro-
cesses (Brandt and Sandler, 2010; Santifort et al., 2013). Brandt and Sandler (2010)
employed Bayesian models to detect dynamics and key-points of terrorist target se-
lection processes. They have specifically employed Bayesian Poisson changepoint
regression models to investigate how transnational terrorists adjust their selection
of targets in response to target hardening. Their study, conducted for attacks that
occurred from 1968 to 2007, identified four separate periods and three underlying
covariates that can explain this clustering over-time, namely the dominant terrorist
influence, countermeasures, and terrorist state-sponsorship considerations.
Santifort et al. (2013), instead, compared diversity in target choice among domes-
tic and transnational terrorism during a 40 years time range. Relying on the Global
Terrorism Database, they have used a Bayesian Reversible Jump Markov Chain Monte
Carlo model obtaining arrival rate changes in both types of terrorism and evaluating
the extent to which their target selection is diverse, also from a temporal standpoint.
Diversity was calculated using Herfindahl indexes for different specifications of at-
tacks. One of the main findings of the study was that bombings of private parties
have become the preferred target-attack at transnational and domestic levels dur-
ing the period taken into account, positing an improvement of homeland security
resources to counter these dynamics.
Focusing specifically on soft targets (like individuals) in the period 1998-2005,
Asal et al. (2009) have detected how ideology, and specifically religion, is the decisive
factor driving the choice to turn towards target civilians. Furthermore, they have
highlighted how there is no relation between democratic regimes and undefended
civilians, contesting a widespread assumption of political science and international
relations which posits that regime type is a relevant dimension in explaining terrorism.
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Formalizing countries as targets and starting from the assumption of regime type as
a determinant of terrorism, Ivanova and Sandler (2006) tested instead whether, based
on the regime, the likelihood of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents
increases. In their study, they have found that there seems to be a positive relation
between democracies and the risk for these attacks.
This non-exhaustive brief review of the state of the art in terrorism research
regarding targets and related dynamics demonstrates that there exists a tiny part
of the scientific community which concentrates on this dimension, and most of the
contributors point out how research in this regard can be extremely important for
real-world applications in counter-terrorism and defense programs. Furthermore, an
interesting point is that, besides differences in samples and actual research questions,
several studies highlight the existence of certain patterns over time (either cycles or
keypoints), this thus suggests that there is a degree of temporal structure in the way
in which terrorism occurs.
6.3 Methodological Framework
6.3.1 Dynamic Meta-Networks of Terrorism
This work is founded on a conceptual intuition that I believe has relevance if a re-
searcher’s desire is to rethink how terrorism happens and evolves over time. Specif-
ically, this conceptual intuition revolves around the idea of “meta-network”. A dy-
namic meta-network, as defined in this dissertation, is a complex network that is
characterized by three main aspects: 1. Multi-modality; 2. Multiplexity; 3. Dynam-
icity.
Multi-modality (also known as multi-entity) means that the networks are com-
prised of different types of nodes, representing substantially different entities. Multi-
plexity means that there are different levels of links, as we can think of a multiplex
network as the union of separated simple one-link-type networks. Finally, dynamicity
is the element that introduces a temporal and evolutionary dimension, meaning that
the meta-network is mapped across different (discrete, in most cases) timestamps
that allow the researcher to assess and analyze changes over time within the meta-
network itself. In a general way, given a temporal vector of discrete time-stamps
T = {t1, t2, ..., ti} where to each temporal element are associated |k +m| networks
that take the form of mathematical graphs G and each graph can be either one-mode
(monopartite) in the form G = 〈N,E〉 or two-mode (bipartite) in the form G =
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〈U,N,E〉 where N,U ⊂ N are two different sets nodes and E = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ N,U},
I define a meta-network a meta-network for the time unit ti as:
Mti =:
⋃ [ l⋃
k=1
Gl 〈Nl, El〉 ,
n⋃
m=1
Gl 〈Ul, Nl, El〉
]
(6.1)
therefore, a unified dynamic meta-network for a whole given temporal vector can
be defined as:
MT =:
T⋃
t=1
Mt (6.2)
This brief introduction already highlights how meta-networks are extremely differ-
ent if compared with common networks used in most SNA research. Usually, networks
in SNA studies (also in the fields of criminology and terrorism research) are one-mode
(one type of nodes) and not multiplex, with cases in which networks combine two (but
not more) types of nodes, mapping a dual entity system, thus generally defined only
as G = 〈N,E〉. Scholars in criminology have not yet exploited the whole potential
of dynamic or multi-mode techniques because they have mainly relied on networks
solely comprising individuals, and often discretizing these networks through artificial
time-stamps is not possible or too subjective. Additionally, networks of individuals in
criminology many times rely on judicial files or open-sources, therefore posing prob-
lems of certainty of network boundaries and missing information (Berlusconi, 2013;
Campana, 2016).
6.3.2 Graph-derived Multivariate Time Series
As reminded many times throughout the work, the intent is to use dynamic meta-
networks to feed multiple neural network architectures to predict future likely targets
attacked by jihadist groups. It is thus necessary to point out what are the technical
steps that will allow performing this task. Moving from the conceptualization of a
meta-network, for each terrorist group, we first define:
GN :=
〈
(V1, V2, ..., Vm) , (E1,2, ..., Em,n) ,
(
WE1,2 , ...,WEm,n
)〉
(6.3)
As a multipartite graph (also called manifold) that contains N partitions describ-
ing relations between different sets of nodes Vm and Vn. These relations are formalized
as edges Em,n that are weighted by W ∈ R>0. Within this context, a single mode
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in the multipartite graph is represented as Gm,n =
〈
Vm, Vn, Em,n,WEm,n
〉
. For each
group, the original graph has terrorist events identified as source nodes, while the
different partitions are locations of attack (intended as targeted countries), employed
weapons, tactics and targets. As already mentioned, each attack may have multiple
features within the single partition (specifically, up to three targets and tactics and up
to four weapons). Weights, within single modes, are at this point the number of times
a single feature is targeted or employed. Additionally, terrorist events A1, A2, ..., Ak
hold a temporal attribute which represents the day of the attack. Specifically, for each
Ai the relation ∀ Ai ∃ t ∈ T = (t1, ..., tn) is generally verified (where T represents a
vector of time units in daily format, t1 coincides with the first attack (the oldest) at-
tack plotted by the group, while tn coincides with the day of the last (newest) attack.
When the relation is not verified, i.e. the day is missing, I have imputed the modal
day for that month.
For the purposes of the analyses, however, I need to restructure the multipartite
graphs to aggregate time units not to end up with extremely sparse matrices, at the
same time preserving the necessary richness of the dataset without incurring in the
“curse of dimensionality”. Considering that the terrorist groups in the sample have
very different histories, compressing the temporal element in too wide time units
would have led to extremely small datasets in some cases (i.e.: the Islamic State,
which appeared only in 2013). Moreover, for intelligence and policy purposes it is
more useful to create predictive models on restricted time units. This is part of the in-
novation of this work, which tries to build a model that is not only useful for scientific
purposes but might be interesting also from practical uses. In particular, developing
three-day-based time series forecasting models seemed a good compromise between
detail, computational feasibility, and applied usefulness. Therefore, for each group, I
have aggregated the data using three-day time stamps. Doing this I have obtained
nested multipartite graphs for each group where source nodes are still events, but
nesting is performed using timestamps. This allowed me to create a dynamic multi-
partite graph for each group. Each feature within each mode associated with each
new timestamp is now simply the frequency of occurrence of that feature in the events
that in the original graph happened in days belonging to that specific three-day time
range. To obtain this, I have operated matrix algebra.
Given that Ga×n is the weighted adjacency matrix of dimension M ×N that formal-
izes the two-mode sub-graph Ga,n ∈ GN , with a indexing the source node, namely
events, I can obtain a one-mode square symmetric matrix Mn×n where the unique
existing mode is given by n, namely the feature of interest among the four considered
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via
GTG = M (6.4)
where GT is the transpose matrix. Through this operation, four one-mode matrices
associated with each nested multipartite graph are created. These matrices show
the recurrence of each feature within each mode in terms of frequency. Frequencies,
however, highly varied across different time units (since terrorist attacks are not
equally distributed over time) and especially across groups. I, therefore, had to extract
comparable knowledge both for internal and external validity. To achieve this goal,
I have computed normalized weighted total degree centrality for each mode. Total
degree centrality is the most common node-level metric used in network analysis. For
a focal node (feature) i in weighted one-mode matrices at each time unit t, the metric
is calculated as:
CWD (i)t =
N∑
j
wMi,j (6.5)
where wMi,j a weighted adjacency matrix, where entries are greater than 0 if feature
i is connected to j, with N being the total number of features. Further, for each t,
the value has been normalized such that:
norm CWD (i)t =
CWD (i)t
max CWD (N)t
(6.6)
The value of norm CWD (i)t can only lie in the range [0, 1]: this operation allowed to
obtain scaled normalized metrics for each group, each feature and each time stamp
at the same time, in order to make data comparable over time and across features,
controlling for the variation originating from the high variance in terrorist attacks per
time unit.
The last step to create the final version of the multipartite graph was then to
collapse the nested architecture to obtain a classic time-series data structure. We
achieved this fixing time stamps as the source mode and maintaining the original
four modes as target nodes. In this final step, the entry it,n represents the centrality
of that specific feature within that specific time-frame. After all these computations,
this metric has to be interpreted as the degree to which that specific feature was
targeted or employed by a given terrorist group. High values of degree centrality
signal that a given feature was very popular during that time frame, while 0 means
that that the feature was not attacked or employed by the considered group. A short
visual explanation of this process is shown in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Simplified Visual Depiction of Graph-Derived Time Series Extraction
This type of process and data transformation provide a framework in which actual
values are abstract representations of reality. For instance, comparing across two
quantities A and B that are also smaller than 1 in two distinct time units does not
mean anything. Even the comparison of the same two values in the same time unit
does not give any information in the absolute sense. However, the relative comparison
is important, and that is why in the models, the prediction will be evaluated in terms
of ranking. Ranking will be useful to provide risk-based outputs regardless of the
absolute centrality values which are, again, an abstraction. It will help to capture the
preferences and recurring patterns of jihadist attacks over-time, providing an easy-
to-understand and interpretable measure of risk. After having explained the steps
behind the processing and manipulation of the data, the next subsection will start to
introduce the proper algorithms that will be used for modeling purposes.
6.3.3 A Brief Introduction to Neural Networks
Machine Learning (in the work also referred to as ML) can be defined as the science of
building computer models that can learn and improve their learning capabilities over
time through the use of information and data. The expression “Machine Learning”
is supposed to be coined by Harmon (1959). ML evolved from the area of pattern
recognition in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and has seen an explosion of theoretical in-
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novations and applications in dozens of fields in the last years, spanning from pure
research to industry, intelligence and government.
The main distinction within the realm of ML is between supervised and unsuper-
vised learning. In the case of supervised learning, the computer program is provided
with inputs and outputs, and the main goal is to find a function that accurately
maps inputs to outputs. Conversely, in the case of unsupervised learning, the pro-
grammer does not provide the program with labels, therefore there is no distinction
between inputs and outputs. The aim of an unsupervised learning system is gener-
ally to discover hidden patterns in the data. Besides these two distinct tasks that
ML algorithms should solve, there is a third one (which sometimes is included in the
former category of supervised learning) that is worth to mention. This third category
is called “reinforcement learning”, and it deals with the problem of finding actions
to take in a given situation to maximize a certain reward (Bishop, 2006) Besides
the different tasks, ML algorithms can be distinguished also by their applications.
Within supervised learning, indeed, we can divide two main applications: classifica-
tion and regression problems. Classification is related to the learning problems in
which the output (also called target or response variable) is categorical. When, con-
versely, the output is real-valued or continuous, the application is called regression
(Murphy, 2012). Within unsupervised learning, two main applications are clustering,
density estimation, and visualization. Clustering aims at discovering similar groups
within the data (Xu and Wunsch, 2005), density estimation at determining the distri-
bution of data across inputs and dimensionality reduction at projecting data to a two
or three-dimensional space, starting from a high-dimensional one (Saul and Roweis,
2013).
The list of ML algorithms is extremely vast and this work does not aim at surveying
them. Instead, it specifically focuses on a particular family of algorithms: Neural
Networks (also called Artificial Neural Networks). The expression “Neural Network”
originates from the pioneering work of McCulloch and Pitts (1943). The American
scientists tried to reproduce the information processes of biological systems via mathe-
matical modeling and proposed a model to simulate how neurons behave. After them,
many others tried to refine and improve this mathematical formalization (Rosenblatt,
1958; Harmon, 1959; Widrow and Hoff, 1960; Block et al., 1962; Rumelhart et al.,
1986). Over the course of decades, scientists have found that, besides some exaggerate
claims regarding the accuracy of artificial neurons in representing the way real ones
act, these mathematical and statistical models were efficient in pattern recognition.
This finding led to the development of a myriad of different models – neural networks
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– that aimed at learning to simulate how the biological brain does.
From the definitional point of view, scholars have tried in many ways to describe
what a NN is. No way has been found to universally define what NNs consist of. A
good review of the definition has been compiled by Guresen and Kayakutlu (2011).
For the sake of simplicity, I will here adopt the definition provided by Haykin (1994).
Haykin defines NN as massively parallel combinations of simple processing units that
can acquire knowledge from the environment (data) through a learning process and
store this knowledge in its connections. This definition is extremely concise, though it
is simple enough to explain clearly what a NN fundamentally is. NNs are organized
in different layers that are made up of many interconnected nodes (i.e. neurons).
These nodes contain an activation function and existing patterns are presented to
the NN through an input layer that is connected and communicates with at least one
hidden layer. A hidden layer is where mathematical processing is done via weighted
connections. This hidden layer is also connected to the output layer, where the actual
outputs of the model are shown (Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2: A Simple Neural Network Structure with a Single Hidden Layer
Basic research has seen the development of dozens of different neural network ar-
chitectures. The most straightforward ones are feed-forward neural networks and per-
ceptrons (Rosenblatt, 1958), while other very popular typologies are Boltzmann Ma-
chines (Ackley et al., 1985; Hinton, 2012), Convolutional Neural Networks (Lawrence
et al., 1997; Lecun et al., 1998), Generative Adversarial Networks (Goodfellow et al.,
2014) and Support Vector Machines (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995). The developments in
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this direction and the creation of neural networks with multiple (generally more than
two) hidden layers gave birth to the so-called area of deep learning. Deep learning is
indeed a sub-area of machine learning that relies on multiple levels of representation
(i.e., hidden layers) (Goodfellow et al., 2016) to find patterns and representations in
the data. In this work, I will specifically deal with the use of a specific deep class of
neural networks capable of handling sequence-shaped data, namely Long Short-Term
Memory network.
6.3.4 Long Short-Term Memory Networks: an Overview
Although several algorithms capable of handling temporally ordered or sequences data
exist (and many more are currently being developed), the most common architec-
ture in the literature is represented by Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks.
LSTM has been created to improve performance and solve the issues of Simple Re-
current Neural Networks (SRNN).
Simple Recurrent Neural Networks (SRNNs) were first developed by Elman (1990).
His work started with the question of how to represent time in connectionist models,
as NNs are. Elman worked in the realm of cognitive science and computational lin-
guistics, and its architecture was first suited for lexical and textual data, specifically
dealing with the problems of words and sentence emergence. SRNNs, as anticipated
by the label, is made up of a simple architecture that basically consists of a three-
layer feed-forward backpropagation network. These networks specifically hold a time
twist. This means that they have connections through time: therefore, the order in
which a network is fed really matters. Besides their simplicity, however, they present
the so-called “vanishing (or exploding) gradient problem” (Bengio et al., 1994; Pas-
canu et al., 2012). This problem is related to RNNs iterative nature and practically
means that information gets rapidly lost over time. Thus, SRNNs are not capable
of handling very long memory processes. As pointed out by Chung et al. (2014), to
formally define a SRNN we can consider a sequence x = (x1, x2, ..., xT ): the SRNN
updates its recurrent hidden state ht as follows:
ht =
{
0 ; t = 0
φ (ht−1, xt) ; otherwise
(6.7)
where φ represents a non-linear function (e.g. a logistic sigmoid) with an affine
transformation. In the same work, Chung et al. say that the network can optionally
have an output y = (y1, y2, ..., yT ) of variable length. Usually, the update showed in
the previous equation is formalized as:
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ht = g
(
WXT + Uht−1
)
(6.8)
where g represents a smooth, bounded function (again, as a logistic sigmoid or a
hyperbolic tangent), W is a weight matrix and U is the hidden state-to-hidden state
matrix, which has the form of a transition matrix, similar to the one that we can find
in Markov chains. It is worth to mention that ht represents the process of carrying
“memory” in a mathematical fashion. Generative SRNNs outputs the probability
distribution over the following elements of a sequence, given its current state ht.
Indeed, the sequence probability can be decomposed applying the general product
rule of probability as follows:
p(x1, ..., xT ) = p(x1)p (x2 | x1) (x3 | x1, x2) · · · p (xT | x1, ..., xT−1) =
p
(
T−1⋂
k=1
xk
)
=
T−1∏
k=1
p
(
xk |
T−2⋂
j=1
xj
)
(6.9)
where the last element represents a special output symbol in the form of a end-of-
sequence value. Finally, we model each conditional probability distribution as follows:
p (xT | x1, ..., xT−1) = g (ht) (6.10)
Regarding applications, this architecture has been used to solve problems in which
sequence matters but not in the pure “temporal” nature, for example in computational
linguistics, where the order of words is fundamental but there is not an actual timeline
and, additionally, a researcher is not interested in the delta between two inputs or
items. Besides computational linguistics, SRNNs have been employed, among the
others, also in classic time series problems (Connor et al., 1994; Ho et al., 2002; Han
et al., 2004) and speech recognition (Graves et al., 2013).
To overcome the issues associated with SRNNs, Hochreiter and Schmidhuber
(1997) have developed Long Short-Term Memory Networks. This particular form
of RNNs was able to control the vanishing gradient problem: this improvement ex-
plains their success. The way in which these networks combat the mentioned issue is
by introducing gates and explicit memory cells. Each node (neuron) has three gates:
input, output and forget. The input gate decides the degree to which the information
coming from the previous layer gets stored in the cell. The output later, conversely,
decides how much information regarding the present cell will be passed to the next
layer. Finally, the forget gate helps in discarding information which is not useful
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and that should not be stored in the network. The flexibility of these networks and
the introduction of explicit memory cells have proved to be very powerful in learning
complex patterns and sequences. LSTM can handle and learn long-term dependencies
and this is the main reason why they can learn complex patterns better than what
can be achieved by SRNNs. This improvement marked the wide use of LSTM in a
wide range of disciplines.
Although different versions of LSTM have been proposed by researchers, a com-
monly used architecture is the one proposed by Graves (2013). In his paper, Graves
provides an LSTM where H, the hidden layer function, is implemented by a composite
function. This composite function comprises five elements: input gate, forget gate,
output gate, cell, cell input activation vectors, hidden vector. All these elements are
of the same length as the latter element. The input target it is given by:
it = σ (Wxixt + Uhiht−1 + Vcict−1 + bi) (6.11)
where σ represent a logistic sigmoid function that maps nonlinear relations, Wxi is the
weight matrix of the input, Uhi is the hidden-input gate matrix, Vci are the cell-gate
diagonal weight matrices all at the previous state, bi is the bias term of the input
gate. The forget gate ft is given by:
ft = σ
(
Wxfxt + Uhfht−1 + Vcf ct−1 + bi
)
(6.12)
withWxf representing the input-forget weight matrix, Uhf is the hidden-forget weight
matrix, Vcf is the cell-forget diagonal weight matrix all at the previous state, and bf
is the bias term of the forget gate. The cell gate ct is represented as:
ct = ftct−1 + ittanh (Wxcxt + Uhcht−1 + bc) (6.13)
where ct−1 is the old state, Wxc is the input-cell weight matrix and Uhc is the hidden-
cell weight matrix all at the previous state, and bc is the bias term of the cell. Finally,
the output (activation) function of the LSTM unit ht is defined as:
ht = ottanh (ct) (6.14)
where ot is the output gate that modulates the amount of memory that is computed
as:
ot = σ (Wxoxt + Uhoht−1 + Vcoct−1 + bo) (6.15)
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where Wxo is the input-output weight matrix, Uho is the hidden-output weight ma-
trix, Vco is the cell-output weight diagonal matrix all at previous state, and again
bo is the bias term of the output. It has to be noted that for the modelling of the
research problem, a slightly different configuration has been used in this dissertation,
as detailed in Subsection 6.3.5.
Besides time series (Gers et al., 2002), LSTM have been applied to face recognition
problems (Levada et al., 2008), emotions modelling in audiovisual settings (Wo¨llmer
et al., 2013), language modelling (Soutner and Mu¨ller, 2013), and medical diagnoses
(Lipton et al., 2015).
6.3.5 Deep LSTM Configuration
The multi-partite graph processing phase led to the creation of dynamic networks for
each group, with data shaped on a three-day unit basis. Since the groups cover ex-
tremely different time-spans, it is highly expectable that neural networks will operate
and perform accordingly. Indeed, while some groups have a long-standing presence
in the global scenario (e.g. Taliban), others are more recent (and far more active in
terms of attacks), thus a first hypothesis is that the algorithms hyperparameters will
have to be set depending on the dimension of the data at my disposal. Table 6.1
displays the number of time units per group, including the number of units with no
attacks.
Group N Time Units
N of Units with
No Attacks
Islamic State 453
34
(7.50%)
Taliban 1949
665
(34.12%)
Al Qaeda 1946
1284
(65.98%)
Al Shabaab 1096
411
(37.46%)
Boko Haram 905
323
(35.65%)
Table 6.1: Time Units per Group
As introduced above, the length of time-series is variable across groups. Further-
more, it is not just the length of time series which differentiates them. Looking at the
number of time units with no attack, we detect that classes are highly unbalanced.
Given its high frequency, for instance, the Islamic State has the shortest time-line,
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but the lower percentage of inactive units. Conversely, the Taliban and Al Qaeda
show longer time-lines, but the actual number of active units is extremely low. These
figures involve potential high impact differences in the way the algorithms will be set
and working. The proper modeling process involves the comparison of the perfor-
mance of different configurations of LSTM networks.3 Each configuration has been
tuned setting different numbers of batch sizes and look back. These concepts are
presented below. Additionally, a description of other relevant elements of the models
is also provided. Elements include the number of layers, number of neurons, regular-
ization, activation function, train size, and optimizer.
6.3.5.1 Architecture of the LSTM
Layers The number of layers in a neural network generally reports the actual num-
ber of hidden layers that are comprised in the model. A vivid debate in the field of
AI focused on whether neural network should have more than a single hidden layer.
Until 2006, most of the field believed that one hidden layer was sufficient due to the
Universal Approximation Theorem proposed by Cybenko (1989) and then expanded
by Hornik (1991). However, in 2006, due to the considerable shift towards more and
more complex datasets (including ones designed for time-series), Hinton et al. (2006)
posited that multiple (and eventually dense) hidden layers can improve the perfor-
mance of the algorithms. In my models, each deep neural network will comprise three
hidden layers, as preliminary testing showed little learning capacity for networks with
just one or two hidden layers. Additionally, networks of higher complexity did not
reach a statistically better performance than the three-layered architecture.
Neurons The number of neurons involves a crucial decision in the topology of the
network. Indeed, the number of neurons can highly influence the performance of the
algorithm. The decision between too few or too many neurons is tightly related to
the problems of under-fitting (for which the algorithm is not capable of detecting
patterns and signals) and over-fitting (for which the network capacity by far exceeds
the complexity of the data structure). Furthermore, neurons have an impact on the
time required to train the network: as the number increases, time does increases too
and can lead to the impossibility of proper training, therefore nullifying the utility
3The entire modelling part has been deployed via Keras (Chollet, 2015), using TensorFlow back-
end (Abadi et al., 2015).
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of the network. After extensive preliminary experiments, each network will have an
input number of neurons equal to the number of features of the whole input space,
the three hidden layers will respectively have 256, 128 and 64 neurons, and the output
layer will be again equal to the input space.
Regularization: Dropout and Early Stopping Dropout is a form of regular-
ization applied to neural networks that was introduced by Srivastava et al. (2014). It
is a technique that aims at preventing a neural network from overfitting. The idea
behind this technique is to drop units and related connections in random order while
the network is training, preventing its excessive co-adaptation. The values that can
be set for dropout fall in the range [0, 1], where 0 means no dropout at all. The
experiments have been carried out applying dropout regularization of 0.5 for each
of the three hidden layers. Extensive preliminary experiments demonstrated that
lower dropout was not able to avoid overfitting in the networks, while higher values
prevented the networks to learn efficiently. In addition, an “early stop” option is
also included. This option automatically interrupts the learning process after several
epochs (i.e., 20) with no detected change (either increase or decrease) in the chosen
loss function during testing.
Activation The activation function of a node in neural network models the output
originating from an input for that given node. There are many different activation
functions, and the most popular are the binary step, logistic sigmoid, hyperbolic
tangent (tanh), rectified linear unit (ReLu), Leaky rectified linear unit (Leaky ReLU)
and softmax. For each of the models, two different functions have been applied: the
logistic sigmoid for the input and output layers, while in the hidden ones ReLu has
been used. The logistic sigmoid is a monotonic non-linear activation function given
by the equation:
σ =
1
1 + e−x
(6.16)
This function guarantees a smooth gradient (preventing spikes in the outputs), bounded
values between 0 and 1 (which constitute a perfect fit for this specific problem, given
that all the data are within this range). Unfortunately, this function also shows
disadvantages, as the vanishing gradient that can dramatically decrease the learn-
ing procedure or severely impact the speed of the computations. For this reason, to
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avoid these risks, the hidden layers are activated via ReLu. ReLu is also a non-linear
monotonic function modeled by the equation:
f(x) =
{
0 for x < 0
x for x ≥ 0 (6.17)
or, much more simplistically, f(x) = max(x, 0). Compared to the logistic sigmoid,
ReLU is much more computationally efficient (it converges fast) and it is sparsely
activated, a characteristic that fits well with the extreme sparsity of the data used
for the analysis of this chapter. It is now very common in the deep learning literature
and the models will then exploit its strengths in the hidden layers, where the majority
of neurons is located.
Loss Function Neural networks involve an optimization process that seeks to min-
imize a given loss function. In other words, loss functions seek to minimize the
prediction error, comparing real and model-generated data. The choice of the spe-
cific loss function is dependent upon the specific problem setting but can be a priori
divided into two main families: loss functions for classification and loss functions for
regression problems. Given the original regression nature of the experiments (that
will be then transformed into a ranking problem through the introduction of two
accuracy measures), two loss functions have been monitored to evaluate the fitness
of the models and detect potential overfitting (or underfitting) issues. The first loss
function that has been monitored is Mean Squared Error (MSE). The standard form
of MSE is given by:
L = 1
n
n∑
i=1
(y(i) − yˆ(i))2 (6.18)
where (y(i)−yˆ(i)) is called residual between the actual and the predicted value of y and
the objective of the function is to minimize the residual sum of squares. Additionally,
also Mean Absolute Error (MAE) has been used to assess the performance of the
LSTM networks. MAE is calculated as:
L = 1
n
n∑
i=1
|y(i) − yˆ(i)| (6.19)
where |•| denotes the absolute difference between the actual and the predicted
value of y. MAE is less efficient than MSE in terms of computation, but it is more
robust to outliers since, compared to MSE, it does not use the square. These two
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functions then map the loss in different ways with respect to the magnitude of the
error, and this is the reason why their combined use as a choice to control either
aspect (i.e. smaller and bigger errors) of the prediction processes.
Look Back The look back is a component that has been included in the models to
set the length of the vector of inputs from which the network has to learn and fore-
cast future values. Indeed, it can be set fixing a certain number N of input vectors
(namely, time units). The name itself suggests that this hyperparameter “force” the
network to only used previous N time steps to detect patterns. This represents an
intriguing way to take memory into account. Of course, for larger N , the training will
be slower. Considered that each time unit includes data for three days, the look back
thresholds will be set accordingly to test meaningful hypotheses regarding “seasonal
pattern”. In the experiments, look back sizes of 1, 2, 3, 10, 20, 30, 50 (equivalent
to 2, 6, 9, 30, 90 and 150 days of data prior the present attack) have been considered.4
Train Set The train size is the amount of data that is fed into the network to
detect patterns before the proper test phase. Generally, the larger is the train size,
the more the network can learn from its inputs. For neural networks with no sequence
or time-dependencies, the split between train and test size is made upon percentage
thresholds off-the-shelf. However, in the case of time series, the distinction is a bit
more delicate. Indeed, fixing a % for models related to groups that have very different
lengths and dimensions has to be evaluated carefully. As a baseline approach for this
dissertation, I have used a 90/10 split. This unbalanced choice is motivated by two
main reasons. First, almost all groups exhibit very few attacks in the first part of
the temporal windows. A more balanced (e.g., 65/35) split would have potentially
posed the risk of training the network on a set of data that does not represent the
current situation highlighted in the right-end of the time-frames. Second, the time
series are not particularly long (especially in the cases of Boko Haram and the Islamic
State), thus providing more data to the networks could practically reduce the risk of
under-fitting. Table 6.2 shows the relative temporal scale of the 90/10 split for each
group.
4For the Islamic State, the maximum lag will be set to 40, as 50 would have exceeded the actual
length of the test set in terms of data points.
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Group
Total N of
Data Points
Training
Time Units
Testing
Time Units
Islamic State 453 3.35 years 4.53 months
Taliban 1949 14.41 years 1.6 years
Al Qaeda 1946 14.39 years 1.59 years
Boko Haram 905 6.69 years 9.05 months
Al Shabaab 1096 8.10 years 10.96 months
Table 6.2: Relative Temporal Scale of the 90/10 Split - per Group
Optimizer An optimization algorithm seeks to minimize (or, alternatively, maxi-
mize) an objective function (i.e. loss function) to improve the training process of a
Neural Network. There are generally two types of optimization algorithms: first-order
(that use first-order derivatives) and second-order (which use second-order deriva-
tives). The former is less expensive, while the latter is slower and costly. Generally,
the most common technique for optimizing a neural network is the so-called Gradient
Descent. Gradient Descent is based on a convex function and updates its parameters
iteratively to minimize a given function (again, loss as an example) to ist local min-
ima. There is a wide range of different gradient descent optimization algorithms. The
most common are: Adam, Adagrad, Adadelta and Nesterov Accelerated Gradient.
Although further experiments will test multiple types of optimization algorithms, my
models have been run using Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2014). Adam is a first-order
optimization algorithm that combines AdaGrad (Duchi et al., 2011) and RMSProp
(Tieleman and Hinton, 2012) and the reason behind its use as optimization algorithm
is that it works well with sparse, noisy and even non-stationary data. Technically,
given the sequence of the gradients at each timestep, g1, g2, · · · , gT it computes the
exponential average of the gradient as :
vt = β1 · v(t−1) − (1− β1) · gt (6.20)
Furthermore, it also calculates the squares of the gradient for each of the parameters
w as:
st = β2 · s(t−1) − (1− β2) · g2t (6.21)
where g2t is the elementwise square gtgt. After the first steps, it chooses the learning
step through:
∆ωt = −η vt√
st + 
· gt (6.22)
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where ω gives the model weights, η is the learning rate. The update ωt is then equal to
(ωt)+∆ωt. It is worth to mention that the authors recommend to keep β1 equal to 0.9,
β2 equal to 0.999 and  equal to 1e-10. The learning rate is fixed at the common value
of 0.001. The learning rate of a neural network is the hyper-parameter which sets
the threshold of how much the algorithm should adjust weights with respect to loss
gradient. On one side, if the learning rate is fixed at a low level, the training phase will
be longer due to the high amount of time needed for convergence. However, training
will be more reliable. On the other side, if the learning rate is high the training will
be much faster but the network will face the risk of divergence. In the case of Adam
algorithm, for convention, in many implementations the learning rate has to be fixed
at 0.001 and kept at that level. The experiments rely on this default level.
Batch Size The batch size indicates the number of examples taken from the training
set utilized in a single iteration. There are three main distinctions in terms of batch
size: 1. batch mode, which means that the batch size is equal to the dataset; 2. mini-
batch mode, which means that the batch size is greater than one training example
but smaller than the dataset; 3. stochastic mode: where batch size is equal to one.
Research showed how mini-batch is usually preferred because of less computational
cost and better performance in gradient descent. More precisely, in a recent paper,
Masters and Luschi (2018) proved how mini-batch sizes better perform when it is
kept in the range between size 2 and 32, contrasting the idea that using very large
(also in the sizes of thousands) mini batch sizes provides better results in terms of
generalization performance. The performance is better also in terms of computation
expensiveness. The models will test performance on batch sizes respectively equal to
2, 32, 64 and 100.
Epochs An epoch indicates when the whole dataset is passed forward and backward
through the network once. In the mini-batch size, an epoch is comprised of multiple
batches. The number of epochs used to train a neural network is usually large. It is
straightforward that the higher the number, the slower the training phase. There is
no a priori rule regarding the number of epochs to set in a neural network. Given the
relatively small dimension of the dataset, and prior experiments on the data, models
with 500 epochs have been run for each group.
To sum up what written in the last paragraphs, Table 6.3 synthetizes the hyperpa-
rameter combinations that were used to run the models per each group. Overall,
multiplying the number of tested batch sizes and the number of epochs, a total of 24
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models per group have been run.
Configuration Tested
N of Hidden Layers 3
N of Neurons n of features, 256, 128
Dropout 0.5
Activation Function Sigmoid and ReLU
Batch Size 2, 32, 64, 100
Look Back 1, 2, 3, 10, 20, 30, 50
Train Size 90%
Optimizer Adam
Learning Rate 0.001
N of Epochs 500
Table 6.3: Tested Configurations for Neural Networks
6.3.5.2 An “Everything to Everything” Learning System
In these particular experiments, the LSTM will use all the variables to predict all the
variables. In a simple and general mathematical notation, this can be formalized as
Xrealt−k 7→ Ypred. In a more precise way, we can think of this type of architecture
as a set of parallel predictions that are run on the same neural network such that if
X = (x1, .., xn) is an input vector and Y = (y1, .., yn) is an output vector and both
have the same length n, the neural network will work using the whole X to predict
the whole Y at (t+ 1), and this Y will then be incorporated in X for predicting the
next step, and so on.
It can be defined, somehow, as a sort of distributed teacher-forcing (Bengio et al.,
2015; Lamb et al., 2016) system to train the network in which each output for a
given feature uses all the other features plus the same feature ground-truth value at
the previous time step (again, previous time steps can be of order higher than just
one, depending on the look back). This choice was privileged due to its flexibility for
other applications in the future (e.g., predicting tactics instead of targets via a little
modification of the code), but other alternatives that could be experimented are (in
order of ascending expected utility): 1. Targets to Targets (forecasting future targets
using only previous data points on targets); 2. Input Space to Targets (which uses
the information on hit countries, weapons, and tactics to predict future targets) and,
finally, 3. Input Space and Targets to Targets (the output prediction is done using
information on the input space and targets at previous time steps).
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6.3.6 Performance Evaluation
MSE and MAE are useful for evaluating the learning process in terms of minimiza-
tion of the error and in the attempt to diagnose potential over- and under-fitting,
considering that the behavior of the training and test curves of the loss functions
is precious in detecting flaws in the deep learning architecture, as diverging curves
indicate over-fitting, while distant parallel curves suggest that the model is actually
under-fitting. Nonetheless, these measures provide little information on the central
task of the models: predicting the correct continuous central values is not the pri-
mary scope of the statistical learning procedure. The main goal is instead to correctly
predict the most central (and therefore popular, and therefore at risk) targets at a
given time unit. To evaluate the performance of the models two metrics have been
developed ad hoc for this work, namely element-wise and set-wise accuracy.
Element-wise Accuracy Element-wise accuracy Φ is the most simple metric among
the two. Given the sequence of time units Tn6=0 = t1, t2, · · · , tk, where at least one
terrorist attack has occurred and tk represent the last (more recent) unit with attacks
in the sequence, and the sets S and Sˆ that map the actual set of most central targets
(up to three5 in each t) and the predicted set of most central targets (again, up to
three elements), I define the element-wise accuracy for t1, φti as:
φti =:
{
1 if Sˆ ∩ S 6= Ø
0 if Sˆ ∩ S = Ø (6.23)
The Equation means that if the sets have at least one element in common, then φti
is equal to one, while if the two sets are disjoint the value will be equal to zero. For
the entire history of considered attacks Tn6=0, then, the overall EA accuracy ΦT is
computed as:
ΦT =
1
Tn6=0
T∑
i=1
φti (6.24)
with ΦT being the ratio between the sum of single unit binary accuracies φti and the
total number of time units T with at least an attack.
5When less than three targets have been hit in a given t, the set comprises either two (if present)
or one entity. When two or more targets are ex aequo ranked within the three most central targets
in the set, a random procedure select only one.
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Set-wise Accuracy Set-wise accuracy Γ is more complicated and further tests the
ability of the deep neural networks to identify and predict the correct set S of most
central targets. Going a bit more in detail regarding S, the cardinality of the set is
bounded in the range 0 < |S| ≤ 3. Thus, for a given time unit ti, single γ is defined
as:
γti =

1 if Sˆ = S
x if Sˆ ∩ S 6= Ø
0 if Sˆ ∩ S = Ø
(6.25)
The singular γti is then equal to 1 if the two set are perfectly identical (as in any set,
it is worth to note, the order does not matter), is 0 when the two sets are disjoint
and can take a real value x when there is an intersection between S and . This value
x is calculated via:
x =
1
|S|
|S|∑
i=1
s¨∈Sˆ∧S (6.26)
where s¨ maps an element which is part of both S and Sˆ. In the case in which s¨ is
exactly equal to the cardinality |S|, the value of x becomes 1 as it would mean that
Sˆ = S. Finally, the overall metric Γ for the sequence Tn6=0 is given by:
ΓTn 6=0 =
1∑T
t=1|S|
T∑
t=1
s¨t (6.27)
ΓTn 6=0 is computed through the product of the inverse of the sum of the elements in
each |S| present in the sequence T and the sum of all elements s¨ that, in each time unit
of T , are both part of sets S and Sˆ. The metric is, as anticipated, more challenging for
the algorithm and aims at providing more comprehensive information to researchers
and - potentially - policymakers on the riskiest targets in a future time unit. The
threshold of 3 has been set arbitrarily upon previous analysis of the average number
of targets hit in each unit with at least one attack. However, it can be modified in
the future based on a particular necessity or in relation to different research problems
analyzed with different types of data (i.e., less sparse).
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6.4 On the Properties of Time Series of
Jihadist Groups
In this section, two key properties of time series are investigated (i.e., stationarity and
randomness) and additional information specifically on targets hit by terrorist groups
is provided to shed some light on how they behave over time, seeking to highlight
some patterns that might be relevant also in the actual modeling part.
6.4.1 Investigating Stationarity
Understanding the structure of the data over time is fundamental when dealing with
time series. Besides merely descriptive statistics, one of the statistical steps which
are required for assessing patterns in data and verifying assumptions in classical
statistical methods is to test for stationarity. A stationary process is defined as
a stochastic process that has unconditional joint probability distribution that does
not change when time-shifting is considered, and therefore parameters as mean and
variance remain stable over time. We could thus say that a time series is stationary
if its properties do not depend upon the time at which the series is observed. There
are two main typologies of stationarity: strict and weak (also known as covariance
stationarity or second-order stationarity, commonly used in signal processing). In
mathematical terms, a process is said to be strictly stationary if all its finite order
distributions are time-invariant, meaning the joint cumulative distribution functions
of:
X(t1), X(t2), ..., X(tk) and X(t1 + τ), X(t2 + τ), ..., X(tk + τ) (6.28)
are the same for all k, t1, t2, ..., tk and τ . Relaxing the assumptions used for defining
a strictly stationary process, the conditions for weak stationarity are three:
1. The second moment of xt is finite for all t, which means that:
E |xt| <∞ ∀ t (6.29)
2. The first moment of xt is independent of t, which means that:
E (xt) = µ ∀ t (6.30)
3. The cross moment E (xt1 , xt2) depends only on t1 − t2 that is:
cov (xt1 , xt2) = cov
(
xt1+h , xt2+h
) ∀ t1, t2, h (6.31)
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The concept of stationarity is extremely important in statistics and econometrics
because most time series models require data to be stationary to be meaningfully
performed. Although in the case of neural networks stationarity is not strictly re-
quired, because the algorithm can handle non-linear relations and it is more flexible
in processing the data, I have checked for stationarity in the network-derived time
series for shedding some light on the shape on the potential patterns that may arise
from the analyses. To do so, I have applied one of the most common statistical tests
for stationarity checking in time series, which is the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF)
test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979). Given an autoregressive process of first order, AR(1),
written in the form:
yt = ρyt−1 + ut (6.32)
where yt represents the dependent variable, t is the time index, ρ is a coefficient and
ut is the related error term, we say that a unit root is present, i.e. the process is
non-stationary, iff ρ = 1. Starting from the model above, the regression model can
be then written as:
∆yt = (ρ− 1) yt−1 + ut (6.33)
where δ indicated the first difference operator. In this case, the unit root can be
tested fixing δ = 0 (where δ = ρ− 1). Considering the fact that the test is computed
over the residual term, the statistic t is characterized by a distribution known as
Dickey-Fuller table. There are three main versions of the original Dickey-Fuller test:
1. Test for a unit root with no drift and deterministic time trend:
∆yt = δyt−1 + ut (6.34)
2. Test for a unit root with drift and no deterministic time trend:
∆yt = a0 + δyt−1 + ut (6.35)
3. Test for a unit root with drift and deterministic time trend:
∆yt = a0 + a1t+ δyt−1 + ut (6.36)
The ADF test simply adds lagged dependent variables to the test equation, and
it is therefore applied to the model:
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∆yt = a0 + βt + γyt−1 + δ∆yt−1 + ...+ δk−1∆yt−k+1 + ut =
a0 + βt −
m∑
k=1
δ∆yt−k
(6.37)
with a0 representing a constant, β as the coefficient on a time trend and k is the
lag order that may allow for higher-order autoregressive processes. The unit root is
tested as the null hypothesis γ = 0 against the alternative hypothesis of γ < 0 which
would detect stationarity. The test statistic has the form:
ADF =
γˆ
SE (γˆ)
(6.38)
and if it is less than the larger negative critical value, then the null hypothesis can
be rejected, and the unit root can be excluded.
To test for stationarity of the data related to the five groups, I have therefore per-
formed the ADF test controlling for different lags. Since my data are divided into
three-days units, I have run the test for 1 ≤ k ≤ 50. Results are provided in Fig-
ure 6.3. The test, iterated through lags of different dimensions, yielded clear results.
Indeed, what is directly noticeable from the figure is that two processes remain sta-
tionary when all lag orders are tested. This is verified in the case of the Taliban and
Al Qaeda (this latter only highlights a risible fluctuation of statistical significance).
Al Shabaab, similarly, starts to highlight non-stationary time series only after k > 30.
In the case of Islamic State and Boko Haram, lags of very high order fail to reject
the null hypotheses: k=10 for the Islamic State already detects unit root processes,
the number further increases up to around 80% of the time series when k is set to
50. For what concerns Boko Haram, the tests starts to fail after k=10, and reaches a
maximum of non-stationary features around k=50, with a ratio of 0.5 over the total
number of time series.
One additional indication has to be drawn from the analysis: the lookback in the neu-
ral networks will have to consider the results of this test. Indeed, fixing a lookback
that is too large may prevent the algorithm from correct learning. As stationarity is
found for lags that do not exceed a certain threshold the interpretation of the results
will take into account this analysis.
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Figure 6.3: Ratio of Stationary Time Series per Each Group with Lag from 1 to 50
6.4.2 Investigating Randomness
After having verified the presence of stationarity in the data, it is useful to check
for another property to understand the structure of the data: this property is ran-
domness. In statistics, a “truly random” process is intended as a process that can
produce independent and identically (i.i.d.) distributed samples. This means that if
a given value in a sequence is influenced by its position, or by the prior data points,
the process is not truly random. There are many possible solutions for testing ran-
domness in time-series data (Moore and Wallis, 1943; Cox and Stuart, 1955; Mateus
and Caeiro, 2013), however I will here apply the Bartel’s Rank Test (Bartels, 1982),
which is a modified rank-based version of von Neumann’s Ratio Test for randomness
(von Neumann, 1941).
Differently from other tests, instead of comparing the magnitude of the observations
with their prior data points, Bartels’ Rank Test ranks all the observations from the
smallest to the largest. If the null hypothesis of randomness if verified, rank ar-
rangements from the whole set of n! possible combinations have the same probability.
Considered the rank R (Xi) as the sequential number of Xi, the probability for the
test statistic RVN is given by:
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RV N =
∑n−1
i=1 (Ri −Ri−1)2∑n−1
i=1 [Ri − (n+ 1) /2]2
(6.39)
It follows that RV N−2
σ
is asitomptically standard normal, where σ is the variance
and it is equal to σ =
4(n−2)(5n2−2n−9)
5n(n+1)(n−1)2 . Among the many different possibilities, this
test that uses ranks is particularly suitable for our data considered two factors. The
first factor that it is worth taking into account is related to the very nature of the
data which are – as reminded several times – abstractions of real-world dynamics.
We cannot tell what a particular value for a particular feature at a given time is
specifically saying. Also, since values across timestamps are not independent, but
depend on the number of features that are also existing in a given timestamp it is
difficult to compare absolute value through time, even in the extreme case where the
same feature is equal to 1 in two consecutive points. In fact, 1 in a case may indicate
that the given feature was the only one that was employed or targeted, while in the
other case, 1 may indicate that all attacks the time unit only implied that feature.
The second factor is tightly related to the development of the model: neural networks
will process absolute values, but predictions will be evaluated on a ranking base.
Therefore, it is far more useful to evaluate potential randomness from the point of
view of ranked sequences rather than focus on their values which are less important,
considering that if there are three features that are respectively equal to 1, 0.05 and 0
we are not concerned about the differences between these features, but we are seeking
to find a perfect overlap in terms of rankings for forecasting risks.
There are three potential alternative hypotheses that one can use to run the test:
right-sided, left-sided and two-sided. When using a right-sided test, the null hypoth-
esis is confronted against the alternative of a systematic oscillation; when using the
left-sided, the alternative hypothesis regards the presence of a trend; finally, when us-
ing the two-sided specification, the alternative hypothesis is proper non-randomness.
The latter is the specification that I have used. The results of the tests are provided
in Table 6.4.
The results are of the Bartels Rank test for randomness are interesting and demon-
strates that the neural networks will deal with potentially very complex prediction
problems. Indeed, the random component of processes is widely present in each
group. The Islamic State is the jihadist organization that presents the wider random
component, with 69.35% of the features that fail to reject the null hypothesis of the
test. Conversely, Al Qaeda shows the smallest presence of randomness in its features
(13.8%).
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Group
Random
Features
(ρ>0.1)
Non-Random
(ρ<0.1)
Non-Random
(ρ<0.05)
Non-Random
(ρ<0.01)
Islamic
State
43
(69.35%)
3
(4.41%)
4
(5.88%)
12
(17.64%)
Taliban
13
(30.9%)
0
(0.00%)
1
(2.38%)
28
(66.66%)
Al Qaeda
10
(13.8%)
0
(0.00%)
0
(0.00%)
62
(86.2%)
Al Shabaab
25
(55.5%)
2
(4.44%)
5
(11.11%)
13
(37.77%)
Boko
Haram
19
(45.2%)
2
(4.76%)
4
(9.52%)
17
(40.47%)
Table 6.4: Results of Bartels Rank Test for Randomness - per Group
The presence of randomness in data can be considered an issue: indeed, how is
it possible to make good predictions out of training data that do not seem to have
any oscillatory or seasonal patterns? This is one of the most challenging points of
terrorist events forecast, especially when such a time series is processed using very
detailed time units, as in this case.
6.4.3 Temporal Dynamics of Targets
The previous paragraphs aimed at verifying stationarity and potential randomness
and served as an empirical analysis to grasp as much information as possible from the
data before properly applying algorithms and analyzing the results. What we now
know, from the macro perspective at least (i.e.: without looking at specific features)
are general properties that should be considered before and after the modeling step.
That said, it is therefore useful to focus on the micro-level. Micro-level, in this case,
is the analysis (though at a first descriptive glance) of temporal dynamics of targets,
which represents the most important and relevant portion of data at my disposal, since
models will be evaluated based on their ability to correctly forecast them. Table 6.5
provides average values for all targets that are present in the data, i.e. all targets
that have at least a mention in at least one group. Figures, in this fashion, are a
valuable instrument to understand which are the most frequent (or popular) targets
overall, without taking into account – or visualizing – trends or temporal dynamics.
Comparing across groups in terms of absolute values does not make sense, but – again
– thinking in terms of ranking is a helpful workaround to make more sense of the data.
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Target
Islamic
State
Taliban
Al
Qaeda
Al
Shabaab
Boko
Haram
Business 0.043 0.056 0.021 0.047 0.033
Government (Diplomatic) 0.033 0.019 0.024 0.012 0.003
Private Citizens 0.273 0.247 0.083 0.217 0.300
Refugee Camp 0.005 0.001 NA 0.002 0.007
Maritime 0.000 NA 0.001 0.001 NA
Private Security Company 0.003 NA NA 0.001 0.002
Police 0.113 0.243 0.006 0.068 0.085
Journalists & Media 0.011 0.008 0.003 0.022 0.001
Religious Figures/Institutions 0.017 0.017 0.007 0.016 0.050
Military 0.069 0.063 0.038 0.079 0.033
Terrorists/Non State Militia 0.078 0.012 0.021 0.008 0.009
Unknown 0.015 0.035 NA 0.008 0.016
Ambulance 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 NA
NGO 0.006 0.024 0.002 0.011 0.001
Transportation 0.009 0.020 0.007 0.010 0.008
Utilities 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.002 NA
Educational Institution 0.003 0.039 0.005 0.008 0.018
Violent Political Party 0.001 0.001 0.002 NA 0.001
Airports & Aircraft 0.001 0.009 0.004 0.011 0.001
Government (General) 0.033 0.167 0.069 0.130 0.045
Other 0.001 NA 0.000 NA NA
Food or Water Supply 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001
Demilitarized Zone 0.000 0.001 0.001 NA NA
Tourists 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.001
Fire Fighters NA NA 0.001 NA 0.001
Telecommunication NA 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.002
Table 6.5: Average Centrality Values for all Targets Present in the Data - per Group
The Islamic State proves to attack more Private Citizens, Police, and Terrorists
or Non-State Militias. Taliban highlights similar preferences, but instead of targeting
terrorists or Non-State Militias, they tend to attack Government (General). Al Qaeda
has a tendency against Government (General) too, coupled with Military (and Private
Citizens), showing how their efforts have been put into actions against institutions.
Al Shabaab has a very similar profile to Al Qaeda’s one, as also detected in Chapter
4. Finally, a first look at Boko Haram’s data points out that the group plots attack
against Religious Institutions as a probable consequence of the hybrid religious setting
of the geographic area in which the organization operates. “Stock” data give a first
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summary of groups’ preferences, however much more information may be provided
visualizing and commenting proper temporal dynamics.
Islamic State Observing Figure 6.4, several things can be detected. First of all, it
is evident why for so many features (also comprising locations, tactics, and weapons)
randomness was detected. In fact, there is a consisted part of targets that seem not
to follow logical or predictable trends. This is the case of targets such as Tourists,
Airports and Aircraft, NGO, Transportation, and Utilities. In the case of Tourists,
relevance looks risible, considering the very low centrality values and frequency of
attacks against this category. Airports and Aircraft, NGOs and Transportation high-
light sudden peaks that are generally not followed by close (in time) consequent
attacks, therefore an algorithm (though powerful) might find it difficult to learn struc-
ture considered the anomaly of such events.
On the other side, other targets appear to be more patterned in time. This is espe-
cially the case for Private Citizens and Properties, Police, Terrorists and Non-State
Militias and Military. There are quite long sequences of attacks that are characterized
by continuous targeting of such categories. In some cases, we can identify very high
recurrent peaks followed by decreasing trends that tend to converge over low levels of
“popularity”. Private Citizens and Properties were particularly attacked in the first
phase of the existence of the Islamic State, probably coinciding with the expansion
strategy over physical territories. After this first phase, the Islamic State seems to
differentiate across targets (whether this is an endogenous or exogenous process re-
mains an open question) and starts to attack other Terrorists or Non-State Militias
and Military forces. One hypothesis is that these two target categories represent the
organized effort of structured or semi-structured bodies to counter the jihadist group.
It is interesting to note how Government (General) has never been a highly recurring
target in the Islamic State’s short history. This, again, might be the reflection of
the fact that the jihadist organization has been able to infiltrate, expand and spread
across territories were the institutional stability and power were weak and not suffi-
ciently present.
Finally, looking at the overall picture, it can be noticed how the most diversity and
complexity of targets (high number of high-level trends in parallel) is clustered from
2013 to half 2014, meaning that in the first years of its existence, the group was
probably able to carry out larger and heterogeneous attacks.
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The Taliban Figure 6.5 shows the trends of the different targets attacked by the
Taliban from the first recorded attack in the GTD to the last. As it will be for Al
Qaeda, during the first years (until the early 2000s) recorded attacks are very few.
Besides 1993, it would be really relevant to understand whether the groups were not
properly active or if this constitutes an additional problem of missing data in the
database compiling process.
That said, the figure seems to distinguish between extremely frequent attacked tar-
gets and other minor categories that look more like random (from a temporal point of
view). On one hand, Business, Government (General), Private Citizens and Proper-
ties, Police and lately also Military are the most recurrent targets that are persistently
present (with high centrality values) across the temporal spectrum, from 2005 circa
on (with the exception of Military, which are shown to be highly targeted from 2012
on).
On the other hand, while Telecommunication, Tourists, Food and Water Supply seem
almost randomly distributed in time, for other categories patterns are similar to mi-
crocycles or medium-term persistent shocks (namely recurrent attacks against a given
category that persists for some weeks or months). This is the case of Transportation,
with microcycles between 2010 and 2012 and persistent shocks between 2008 and
2009, NGOs (medium-term persistent shocks at the end of 2008 and 2009) and Ed-
ucational Institutions (the most evident medium-term persistent shock is at the end
of 2005).
At a first look, it seems that from 2011 on the Taliban has continuously plotted
very diverse attacks, with multiple targets, proving a capacity to handle logistical
complexity.
Al Qaeda Figure 6.6 looks in part similar to Figure 6.5 because of the absence (or
very low frequency) of attacks in the first part of the plots. It is worth to highlight that
the parallel peaks in Business, Government (General), Private Citizens and Properties
and Airports and Aircraft at the end of 2001 represent the 9/11 attacks.
The frequency of events increases especially after 2004: interestingly, we can observe
medium- and long-term persistent shocks in attacks against Police and Military, while
Private Citizens and Properties and Government (General) are quite stably present
with high levels of popularity across the last ten years spectrum.
The fact that Al Qaeda is represented here is a set of different actors (belonging to the
Al Qaeda network) that may explain the popularity that the Government (General)
category has. In fact, the ideology and final goal of the Al Qaeda Network can be
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linked to the necessity to target institutional symbols of declared enemies to obtain
enough echo and provoke potential sympathetic reactions by possible recruits.
It is furthermore worth to focus on some microcycles and medium-term recurring
shocks in attacks against utilities, which may indicate particular strategies (maybe to
illegally obtain resources) in specific geographic areas (trends should be disaggregated
by a single group to actually understand micro-dynamics, this will thus be a good
path for potential future work).
Finally, as it was found for Islamic State and Taliban, some targets do not seem to
follow any type of trend or pattern. In the case of Tourists, Food and Water Supply,
Demilitarized Zones and Fire Fighters, either events are too few or too distant in
time. This will represent a considerable challenge for the algorithms, and it has to be
taken in mind.
Boko Haram Figure 6.7 shows the target dynamics referred to attacks plotted by
the Nigerian group Boko Haram. As it was already shown for other types of analysis
(trails, for instance), Boko Haram holds several characteristics that are different from
all the other groups. This consideration can be corroborated here by two target
categories which are prominently present (though not with universal stability over-
time) in Boko Haram temporal spectrum and that are not equally important for other
groups: Religious Institutions and Educational Institutions.
The motivation behind the popularity of Religious Institutions in the Boko Haram
attack strategies lies in the fact that the region in which the group operates has a
consistent percentage of Christian population. Furthermore, it has to be noted that
Islamic communities have denounced and refused the ideology of Boko Haram as
written by Aghedo and Osumah (2012), thus Religious Institutions are enemies of
the jihadist groups on a regardless of the specific religion.
A line can be drawn which connects Religious Institutions to Educational Institutions,
a second relevant target category for Boko Haram. Indeed, Boko Haram attacks
schools, colleges and universities (Catholic and not) that are in line with the Western
idea of education completely refused and repudiated by Boko Haram. Educational
Institutions, in general, are also used by Boko Haram as effective places for kidnapping
girls and women that are used as hostages or are smuggled across adjoining African
countries, like Chad and Cameroon (Peters, 2014).
Besides Religious and Educational Institutions, Boko Haram tends to mostly attack
Private Citizens and seemed to stop targeting Police, since from late 2013 centrality
has dramatically reduced (except for certain short cycles).
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Al Shabaab Finally, figure 6.8 points out several things regarding the dynamics
of targeting conducted by Al Shabaab. In the first three subplots, it is immediately
noticeable how Business, Government (General) and Private Citizens and Properties
represent by far the most preferred (also because of permanent recurrence overtime)
targets by the Somalian group.
Looking at less persistent mechanics, Police and Military, two categories that are
generally related if not mathematically at least conceptually, present medium- and
long-term recurring shocks that are identifiable in the plots (for the former, between
2012 and 2013 and in early 2015, while for the latter a quite long term is exhibited
during 2014). These two targets hold interesting dynamics that can indicate and
highlight time windows where either countering actions forced the group to react
massively or, conversely, direct strategies of the group to reach a particular goal.
Finally, Government (Diplomatic), Transportation, Telecommunication and Terror-
ists or Non-State Militias are certainly not amongst the most frequent targets, and
the distribution may seem random if we concentrate on the whole spectrum, nonethe-
less, there are cases in which high spikes are actually followed by decreasing centrality
values, indicating that, somehow, the given category has been the subject of attacks
for a short, but detectable, period of time. This type of behavior certainly represents
a challenge for the deep learning models, but it is more solvable than pure singular
peaks that in statistical terms are defined as “outliers”.
In these three cases we have instead short cycles that might remember of the be-
haviour that can be captured by Hawkes Processes, where - as seen in Chapter 5 - a
first shock is followed by other shocks of minor intensity for a certain period of time,
until the frequency and intensity converges over 0 in a certain amount of time (Ogata,
1988, 1998).
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6.5 Results of the Models
6.5.1 The Islamic State
The Islamic State with the shortest time sequence overall: however, when taking into
account their activity, the group geographically originating in Iraq and Syria shows
the highest frequency of attacks. The feature space comprising targeted countries,
employed weapons, adopted tactics and hit targets is the less temporally sparse over-
all. Figure 6.9 provides a graphic visualization of the correlation between each column
vectors (i.e., Syria, Firearms, Government (General) and so on) to preliminarily in-
spect the existing relation between the variables. The plot shows that few features
actually show very high (either positive or negative) correlation values in the 62 × 62
matrix. This suggests that the prediction problem might be particularly challenging.
    
    
    
    
    
    
Figure 6.9: Correlation Matrix of Centrality Values (All Features) - Islamic State
To further inspect the correlations to provide more specific knowledge on the is-
sue, Table 6.6 lists the ten highest correlation values between the variables. Trivially,
the tactic “Bombing/Explosion” and weapon “Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite” almost
reach a perfect correlation of 1. Following, it is interesting to note how the territo-
ries of the West Bank/Gaza Strip are strongly related to the targeting of Diplomatic
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Figures. Additionally, Indonesia and the Philippines also are particularly correlated,
indicating that often when one country is targeted in a given t, the other one also
experiences an attack, and vice-versa. With regards to targets, attacks in Jordan are
more likely to be directed against Tourists, Journalists/Media are targeted via Facil-
ity/Infrastructure attacks and terrorist events in Turkey are generally related to the
presence of Refugee Camps, considering that Turkey has shared borders with both
Syria and Iraq, the two most attacked countries by the Islamic State.
Feature 1 Feature 2 r
Bombing/Explosion Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 0.911
West Bank/Gaza Strip Government (Diplomatic) 0.795
Indonesia Philippines 0.755
Armed Assault Firearms 0.726
Jordan Tourists 0.710
Facility/Infrastructure Journalists/Media 0.668
Unknown Unknown 0.571
Egypt Lybia 0.547
Turkey Refugee Camp 0.501
Melee Other 0.480
Table 6.6: Ten Highest Correlation Coefficients Between Features - Islamic State
Before commenting on the results of the models, the reader may appreciate the
information provided by Figure 6.10. The heatmap aims to visualize the patterns
of each column vector (to be read as “feature”) over time in terms of centrality.
In the case of the Islamic State, this heatmap clearly shows several things. First,
as anticipated above, the Islamic State is responsible for a dramatic frequency of
attacks over the considered period. Second, the matrix values are clustered within
a small number of vectors. Third, and related to the first point, Iraq (belonging to
the Countries dimension of the manifold) Bombing/Explosions (belonging to tactics),
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (weapons), and Private Citizens and Property (targets)
are the four leading vectors in terms of variance within the manifold. This can
anticipate that the prediction problem might not be extremely challenging, in the
end, at least in terms of Φ(T ) accuracy.
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Figure 6.10: Temporal Heatmap - Centrality Over Time (Islamic State). Vertical White Lines
Separate Modes
The results obtained from the models are particularly promising. Indeed, all
models (with no exception) can identify at least one of the three most central targets
in each time unit (Φ(T )). This might be due to the extreme regularity of attacks
against Private Citizens and Property that the Islamic State exhibits in the period
under observation.
Nonetheless, the results of setwise accuracy Γ(T ). As noted in the presentation of
the metric, it is much more challenging compared to Γ(T ), and this is showed by the
existing disparity between the two, for this particular jihadist group. However, the
range in which the prediction fall (∼ 0.4 - 0.75) demonstrates that the deep neural
network has considerable power in detecting and revealing the most probable future
targets, beyond the easily predictable regularity of Private Citizens and Property.
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Figure 6.11: Bivariate Relation Between Model Performance in Γ(T ) and Φ(T ) - Islamic State
Specifically focusing on the best model6, the parameters and characteristics show
that a batch size of 32 performs better than the two other bigger alternatives (64
and 100) and that, in spite of the non-stationarity of considerable number of features
around k=30 (∼ 35%), the model performs better when it is fed with data coming
from the last 30 points (∼ 3 months).
Parameter Value
Batch Size 32
Look back 30
Φ(T ) 1
Γ(T ) 0.75
MSE 0.005
MAE 0.026
Execution Time ∼ 11 min.
Table 6.7: Best Model Performance and Results - Islamic State
6For each of the jihadist groups, the best model will be selected based on the best performance
in terms of Γ(T ), as the most demanding metric.
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Furthermore, Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13 show how the loss functions converged
quite fast and the models stopped to learn after 140 epochs due to the imposed
constraint of the “early stop” option to prevent over-fitting.
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Figure 6.12: MSE - Islamic State
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Figure 6.13: MAE - Islamic State
6.5.2 The Taliban
The visual inspection of Figure 6.14 reveals how the Taliban presents some strong
relations across the feature vectors of the 39 × 39 matrix. Overall, the Taliban
are associated with the lowest number of features to learn from and forecast, this is
partially due to the extreme concentration of attacks in Afghanistan (and, marginally,
Pakistan).
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Figure 6.14: Correlation Matrix of Centrality Values (All Features) - Taliban
In detail, the strong role of Afghanistan within the matrix is testified by the
information included in Table 6.8: out of the ten highest correlation coefficients, half
are related to it. This strong clustering dynamic might lead to two divergent results.
It could either reduce the range of information to learn from, bounding variance and
therefore posing challenging problems to the forecasting or, contrarily, mark well-
determined patterns facilitating the task of the LSTM.
Feature 1 Feature 2 r
Bombing/Explosion Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 0.927
Armed Assault Firearms 0.834
Facility/Infrastructure Incendiary 0.822
Afghanistan Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 0.743
Afghanistan Bombing/Explosion 0.718
Unknown Unknown.1 0.716
Afghanistan Firearms 0.671
Unarmed Assault Chemical 0.669
Afghanistan Armed Assault 0.633
Afghanistan Police 0.628
Table 6.8: Ten Highest Correlation Coefficients Between Features - Taliban
Figure 6.15 further allows noting the prominent presence of Afghanistan over time.
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The color map also shows how the country has been the most central nearly in each
unit of the sequence. Less clear patterns can be detected in the other modes, and
especially in the target dimension which accounts for half of the column vectors.
Indeed, besides the clear persistent centrality of Police and Private Citizens and
Property, other types of targets are much more sparse, volatile or clustered in limited
time frames, with high spiking centrality that vanishes after relatively short periods.
This is the case of Business-related targets or Religious Figures/Institutions. With
regards to tactics, bombing and explosions and armed assaults are stably central
over-time, in association with related weapons (i.e., Explosives, Bombs, Dynamite
and Firearms).
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Figure 6.15: Temporal Heatmap - Centrality Over Time (Taliban). Vertical White Lines Separate
Different Modes.
Also in the case of the Taliban, the results are encouraging. Figure 6.16 shows that
the performance of each model is concentrated between ∼ 0.95 and ∼ 0.98 for Φ(T )
and ∼ 0.75 and ∼ 0.76 for Γ(T ). The relation between the two metrics is positive
linear: as one metric increases in its power, so does the other.
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Figure 6.16: Bivariate Relation Between Model Performance in Γ(T ) and Φ(T ) - Taliban
The best model and its characteristics are illustrated in Table 6.9: the deep LSTM
which achieved the highest set-wise accuracy was trained using a look back of 10:
thirty days of history are sufficient for learning patterns and forecast them in the
most accurate way across all the twenty-eight networks. The implication of this
result is that Taliban hold medium-range dependencies between the present and the
past: the Taliban seem to be consistent and homogeneous in their behaviour for some
weeks.
Parameter Value
Batch Size 32
Look back 10
Φ(T ) 0.758
Γ(T ) 0.973
MSE 0.053
MAE 0.126
Execution Time ∼ 15 min.
Table 6.9: Best Model Performance and Results - Taliban
The behavior of the loss functions shows no particular sign of over-fitting. Con-
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trarily, the performance of MAE might even suggest that there is still room for im-
provement since the curves are parallel and do not converge over the epochs, as early
stop parameters stopped the process after only 80 epochs.
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Figure 6.17: MSE - Taliban
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Figure 6.18: MAE - Taliban
6.5.3 Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda has demonstrated to be the most challenging group overall in terms of
forecasts. The 72 × 72 matrix is the most sparse and the one with most features
among all the considered groups: the dimensionality of the data certainly played a
role in the performance of the models. Figure 6.19 shows how most of the vectors
do not show any relation. Notably, very few pairwise relations show values higher
than 0.5. The upper left region of the matrix is almost perfectly uncorrelated. This
introductory description already anticipates some of the challenges that the models
had to face in reaching their goals.
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Figure 6.19: Correlation Matrix of Centrality Values (All Features) - Al Qaeda
Focusing on the highest correlations (Table 6.10, and going beyond the most trivial
and expectable relations, among the top ten ones only one actually refers to a specific
target. Indeed, Airports and Aircraft are highly associated with the United Kingdom
(r=0.495). It is also interesting to note that when information on tactics is not
available for an attack, generally the same applies to information on weapons. Data
also show a prominent tendency of Al Qaeda to plot facility/infrastructure attack by
means of incendiary tactics.
Feature 1 Feature 2 r
France Unarmed Assault 0.957
Bombing/Explosion Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 0.909
International Maritime 0.857
Armed Assault Firearms 0.718
Facility/Infrastructure Incendiary 0.659
Unknown Tactic Unknown Weapon 0.608
United Kingdom Vehicle 0.567
Yemen Firearms 0.509
United Kingdom Airports and Aircraft 0.495
United States Vehicle 0.491
Table 6.10: Ten Highest Correlation Coefficients Between Features - Al Qaeda
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Figure 6.20 shows how that, in spite of the dimension of the matrix, the majority
of information is clustered around a relatively small number of feature vectors. In
fact, the first mode of the manifold, which includes countries, is scarcely populated
(with the most attacks plotted in Iraq and Yemen). More heterogeneity can be found
in the mode containing tactics and weapons. However, the information might not
be sufficiently rich to meaningfully infer patterns within the target mode, which is
instead more diverse (at least, from a visual inspection of the heatmap).
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Figure 6.20: Temporal Heatmap - Centrality Over Time (Al Qaeda). Vertical White Lines Separate
Different Modes.
Figure 6.21 shows the bivariate relation between the two different types of accu-
racy metrics used to assess the model predictive ability. It is worth to note how there
is a small number of models that perform poorly in both measures. However, much of
the models get results that are clustered in the upper region of the plot. Nonetheless,
the forecasting models for Al Qaeda are certainly the most problematic ones. Both
Γ(T ) and Φ(T ), also when only considering the best model, have the lowest values
across all groups. A connection might be drawn from this findings to the conclusion
of Moghadam (2013), who claims that the more decentralized a group is, the more it
innovates in terms of actions and attacks: Al Qaeda is certainly the most decentral-
ized group in this analysis (as it contains several sub-groups), and innovation might
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be here seen as the degree of sparsity and low-correlation between feature vectors.
Furthermore, as noted by Pham (2011), the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb faction
has become over time more pragmatic also in terms of attack planning (and not only
in relation to its geographical scope of action), and this aspect also can be reflected
in the data.
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Figure 6.21: Bivariate Relation Between Model Performance in Γ(T ) and Φ(T ) - Al Qaeda
The best model for Al Qaeda is obtained via a minibatch size of 32, as seen with
the Islamic State and the Taliban (Table 6.11). The deep LSTM achieves the highest
result in Γ(T ) when using a wide time range to infer future behaviors: the look
back is equal to 50 (150 past days), meaning that the network is more efficient when
can access information on quite long past sequences. This result may suggest how
Al Qaeda tends to frequently change its behavior (mapped by the 72 multivariate
times series) over time, preventing the network to learn efficiently on short windows.
Figures 6.22 and 6.23 interestingly show a fast convergence towards a minima after
very few epochs. In the MAE plot, it can be noted of the curves started to diverge
after 45 epochs, however, the early stop parameter stopped the learning process after
80 epochs, avoiding further risks of over-fitting.
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Parameter Value
Batch Size 32
Look Back 50
Φ(T ) 0.508
Γ(T ) 0.404
MSE 0.020
MAE 0.044
Execution Time ∼ 11 min.
Table 6.11: Best Model Performance and Results - Al Qaeda
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Figure 6.22: MSE - Al Qaeda
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Figure 6.23: MAE - Al Qaeda
6.5.4 Boko Haram
The introductory graphic visualization of the correlation between the feature vector
comprised in the 42 × 42 matrix of Boko Haram illustrates how, in spite of the vast
majority of vectors not showing any correlation, there exist some regions in which a
relatively strong relation holds for certain variables (see, for instance, the bottom left
or the top right of the matrix). On the contrary, the bottom right of the lower triangle,
where targets are located, is almost completely uncorrelated: this may suggest how,
in any given time unit, Boko tend not to combine different types of targets for their
terrorist attacks.
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Figure 6.24: Correlation Matrix of Centrality Values (All Features) - Boko Haram
Nigeria - the country that was most affected by the attacks of Boko Haram - is
strongly related to events against Private Citizens and Property. This target is also
connected to the use of firearms through armed assault tactics. (Table 6.12).
Feature 1 Feature 2 r
Bombing/Explosion Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 0.957
Armed Assault Firearms 0.909
Facility/Infrastructure Incendiary 0.857
Nigeria Firearms 0.718
Unknown Tactic Unknown Weapon 0.659
Nigeria Armed Assault 0.608
Nigeria Private Citizens and Property 0.567
Nigeria Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 0.509
Armed Assault Private Citizens and Property 0.495
Firearms Private Citizens and Property 0.491
Table 6.12: Ten Highest Correlation Coefficients Between Features - Boko Haram
The temporal heatmap in Figure 6.25 indeed shows the consistent high centrality
of Nigeria: other countries started to appear later (more than one year after the first
attack in Nigeria). The attacks of Boko Haram are carried out using a variety of
tactics, as visible in the second mode of the manifold: besides armed assault and
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bombings or explosions, which are common to most groups, many time units experi-
ence significant centrality of tactics such as Hostage Taking, Incendiary attacks and
also Facility/Infrastructure. The heterogeneity of tactics does not reflect into the
heterogeneity of weapons: Boko Haram consistently oscillates between Firearms, Ex-
plosives, and Melee. Private Citizens and Property dominates in the mode of targets.
The mode also shows sparse and rare signals on several targets, with apparently no
evident time clustering.
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Figure 6.25: Temporal Heatmap - Centrality Over Time (Boko Haram). Vertical White Lines
Separate Modes
Concentrating on the models, their behavior seems promising in spite of the prob-
lems with stationarity failing fastly when wider lags are introduced. Nevertheless,
the relation between Φ(T ) and Γ(T ) is anomalous: in the two-dimensional space,
the points representing the models almost form a circle: the relation is not certainly
linear. As a matter of fact, the detected Pearson coefficient is not statistically sig-
nificant. Those models that perform better in terms of Φ(T ) are not automatically
among the subset of those that also perform better in Γ(T ).
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Figure 6.26: Bivariate Relation Between Model Performance in Γ(T ) and Φ(T ) - Boko Haram
The model with the best performance in Γ(T ) has different characteristics from
the other best models commented for the other groups. First, its batch size is equal
to 64, going against the results of the other models and the suggestions contained in
the paper by Masters and Luschi (2018).
In addition, it relied on a short look back: this might suggest that Boko Haram
changes frequently its behavior that might have a microcycle-shaped nature. For this
reason, the LSTM only needs data from the past 6 days to infer the future targets,
as then more distant information in time could not be relevant or even noisy and
disruptive of the learning process.
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Parameter Value
Batch Size 64
Look back 2
Φ(T ) 0.839
Γ(T ) 0.601
MSE 0.046
MAE 0.103
Execution Time ∼ 5 min.
Table 6.13: Best Model Performance and Results - Boko Haram
The MAE loss function decay (Figure 6.28 again testifies the important role of
the “early stop” option to avoid overfitting: 100 epochs are sufficient to the LSTM
to achieve the results. In the case of MSE (Figure 6.27, the learning curves are
overlapping up to epoch 20, and then separate and remain in parallel, with the same
trend.
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Figure 6.27: MSE - Boko Haram
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Figure 6.28: MAE - Boko Haram
6.5.5 Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab is the last group of the sample. The correlation plot between the feature
vectors that make up the 45 × 45 matrix shows more clear correlated sub-regions
than the previous ones: though the extremely high values seem not so frequent, there
are several clustered areas where the coefficient floats around 0.25-0.5 (Figure 6.29).
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Figure 6.29: Correlation Matrix of Centrality Values (All Features) - Al Shabaab
The list of the highest correlation coefficients within the matrix shows how, in
terms of targets, Somalia (which is the country that accounts for the most attacks
plotted by Al Shabaab) is strongly related to events against Private Citizens and
governmental entities (Government (General)). Indeed, the first column vector in
the lower triangle of Figure 6.29 maps the relation of Somalia with other variables
and it clearly shows how the country accounts for a large number of positive strong
associations. Another strong pairwise connection is the one between the Hijacking
tactic and Ambulance targets (Table 6.14).
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Feature 1 Feature 2 r
Bombing/Explosives Explosives 0.844
Incendiary Facility/Infrastructure 0.740
Armed Assault Firearms 0.732
Hostage Taking Unknown Weapon 0.578
Hijacking Ambulance 0.539
Unknown Tactic Unknown Weapon 0.533
Private Citizens and Property Somalia 0.481
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite Somalia 0.426
Bombing/Explosives Somalia 0.389
Government (General) Somalia 0.382
Table 6.14: Ten Highest Correlation Coefficients Between Features - Al Shabaab
The temporal heatmap below (Figure 6.30) has similarities with the Boko Haram
one: indeed, almost half of the manifold is occupied by targets, as a consequence
of the actions of a group that shows no particular variety of adopted tactics and
weapons and that act on a regional scale. Somalia again demonstrates its consistent
stability in the time series, with a marginal role of Kenya, especially in the second half
of the considered period. Two tactics are prominently present: armed assaults and
bombing/explosions, but it is worth to note how Al Shabaab seems to plan attacks
or short campaigns that combine more than one tactic, as testified by the color of the
temporal units of tactics: many are darker colors, indicating lower centrality values
and, therefore, a non unitary behavior. The same, similarly, can be said for Firearms
and Explosives. The mode occupied by targets, instead, is less patterned. In spite
of the recurrent centrality of Military, Government (General) and Private Citizens,
Al Shabaab also directed its attack to other types of targets that, although sparsely,
were noticeably central in certain time windows.
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Figure 6.30: Temporal Heatmap - Centrality Over Time (Al Shabaab). Vertical White Lines Sepa-
rate Modes
The behavior of the models in terms of Φ(T ) and Γ(T ) is showcased in the regres-
sion scatter plot in Figure 6.31. Besides an outlier model that performed significantly
worse than all the others in both metrics, most of the models are tightly clustered
in the upper right region. The values of Φ(T ) fall within the 0.8-0.9 range, demon-
strating a very high capacity of forecasting at least one of the most central targets
in the next time unit. In terms of Γ(T ), the LSTM show even small variance: most
points are centered around ∼ 0.6, which is also a promising outcome considering the
challenging construction of the metric.
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Figure 6.31: Bivariate Relation Between Model Performance in Γ(T ) and Φ(T ) - Al Shabaab
In spite of the similarities detected comparing Al Shabaab’s and Boko Haram’s
temporal heatmaps, the best model for the Somali jihadist organization has differ-
ent characteristics (though the performance is similar between the two groups). Al
Shabaab is the group that achieved the best result through the smallest batch size
overall (2): this result justifies the longest execution time (∼ 49 minutes). Further-
more, the best look back is the same as the Taliban: the last month of data is the
right trade-off for the LSTM to obtain the most accurate predictions.
Finally, Figures 6.32 and 6.33 reports the learning process behaviour through the
Parameter Value
Batch Size 2
Look back 10
Φ(T ) 0.859
Γ(T ) 0.617
MSE 0.026
MAE 0.081
Execution Time ∼ 49 min.
Table 6.15: Best Model Performance and Results - Al Shabaab
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trend of MSE and MAE: the deep neural networks converge on a very low local min-
ima after one epoch for train set, while it takes about 10 epochs in the MSE case for
the test set: the training curve then continues to decrease, while the learning process
of train set curves almost stops or deteriorates over time. The test curve in the Figure
6.33 displays an anomalous trend, since it starts very low, increasing then the error
around epoch 10, and subsequently improving its performance up to the final epoch.
The “early stop” option prevents over-fitting by stopping the process around epoch
50.
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Figure 6.32: MSE - Al Shabaab
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Figure 6.33: MAE - Al Shabaab
6.5.6 Performance Summary
This last subsection aims at summarizing the results across the models, to more
comprehensively show the performance of the models (with a special focus on Look
Back) and to possibly anticipate future directions.
Figure 6.34 provides a 2d Kernel Density Estimation plot to show how, regardless
of the group, the models performed overall to understand if there exists a general
underlying pattern in terms of Φ(T ) and Γ(T ). The plot displays the presence of
a positive linear relationship: while some models performed poorly (bottom left),
most data point concentrates in the upper-right region, falling in the ∼ 0.5-0.6 range
for Γ(T ) and 0.8-1 for Φ(T ). While this result has been partially introduced in the
previous subsections specifically dedicated to each group, it is worth to note that,
at a more aggregated level, this finding supports the optimistic nature of the LSTM
networks for target forecasting.
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Figure 6.34: Two-dimensional Kernel Density Estimation of Φ(T ) and Γ(T ) Across All Models
Finally, Figures 6.35 and 6.36 report the distribution of each look back size (re-
gardless of the jihadist group) across models. Interestingly, the distributions for Φ(T )
look very similar from a look back equal to 1 up to 30. The 40 case is specifically
dedicated to the Islamic State since due to the small size of the test set I could not
rely on the ordinary maximum look back of 50. This latter look back indeed shows the
lowest median value overall, while 30 slightly outperforms all the others. This finding
might suggest that, when only accounting for one out of three most central targets,
there is no necessary need to consider long past sequences. Instead, the pay-off of
choosing a small portion of the group’s behavioral history is sufficient to achieve very
good results.
The situation for what concerns Γ(T ) is, instead, less clear, probably due to the fact
that the challenging nature of the metric does not lead to a “one size fits all” result,
making it highly dependent upon each group’s history. Overall, what emerges is that
look back of 1 and 2 have significantly more compressed distributions, and that the
median value is almost identical across all configurations. What changes is the range
between lowest and highest performances: 3, 30 and 50, in this case, reach the highest
peaks of Γ(T ), but at the same time their worst results are the worst overall. This
may indicate that the bigger the look back, the higher the risk of noisy variability
that may affect the learning process.
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Figure 6.35: Box Plot of Look Back Performance in Relation to Φ(T ) Across all Models and Groups
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Figure 6.36: Box Plot of Look Back Performance in Relation to Γ(T ) Across all Models and Groups
185
6 DEEP LEARNING AND TERRORISM
6.6 Overcoming Issues on Weak and Rare Signals
There are opposing views about the ability of predictive analytics to prevent terrorism.
When discussing about predictive analytics we can include all those mathematical or
computer models that try to predict or forecast terrorist events, perpetrators, dynam-
ics. Scholars are divided into different factions: some are more optimistic (with vari-
ous degree of cautiousness) (Chen et al., 2008; Haberman and Ratcliffe, 2012; Siegel,
2016), while others have less positive expectations on the power of these computa-
tional instruments to actually help the fight against terrorism (and, more generally,
crime) (Weber and Bowling, 2014; Bouchard, 2017; Ha¨lterlein and Ostermeier, 2018).
It is not just a matter of the debate fostered around the unethical behavior of certain
algorithms and the damages that these instruments can pose to certain parts of the
societies (Berk et al., 2018; Hannah-Moffat, 2018; PAI, 2019). It is, instead, a debate
that revolves around some reasoning on the statistical power of these models. The
negative opinions are generally centered around three critical points: (1) the lack of
meaningful and solid data to be used by the scientific community (Sageman, 2014),
(2) the insufficient training or computational skills of intelligence analysts training or
skills of intelligence analysts (Sageman, 2014; Britten, 2018) and, finally, (3) the in-
trinsic and non-solvable problems of forecasting things that are simply unpredictable.
Specifically, concerning the latter, Munk (2017) claimed that the quality of the data
and other statistical problems make it very difficult to develop and deploy reliable
models for predicting, for instance, potential terrorist actors within a population.
The author estimates a potential cost of 100,000 false positives per every real ter-
rorist found by an algorithm. While this estimate should be carefully verified, and
predicting terrorism is not just about “predicting” the next lone-wolf or the next
radicalized individual, it is surely true that the scientific community should invest
much more on researching ways to reduce the cost of false positives (and even false
negatives) and, in general, should focus on finding ways to detect those events, people
or entities that, in the strict statistical sense, we call “outliers”.
In my experiments, the risk of losing outliers is high. I will focus on the shortcomings
of my analyses in the next section, but this consideration led me to reason about how
to frame, evaluate and potentially solve this issue in the future. The data that I use
only map the centrality of entities over time, starting from the single event as the
original bit of information. As a recap, an event can be abstractly and compactly
defined as a combination of (1) a certain group responsible for the attack, (2) a cer-
tain country that was hit by the event, (3) an employed tactic (up to three) to carry
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out the attack, (4) a weapon (up to four) used in the tactical plan and (5) a target
(up to three), against which the event is directed. This is a flexible and meaningful
way to define an attack: it potentially incorporates rich features that - as seen by the
model results - can be learned by an algorithm to make inferences about the future.
Nonetheless, criminologists and terrorist researchers might reasonably raise a crucial
point, and tightly connected to the issue of outliers. I am referring to the absence
of any information regarding the impact of the attack. In fact, in the time series,
every attack is only distinguishable based on the abovementioned features, but no
distinction is made based upon the number of fatalities, casualties or the economic
damages that follows a violent event.
This is extremely relevant: leaving that kind of information out of the picture poses
the risk of losing large-scale attacks in the stream of data that are fed into the models.
Figure 6.37 helps illustrate the problem.
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Figure 6.37: Islamic State Sample Comparison of Two High-Frequency and Two Weak Signals
The two top subplots (Private Citizens and Property and Police) are examples of
strong signals that are persistently present across the whole time frame. The other
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two subplots, instead, describe a very different situation. The case of Journalists and
Media can be defined as an example of a “weak” signal: the signal, in fact, is not
as persistent as the previous two and, additionally, its centrality tends to be very
low in magnitude also in those periods where the specific target category raises in
popularity (e.g., second semester of 2015). Finally, NGO is a perfect example of a
“rare” signal. Over the years, very few time units experience attacks against non-
governmental organizations, and the distribution of the centrality values is too sparse
to reasonably expect meaningful inferences.
As anticipated, being a weak or rare signal can hide numerous and serious pit-
falls. What if the constant and persistent signals are associated with small-scale and
low-impact attacks, while events belonging to rare signals are correlated with massive
and high-impact plots? (Martens et al., 2014). The algorithms, fed only with the
information I have described earlier in the chapter, cannot capture the underlying
dynamics that govern such hidden bits of information.
As a matter of fact, 9/11 belongs to this latter family of signals: here resides the
importance of putting efforts and attention to address this problem. Interesting and
very well-grounded research exist in terms of estimating the probability of rare events
(Glasserman et al., 1999; Haan and Sinha, 1999; King and Zeng, 2001; Reijsbergen
et al., 2013), also in terrorism (with a specific attention also to sever ones) (Clauset
et al., 2007, 2010; Johnson et al., 2011; Clauset and Woodard, 2013), as well as
extensive research on outlier detection and modelling (Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987;
Hodge and Austin, 2004; Ben-Gal, 2005; Campos et al., 2016). Nonetheless, I am
here proposing a heuristic method that might serve as a baseline for future work on
weak and rare signals in temporal dynamics within the realm of terrorism research.
This method is inspired by how humans memorize and learn how to deal with rare
but impactful events. Though in the context of artificial intelligence the expression
“memorizing is not learning” resonates, memorizing can be a crucial first step for se-
lecting meaningful information that should then be learned subsequently by a model.
Going back to humans, we are generally particularly good at memorizing the effect
that impactful rare events may have on our lives, as to modify our future behaviors.
This may happen with rare diseases: once an individual gets curated, it will always
remember how that disease changed his or her existence. Lotteries are another ex-
ample: the winner of a monetary prize (a reasonably high prize) will always carry
memory about the happiness and excitation felt after the announcement.
These are extremely rare events that are likely not to get repeated over one’s life.
However, there are other types of events - such as winning sports competitions, get-
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ting job promotions, falling in love - that can occur rarely but more than once in
our lives. These might belong to the class of “weak” signals, and nonetheless we,
as humans, are able to memorize the event, its consequences, our feelings so that,
eventually, we may adapt our behaviour in the future according to that experience
(e.g., a soccer player that wins a Champions League with a non-top tier team will not
only memorize the glory and joy of the moment but also all those behaviors and facts
that, according to his/her vision, led to the final result). This process can be associ-
ated with the so-called “attentional boost effect” found in psychology and cognition
experiments (Swallow and Jiang, 2012).
In light of this, a terrorist attack i should be evaluated based on two components:
(1) its rarity and (2) its impact. Not all rare events are impactful (many terrorist
attacks that follow no historical patterns end up with no physical damages to the
selected human targets, for instance), and not all impactful events are rare (as there
exist, in certain regions of the world, very long sequences of attacks associated to very
high number of deaths), this is the reason behind the necessity to incorporate both
information in the evaluation. This conceptualization can lead to the formalization
of a measure that provides a numerical quantification of the rarity and impact of an
event.
Given x which captures the number of classes to which events i belongs (in the
case of our manifold, a single target (e.g., NGO) belongs to a set of x classes, where
(x-1) are the other types of targets in the mode), N which is the total number of
sampled events (do we want to evaluate rarity over the entire history of a single group?
Or do we want to evaluate rarity over the entire history of attacks plotted against a
specific location?), n which is the total number of events in which the considered x
has happened, and, finally, (α)i, which is the impact of the given event, that can be
formalized as an arbitrary multivariate function of k variables, as:
αi = f(d, c, e, · · · , k) (6.40)
with d, c and e mapping, to exemplify, the number of deaths, the number of in-
jured people and the economic loss or damage, then the rarity/impact indicator Ωi is
computed as:
Ωi = ln
[
x−1i
(
N
ni
)]ln(αi)
(6.41)
The equation multiplies the reciprocal of the number of classes to which the event
belongs (so that the wider the set of classes, the smaller the quantity) by the ratio
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between the total number of sampled events and the actual number of attacks be-
longing to that class (e.g., attacks against NGO). This quantity is then raised to the
power of the natural logarithm of α, the impact of the event.
Three simulations on mock data have been run to picture the behavior of Ω. I have
let vary the three key components of the equation, namely n (Figure 6.38), x (Figure
6.39) and α (Figure 6.40).
The three different plots indicate that Ω reports three well-patterned behaviors.
Firstly, and trivially, the equation let rare events to be weighted more: this is visible
from Figure 6.38. In a sequence with a total of 3000 sampled events, when n is set
to a very small quantity Ω increases fastly, and vice-versa.
Secondly, rare events raise Ω when the number of classes is lower. This means that if
we are analyzing the history of a certain group and our data space divides targets into
three classes then a rare event falling in one of those three classes will be weighted
more than a rare event belonging to a class out of potentially hundreds. This is to
capture a form of relative rarity in terms of the likelihood of an event: given that we
know the set of all potential outcomes (e.g., classes) a priori, the rarity in a binary-
space is more important than the rarity in multidimensional one.
Thirdly, rare events with high impact α are weighted exponentially, as visible in Figure
6.40. This allows distinguishing between rare events that have not had a considerable
impact and all those attacks that have had large-scale consequences (it is worth to
note that the composition of α function may depend upon the specific problem and
research or policy setting).
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Figure 6.38: Ω Trend With Different n (N=3000)
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Figure 6.39: Ω Trend With Different Number of Potential Classes (Max=250)
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Figure 6.40: Ω Trend With Impact Levels (ln α)
Once the metric has been calculated for a single event, it has to be incorporated
into the models and distributed over-time. From the theoretical point of view, Ω
should act as a sort of memory-keeper such that its permanence into the data space
T (M) is proportional to its own value:
T (M)i ∝ Ωi (6.42)
The proper kernel to be used for the decay has to be empirically tested and may
be subjected to the particular problem to be investigated, however, this construction
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allows to introduce a mathematical quantity potentially able to reduce the risk of
missing relevant rare patterns that cannot be captured solely looking at strict and
static event characteristics.
Further work will certainly test the performance of Ω on real-datasets such as the
GTD: in the meanwhile, this section aimed at theoretically introducing the whole
concept drawing a line that connects human behavior, outlier detection, and data
science. It may sound or seem a naive approach to some readers, but, in my humble
opinion, this section addresses a crucial problem that still prevents researchers and
policymakers to obtain meaningful predictions in a large number of sub-domains
falling within intelligence analysis. In a field such as terrorism, where weak and
rare signals may hide thousands of human losses, outliers are never solely statistical
constructs.
6.7 What is This All About? Notes to Potential
Critiques
After having read this chapter, a person who is not familiar with network science,
machine learning and mathematics might be asking what is this all about and what
would be - in the end - the added value of the whole machinery for the field of
criminology, and terrorism research more precisely. The concerns are, in principle,
more than reasonable, and this section will try to clarify different aspects of this work.
Indeed, I will try to anticipate and answer two possible critical questions posed by
readers and potential reviewers.
What is the criminological contribution of this work? The strong method-
ological accent of this work has been mentioned many times throughout the previous
sections. However, I am convinced that this work has not only relevance because it
tries to merge network science and artificial intelligence, proposing a possible model-
ing framework derived from these two fields, but also because it tries to advance the
knowledge on terror dynamics, specifically. My sensation is that it can contribute to
the field investigating two interrelated concepts that link all the parts of this work:
interdependence and memory.
Interdependence represents the foundation of some of the intuitions that allowed
me to think about the benefits of using the science of complex networks as the first
basis for the present dissertation. Indeed, the physical and abstract interdependence
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between terrorism features in a complex setting that involves multiple distinct di-
mensions guided the creation of dynamic meta-networks of jihadist groups and the
fostered the idea that hidden knowledge can be extracted from data, stepping out of
the comfort zone of purely physical relations, that is the core of social network anal-
ysis. In criminology, researchers tend to limit their analyses to certain common types
of interdependencies (e.g. spatial ones and autocorrelations), without considering also
other types of relations that might not be always self-evident and naturally visible.
This work thus seeks to provide new insights into the benefits of deeply looking at
interdependencies between distinct entities that are part of the same evolving phe-
nomenon to highlight hidden schemes that may better explain strategic and rational
dynamics.
Although the concept of “memory” cannot be explicitly found in criminological
studies on terrorism, a variation of this concept is intrinsically connected to the studies
that investigate the distribution of terror events over time and the strategic behavior
of terrorist groups. However, in the present thesis, memory has to be considered not
only as a proof of the spatio-temporal concentration of attacks but also as a more
complex concept. Indeed, when discussing about memory I also intend to deal with
the non-random recurrence of multi-dimensional patterns over time (e.g., a group
attack a target y in a country c, with a tactic x and a weapon z for a certain length
of time t, and then changes its behavior modifying the characteristics of the events
according to new campaigns and aims). This leads to the hypothesis that sequence-
handling algorithms can be trained to infer and detect patterns to forecast feature
behaviors, assuming that not only events themselves do not behave randomly, but
also locations, tactics, weapons, and targets follow some specific schemes that are
interdependent and recur in time. Memory, in this fashion, goes in parallel with
the concept of interdependence, and a further hypothesis is that only by looking
at the whole realm of interconnections between event characteristics we can search
for meaningful memory like-processes. Thought it is not certainly a proof of these
ideas, data in Section 4.2 demonstrate how, out of the infinite possible combinations
in which terrorism could happen, only a minimal part actually takes place. This is
somehow a suggestion that some regularities exist, and that we should focus on them
to build informative models.
The criminological relevance lies, indeed, in the combination of the strategic per-
spective and the spatio-temporal patterns of concentration of terrorist violence which,
combined in such a novel methodological framework, can help in enhancing the knowl-
edge on the violent histories of these groups.
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Why using network science and machine learning instead of classic time
series analysis? A question that might be posed regards the motivation behind
the use of this specific methodological framework instead of the application of more
traditional techniques. The analysis of time series is one of the most developed and
longstanding fields in statistical sciences. Applications of time series analysis vary
across a wide number of disciplines and sciences. Within this frame, there exist
some very common techniques: autoregressive (AR) models, moving average (MA)
models, integrated (I) models, autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models, au-
toregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models, autoregressive fractionally
integrated moving average (ARFIMA) models. Besides these, others exist for deal-
ing with multivariate analysis, as vector autoregression models (VAR) and Hidden
Markov models (HMM).
All these different modeling techniques are solidly grounded in literature and have
been used also in criminological or terrorism studies (Enders et al., 1992; Li and
Schaub, 2004; Brandt and Sandler, 2010). However, in this work, I have not applied
any of the abovementioned ones for two main reasons. The first one is related to
some general advantages that machine and deep learning have over classic statistical
methods. The second one is related to the specific use case of my application.
Regarding the first one, I have chosen LSTM because DL models are generally
more flexible and can handle nonlinear relations between variables, while classic time-
series models require more assumptions on data to be made. The ability to find non-
linear relations (which theoretically increases when data increases, though requiring
a relatively high number of observations) is indeed one of the main advantages of
LSTM networks in general (Giles et al., 2001; Bontempi et al., 2013).
Concerning the second motivation, the specific application required a flexible algo-
rithm able to perform sequence modeling on many multivariate time-series. This can
be technically defined as a multi-label prediction learning problem (Zhang and Zhou,
2014), meaning that for each time unit, given a certain definition of the feature space,
we want our algorithm to be trained to obtain different output prediction, terrorist
targets in our case, via real-values assignment representing the forecasted centrality
values. In notational terms, given a feature space X = Rd which is d-dimensional
and an output space Y = (y1, ..., yq) that includes q possible labels, the task that it is
required to a multi-label learning algorithm is to find and learn a function h : X 7→ 2Y
from the multi-label training set D = {(xi, Yi) |1 ≤ i ≤ m}. This type of complex pre-
diction problem can be more easily achieved using algorithms such as LSTM, while
classic time-series methods are usually used for predicting single outputs y. However,
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though the forecasting task has not relied on classic time-series techniques, prelimi-
nary analyses have been run via popular stationarity and randomness tests that are
valid across the whole spectrum of modeling techniques.
6.8 Discussion and Future Work
The pervasiveness of artificial intelligence has contaminated a huge number of scien-
tific fields. This is no surprise, considering the incredible results that methods coming
from machine, deep and reinforcement learning have reached on practical problems
(Weiss et al., 2012; Jean et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2016; Silver et al., 2016; Krittanawong
et al., 2017; Brown and Sandholm, 2018; Fang et al., 2019). Nonetheless, criminol-
ogy and terrorism research still struggle in finding appropriate ways to exploit the
strength of intelligent algorithms for the study of criminal human behavior (poten-
tially, this also holds for the exploitation of traditional statistical methods, as noted
by LaFree and Freilich (2012)). This is due to a variety of reasons, as the lower avail-
ability of data compared to other disciplines and the lack of sufficient quantitative
and computational training of scholars belonging to the field.
With the aim to accelerate the process of bridging AI and criminology, this chapter
has presented a methodological framework that combines the science of complex net-
works and deep learning to forecast future most likely targets hit in attacks plotted by
five jihadist groups, namely the Islamic State, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram
and Al Shabaab. Beyond the technical aspects, the work has been founded on a
two-fold theoretical framework. This theoretical framework relied on (1) the theories
on the spatio-temporal concentration of crime and (2) the strategic perspective of
terrorism decision-making.
The spatio-temporal concentration of crime has been largely investigated with re-
gard to several crimes and offenses. Terrorist violence is no exception. Many studies
(Porter and White, 2012; Braithwaite and Johnson, 2012; Tench et al., 2016), starting
from the seminal work of Midlarsky et al. (1980), have analyzed how terrorism clusters
in time and in space, leading for instance to diffusion, contagion and microcycles dy-
namics (Midlarsky, 1978; Behlendorf et al., 2012). Terrorism is a patterned criminal
phenomenon: its apparent chaotic and random nature hides, instead, schemes that
can be captured by mathematical and statistical modeling, especially when terrorism
is studied in terms of its temporal and geographic components.
Many theories have been developed and proposed to explain how terrorists decide to
act. Studies on the decision-making processes of terrorist organizations have formal-
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ized different explanations that many times are incomplete pictures of a multi-faceted
phenomenon. This is also the case of the strategic theories on terrorism, which are
built on some assumptions (such as rationality) that may exclude other relevant com-
ponents of terrorist dynamics, as the psychological or purely organizational sides of
the phenomenon. Nonetheless, for the aims of this study, the strategic explanations
fit the problem to describe how jihadist groups recursively combine sets of tactics and
weapons to hit some specific countries and targets.
The present chapter, indeed, extracts graph-derived time-series for each group from
the GTD, mapping the over-time centrality of each feature comprised into the four
modes of the manifold (i.e., Countries, Tactics, Weapons and Targets) and feed LSTM
networks - algorithms specifically designed to handle sequence-dependent data - to
provide forecasts of targets at highest risk of being hit in the future. The mathemati-
cal abstraction of the jihadist behavior relies in the first phase on the construction of
meta-networks that aggregate terrorist attacks based on three-day time units via the
creation of connections that map relations between events. This allows taking into
consideration hidden relations that may not be captured using models that work on
the assumption of i.i.d. data.
In the second phase, the models rely on the existence of memory-like processes and on
the assumption of the strategic behavior of the jihadists to evaluate the performance
of a very popular class of algorithms for the abovementioned forecasting purposes.
In spite of the promising results of the models, this work is just a very first ex-
ploratory step towards more meaningful and accurate models. The actual strength
of this chapter actually resides in its incompleteness. The vibrant community of AI
is continuously working on developing new ideas and methods, with an increasing
interest in the area of social good (i.e., all those fields of application that address
social and societal problems): this is encouraging. Besides the technical reasoning
that led to the creation of graph-derived time series, the employed algorithms have
nothing really innovative and, additionally, not all the potential configurations have
been run due to computational expensiveness and time constraints (the models in-
cluded in this thesis have run on my personal computer for sessions of 11, 9 and 7
days respectively). This indicates that there is potentially much more to explore.
Furthermore, this chapter only deals with a very restricted and particular sample of
jihadist groups. It could be plausible that, applying the same framework to groups
belonging to other ideologies and fighting for other motivations, the results might
be different not only numerically but also conceptually (e.g., which type, if any, of
memory does an Asian nationalist group have?). The choice beyond this restricted
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sample was to center the focus on jihadism, in the first place and was also related to
the necessity of having a sufficient amount of data to use to train the algorithms.
Data are crucial. Not only with regards to their quality (Sageman, 2014), but also in
relation to their quantity, especially in AI. These algorithms work better when they
can dive in and explore massive amounts of information. This is certainly a limita-
tion of my study: I am using what are nowadays called “small data” since events are
tracked by day and many groups do not have a longstanding history. What if we can
apply the same framework to more detailed, precise and vast data? This question
remains now open, but the hope is to have the chance to answer to it, one day.
There are potentially hundreds of pathways for future work, starting from this chap-
ter: the integration of socioeconomic and political contextual data to control for
exogenous components that may impact terrorist behavior and the disaggregation of
information at a lower level (e.g., from weapons categories to weapons subcategories,
from countries to provinces) are just two of the most promising directions. However,
what really needs to be taken away from this work is that AI can help in the study of
terrorism, and might provide really interesting insights and suggestions also in terms
of practical applicability.
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7 Concluding Remarks
There is something strikingly fascinating associated with apparently chaotic, random,
unpredictable phenomena. The human history is full of scientists that have tried to
capture a sort of order behind the visible layer of chaos using models and numbers to
characterize phenomena that generally escape from our understanding. This addicting
fascination is what brought me here, today, as a computational criminologist. After
three years of research, there are many more unsolved questions on my table rather
than answers. Three years ago I was naively thinking that ending a Ph.D. would have
instead provided me with much stronger conclusions and certainties. I was wrong,
and I have realized it as getting closer to grasp the inherent order of terrorism. There
have been answers to some of my questions, but these answers fatally generated
further questions, which grew exponentially over time, until today. In spite of the
disorienting distance between my curiosity and what I was able to understand, an even
stronger fascination now dwells in me. The hypothesis that even the most terrible
actions of humans on this planet can be modeled and described through the use of
numbers and mathematics is not only captivating but also, in a way, heartening. I
do not believe in the perspective of a future in which we will be able to completely
understand how every component of human behavior works, and why, but I am fully
confident that many signs of progress will be made in order to unveil many of the
obscure dynamics that daily governs our world. Since the second part of the Twentieth
century, enlightened scholars have chased the order behind the chaos in the study of
terrorism, and many are still doing it now.
This doctoral dissertation, entitled On Meta-Networks, Deep Learning, Time and
Jihadism is my humble attempt to contribute to the cause and marks my efforts
to highlight the potential connected to the combination of complex networks and
artificial intelligence for the study of the behavior of jihadist groups.
The first chapter illustrates the challenges of the conceptualization of terrorism,
proposing a focus on four specific dimensions of terrorism to overcome the issues
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with its unitary definition. Furthermore, it also presents the two-fold theoretical
framework of the dissertation: the spatio-temporal concentration of crime and the
theories of strategic terrorism as the backbones.
The second chapter outlines an overview of the aims of the work at a general
level. It also proposes a reflection on the need to rethink research in criminology and
terrorism in light of the spread of novel available computational methods, following
the massive popularity gained by Artificial Intelligence in many academic disciplines.
The third chapter describes the origins and main characteristics of the jihadist
groups taken into consideration in the thesis, namely the Islamic State, the Taliban,
Al Qaeda, Boko Haram and Al Shabaab and it also provides details on the Global
Terrorism Database, the dataset used in the analyses. Besides the first introductory
ones, the dissertation comprises three analytic chapters.
The fourth chapter, entitled Stochastic Matrices of Terrorism: Complexity and
Heterogeneity of Jihadist Behavior, is indeed a study on the use of stochastic transition
matrices and trail networks to compare jihadist groups in terms of their strategic
behavior. The chapter develops a two-fold analysis. First, it assesses the complexity
in the combination of weapons, targets and targets and weapons together through
a novel approach based on N -dimensional super-states: the approach allows us to
consider cycles and sub-sequences of attacks as a new tool for highlighting terrorist
dynamics. Second, it develops a coefficient that maps the pairwise similarity between
each pair of groups considering their transitions between different types of weapons,
targets and weapons and targets combined. With regard to the first part, the results
of the study shows that all the terrorist groups have a very complex repertoire of
combinations and configurations in the use of the same weapons and targets and that,
as the dimension of the transition matrices is increased, clearer patterns emerge, as
each sub-sequence (defined by super-states) is connected to few others only.
For what concerns the second part, Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab are found to be the
most similar groups overall, while, on the contrary, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are the
least similar. Another interesting finding is that, while groups can be similar when
only targets are considered, they can show distinct strategic behavior with regard to
weapons and vice-versa, suggesting how there exist different ways to reach a certain
terrorist goal and that relying solely on one source of information can be misleading.
The work, which has also been published in a shorter version as a research article
in the Journal of Computational Social Science, is a first exploratory study in the
use of N -dimensional chains and trails as meta-networks for the analysis of sequential
patterns and call for further work in the direction of integrating multiple data sources
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to extrapolate additional knowledge.
The fifth chapter, entitled Hawkes Processes of Jihadism, explicitly aims at inves-
tigating the presence of memory-like processes in the temporal patterns of jihadist
attacks. For each group, two models are developed using data sequences on the two
most attacked countries per each group, limiting further the scope to the most pop-
ular target category hit. Building upon the blooming literature on point processes in
terrorism research and criminology, Hawkes models are used to detect the presence
of memory in terrorist patterns. Hawkes models are a particular class of stochastic
processes that are characterized by the presence of self-excitability. Self-excitability
captures the extent to which a certain event can increase (or even decrease) the
probability of the future occurrence of another event. Contrarily to ordinary Pois-
son processes, Hawkes processes are not randomly distributed. They hold memory
properties meaning that the present is generally dependent upon the past. This type
of analysis is innovative in the sense that, contrarily to most literature, does not
treat all events as equal but, instead, disaggregates by country and target to control
for memory-like processes also at a finer-grained level. Comparing the performance
of each Hawkes process against a Homogeneous Poisson model, statistical outcomes
show how most of the sequences actually hold memory-like processes (nine out of
ten). The finding goes against the cornerstone concept of “asymmetric warfare” as
random and unpredictable violence as posited by Matusitz (2012) in its definition of
terrorism.
Terrorist attacks against most popular targets are thus clustered in time and not
randomly distributed, meaning that there is a time-dependent structure that can be
captured and analyzed to characterize the behavior of each jihadist organization. The
results are in line with previous research on terrorist events and, also in this case, call
for future work. The field of point processes is vibrant and developments are continu-
ously made also from the theoretical and foundational points of view: there are dozens
of potential new directions to take, starting from multivariate modeling for studying
Granger causality between multiple time-series and the use of marked-Hawkes pro-
cesses to further distinguish between events of different magnitude and impact. At a
general level, this chapter preciously corroborated the presence of memory, which is
a fundamental concept for the third and last analytic chapter.
The sixth chapter, Deep Learning and Terrorism: Long Short-Term Memory Net-
works for Target Forecasting, is the last and the longest of the entire dissertation. It
specifically proposes a methodological framework that combines the science of com-
plex meta-networks with deep learning to unfold the temporal patterns of jihadist
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groups. From a dynamic manifold, I have extracted multivariate time-series mapping
the centrality of attacked countries, tactics, weapons and targets for each group and
then fed Long Short-Term Memory deep neural networks with the time-series. The
deep learning algorithms are hence employed to learn the existing time-dependent
structure in the data based on the inter-dependence among event characteristics and
the presence of memory in terrorist behavior.
Following the definition of two measures of accuracy, the performance of the algo-
rithms is evaluated based on their ability to correctly rank the most central - and thus
probable - target in each future time-step. The quantitative results are encouraging
and highlight different levels of predictability for each group, providing insights also
on the evolution of their behavior over time. A potential solution against the problem
of rare and weak signals is also proposed. This first theoretical step towards a more
efficient and effective combination of complex networks and artificial intelligence au-
tomatically poses new challenges and perspectives for future research, including the
test of less conventional algorithms for time-dependent data or the integration of con-
textual socioeconomic and political data to control for external sources of variation
and influence in jihadist behavior.
This work inspired in me also general consideration regarding the current and
future perspectives in terrorism research. When I started my doctorate, back in 2016,
the world was just stepping out from very hard times in terms of terrorist activity.
Most of the resonance of terrorism worldwide was caused by the actions of jihadist
groups that, operating in different regions and by means of different tactics, diffused
violence systematically. The peak of deaths reached in 2014 has been followed by a
decline that still persists: data shows how this decline is associated with the battle-
ground defeats of the Islamic State (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018). The
Islamist group which once governed over many areas of Iraq and Syria has now lost
all its outposts and many of its resources and militant fighters (Tønnessen, 2019).
However, as noted by Ineichen (2018) and Dawson (2018), it would be an error to
simplistically consider the Islamic State threat as solved, since many issues are still in
place in the global scenario, including the displacement of the group in smaller units
and dispersal of the remaining Western foreign fighters.
The Islamic State is capable of driving alone most of the aggregated statistics on
terrorism, especially when concentrating on the European situation. In fact, in the
last two years, Europe has experienced a significant reduction in terms of fatalities,
as a positive byproduct of the deteriorated strength of ISIS. In this statistic breathes
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and lives a dangerous trap.
Research survives thanks to grants, private and public funding and scholarships,
which are many times driven by the policy-agenda of institutions and governments
of the Western countries. As jihadism started to become less present in the daily
chronicles due to the decrease of large-scale and fatal attacks in Western countries,
suddenly the availability of resources to conduct research on this type of terrorism
almost vanished, too. The last two years have seen the rise of other types of priorities
for policy-makers, including the study of how social media can modify, influence or
distort political opinions, fueling extremism and misinformation (Del Vicario et al.,
2016; Vosoughi et al., 2018; Wu and Liu, 2018; Carley et al., 2018) and the renovated
attention towards political terrorism, with a special mention to far-right and racist
ideologies (Freilich et al., 2018; Ravndal, 2018; Fahey and Simi, 2019). It goes without
saying that these topics are extremely relevant and that I am not claiming that there
might be an intrinsic moral superiority associated with the study of jihadism. What I
am suggesting is, instead, that relegating jihadism in the list of the marginal priorities
of today might pose serious consequences for tomorrow.
Schuurman (2019) claims that the over-representation of jihadism in terrorism
studies is not only incorrect but rather dangerous and the process underestimates
the threats posed by other types of terrorism. The assumption of a sort of mutually
exclusive allocation of attention is wrong and the reasoning misses a focal point:
jihadist terrorism has been studied more than other types of terrorism because it has
posed much bigger threats and inflicted much more damages than all the other types
of political or religious violence, in the last twenty years. This, again, should not
be reflected in a sort of “monopoly” in research. Nonetheless, certain comparisons
should be carefully made based on historical facts.
Terrorism research has received massive funding after the 9/11 attacks and the
European events of Madrid and London: more than ten years of research have, ac-
cording to many, produced very little knowledge and responded to very few crucial
questions regarding jihadism. Agreeing with this position or not, suspending or inter-
rupting research in this area is certainly the best way to slow down the progress that
has been made and that still could be made in the attempt to better understand ji-
hadist terrorism and to provide policy-makers and institutions with meaningful tools,
suggestions, guidelines to mitigate the problem.
Furthermore, we all risk falling into an overly Western-centered vision, where the
ranking of priorities is tailored solely upon the necessities and issues experienced by
developed countries. This is not political speculation (I am a researcher dedicated to
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science): it is, instead, a fact.
While Europe has experienced a decrease in the number of fatal attacks, there
are many areas in the world in which jihadist groups still organize and plot terrible
attacks that are capable of killing hundreds of people at a time. Regional groups such
as Boko Haram and Al Shabaab attract less attention in the Western world because
their actions are confined to specific regions of the African continent, and do not,
therefore, pose any risk to the security of European, American, Australian borders.
However, terrorism should not be a strict matter of physical borders. History has
taught us that the globalized world is a powerful weapon also for terrorists, and
treating regional groups as if they were only an issue of those African countries is not
only partially immoral and hypocrite, it is also a good way to underestimate the risks
associated to these groups. The Islamic State has shown how it is not necessary to be
trained or officially affiliated to the group to act in its name. Why should it be different
for other groups that are not acting (so far, at least) on a global scale? Another point
that should be considered is that, even hypothesizing a complete defeat of the most
important jihadist groups that are still operating nowadays, jihadist terrorism may
strike back in the future years under different symbols, flags, and acronyms. Why,
then, should we stop or cut research in terrorism?
The exact point is that we should not. This dissertation is, indeed, a modest
attempt to show that there is a tremendous need for data, resources, training, and
cross-disciplinary collaboration and that these elements combined can play a funda-
mental role in advancing our understanding of the phenomenon. This understanding
is not solely confined to academia and scientific research, it can be, instead, directly
applicable for policy or counter-terrorism intelligence purposes.
My thesis has dealt with a small region of the overwhelmingly vast complexity of
jihadist terrorism. It has focused on a small sample of jihadist groups, and it has
focused on events, not on people, individuals, organizational structures and psycholog-
ical motives. It has treated every group as an entity, without considering the internal
components that drive the decision-making process of each organization, it has only
focused on general event characteristics, without going too much in depth in terms
of geographic profiling, for instance. It has addressed some precise research questions
that, in turn, leave out many other relevant ones, as “what drives jihadism?”, or “why
do individuals resort to jihadist terrorist violence?”.
This is to say that this work does not aim to be comprehensive and universal.
It has, indeed, many limitations. It is only the first incomplete step towards a long
path of further research. It, however, poses the basis for the integration of two fields
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- network science and artificial intelligence - for the study of jihadism, exploiting the
strength of both fields. The ability of network science to map, detect, recognize,
interpret the complex underlying physical and abstract relations between events and
the power of artificial intelligence to flexibly handle multidimensional and non-linear
data, going beyond the strong assumptions required by ordinary statistical models.
This dissertation is an attempt to show that these two fields can be meaningfully
combined to highlight patterns, motifs and recurrent behaviors and that the research
community should not be worried about opening its doors to a new idea of contami-
nation.
Terrorist research has, over the years, benefited from the dialogue between distinct
disciplines (Ross, 2006; Richardson, 2013). While first originating from international
relations and political science (Jenkins, 1974; Jongman, 2017), it has then attracted
the interest of psychology (Silke, 2003; Horgan, 2005; Bongar et al., 2006), sociol-
ogy (Turk, 2004; Tilly, 2004), economics (Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2005; Llusa and
Tavares, 2007; Berman, 2011) and, lately, criminology (LaFree and Freilich, 2016).
This process led to a hybrid debate which certainly brought new ideas, perspectives
and answers to a dimension of human behavior that, in the last decades, has af-
fected the entire world in dramatic and horrific ways. Opening the doors towards
further contamination from fields such as complex networks, artificial intelligence,
and computer science could bring added values to the community itself and, in turn,
to research on the phenomenon.
Schuurman (2018) found that the prevalence of “one-time” contributors is one of
the most relevant issues of the terrorist research community. This is exactly one of
the negative loops that can arise in the absence of a well-structured, defined and solid
multidisciplinary community. On one hand, computer scientists, statisticians and
scholars from the field of complexity science address the problem of terrorism as a
laboratory where to experiment new algorithms and techniques, without posing any
attention over the real implications of certain results or without carefully evaluate
assumptions or data limitations, giving birth to sophisticated and yet sterile forms
of science. On the other hand, terrorist researchers struggle to explore the landscape
of state-of-the-art computational methods because they lack technical expertise and
training. This process leads to sparse research, which is not followed up during the
years and cannot meaningfully address the crucial points that are still without an
answer, avoiding solid theoretical explanations and extensive reasoning on. Further-
more, the hype around artificial intelligence poses the virtual risk of future funding
allocation exclusively to data scientists, engineers, computer scientists, ruling out
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social scientists from the policy-oriented research arena.
This perspective is alarming. The power of data and the revolution of artificial in-
telligence have started to change the world, and the benefits experienced by every one
of us every day are uncountable. But this revolution also calls for new responsibilities,
opening ethical and moral debates on the role that machines have in impacting our
future. The exclusive allocation of power, funding and resources to algorithmic sys-
tems to predict crime or recidivist behavior has already shown its tremendous flaws
and drawbacks. This is why criminologists and social scientists in general cannot
be excluded by this progress, as they can act as guarantors and barriers against the
misuse of data and computational methods in such critical areas. Terrorism research
should proactively behave for its renovation in light of these aspects because wasting
the opportunities of this new era would be not only mindless, but even dangerous.
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“The time is gone, the song is over
thought I’d something more to say”
Pink Floyd, “Time”
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247
A Transition Networks of
N-Dimension Super-States
248
A TRANSITION NETWORKS
Figure A.1: Example Transition Graph - 1-Dimensional Super-States for Islamic State Targets
Transitions (Nodes Sized by In-Degree Centrality)
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A TRANSITION NETWORKS
Figure A.2: Example Transition Graph - 2-Dimensional Super-States for Islamic State Targets
Transitions (Nodes Sized by In-Degree Centrality)
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A TRANSITION NETWORKS
Figure A.3: Example Transition Graph - 3-Dimensional Super-States for Islamic State Targets
Transitions (Nodes Sized by In-Degree Centrality)
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A TRANSITION NETWORKS
Figure A.4: Example Transition Graph - 4-Dimensional Super-States for Islamic State Targets
Transitions (Nodes Sized by In-Degree Centrality)
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A TRANSITION NETWORKS
Figure A.5: Example Transition Graph - 5-Dimensional Super-States for Islamic State Targets
Transitions (Nodes Sized by In-Degree Centrality)
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B Additional Results of LSTM
Models
254
B ADDITIONAL RESULTS OF LSTM
Layer (Type) Output Shape N of Parameters
LSTM (None, 62) 31,000
Dropout 1 (None, 62) 0
Dense 1 (None, 256) 16,128
Dropout 2 (None, 256) 0
Dense 2 (None, 128) 32,896
Dropout 2 (None, 128) 0
Dense 3 (None, 64) 8,256
Dense 4 (None, 62) 4,030
Total Parameters: 92,310
Trainable Parameters: 92,310
Non-trainable Parameters: 0
Table B.1: Best Model Summary - Layers and Parameters (Islamic State)
Layer (Type) Output Shape N of Parameters
LSTM (None, 62) 12,324
Dropout 1 (None, 62) 0
Dense 1 (None, 256) 10,240
Dropout 2 (None, 256) 0
Dense 2 (None, 128) 32,896
Dropout 2 (None, 128) 0
Dense 3 (None, 64) 8,256
Dense 4 (None, 62) 2,535
Total Parameters: 66,251
Trainable Parameters: 66,251
Non-trainable Parameters: 0
Table B.2: Best Model Summary - Layers and Parameters (Taliban)
Layer (Type) Output Shape N of Parameters
LSTM (None, 62) 42,924
Dropout 1 (None, 62) 0
Dense 1 (None, 256) 18,944
Dropout 2 (None, 256) 0
Dense 2 (None, 128) 32,896
Dropout 2 (None, 128) 0
Dense 3 (None, 64) 8,256
Dense 4 (None, 62) 4,745
Total Parameters: 107,765
Trainable Parameters: 107,765
Non-trainable Parameters: 0
Table B.3: Best Model Summary - Layers and Parameters (Al Qaeda)
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B ADDITIONAL RESULTS OF LSTM
Layer (Type) Output Shape N of Parameters
LSTM (None, 62) 14,280
Dropout 1 (None, 62) 0
Dense 1 (None, 256) 11,008
Dropout 2 (None, 256) 0
Dense 2 (None, 128) 32,896
Dropout 2 (None, 128) 0
Dense 3 (None, 64) 8,256
Dense 4 (None, 62) 2,730
Total Parameters: 69,170
Trainable Parameters: 69,170
Non-trainable Parameters: 0
Table B.4: Best Model Summary - Layers and Parameters (Boko Haram)
Layer (Type) Output Shape N of Parameters
LSTM (None, 45) 16,380
Dropout 1 (None, 45) 0
Dense 1 (None, 256) 11,776
Dropout 2 (None, 256) 0
Dense 2 (None, 128) 32,896
Dropout 2 (None, 128) 0
Dense 3 (None, 64) 8,256
Dense 4 (None, 45) 2,925
Total Parameters: 72,233
Trainable Parameters: 72,233
Non-trainable Parameters: 0
Table B.5: Best Model Summary - Layers and Parameters (Al Shabaab)
256
B ADDITIONAL RESULTS OF LSTM
Batch Look Back Γ(T ) Φ(T )
32 30 0.750 1
32 10 0.663 1
2 30 0.636 1
64 30 0.636 1
100 1 0.626 1
2 20 0.611 1
32 20 0.611 1
64 20 0.611 1
100 20 0.611 1
2 10 0.602 1
64 10 0.602 1
100 10 0.602 1
2 40 0.600 1
32 40 0.600 1
100 40 0.600 1
2 3 0.598 1
32 3 0.598 1
64 3 0.598 1
100 3 0.598 1
2 2 0.592 1
32 2 0.592 1
64 2 0.592 1
100 2 0.592 1
2 1 0.585 1
32 1 0.585 1
64 1 0.585 1
64 40 0.400 1
100 30 0.386 1
Table B.6: Deep Neural Network Models - Results Ordered by Descending Γ(T ) (Islamic State)
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B ADDITIONAL RESULTS OF LSTM
Batch Look Back Γ(T ) Φ(T )
32 10 0.758 0.973
64 10 0.758 0.973
100 10 0.758 0.973
2 20 0.757 0.977
64 20 0.757 0.977
100 20 0.757 0.977
2 3 0.756 0.968
32 3 0.756 0.968
64 3 0.756 0.968
100 3 0.756 0.968
100 2 0.755 0.974
32 20 0.755 0.971
2 10 0.754 0.967
2 50 0.753 0.972
32 50 0.753 0.972
64 50 0.753 0.972
100 50 0.753 0.972
2 1 0.753 0.969
2 30 0.752 0.975
32 30 0.752 0.975
64 30 0.752 0.975
100 30 0.752 0.975
32 2 0.751 0.963
64 2 0.751 0.963
32 1 0.751 0.964
64 1 0.751 0.964
100 1 0.749 0.953
2 2 0.748 0.963
Table B.7: Deep Neural Network Models - Results Ordered by Descending Γ(T ) (Taliban)
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B ADDITIONAL RESULTS OF LSTM
Batch Look Back Γ(T ) Φ(T )
32 50 0.404 0.508
32 2 0.402 0.493
32 1 0.398 0.487
2 3 0.396 0.486
2 50 0.393 0.475
64 20 0.390 0.478
2 30 0.390 0.470
100 30 0.390 0.470
64 1 0.389 0.474
100 1 0.389 0.474
32 3 0.387 0.459
2 10 0.383 0.465
32 30 0.380 0.455
64 3 0.378 0.446
100 3 0.378 0.473
100 2 0.375 0.453
64 2 0.366 0.440
64 30 0.360 0.470
32 10 0.346 0.465
2 20 0.343 0.406
2 2 0.339 0.400
32 20 0.333 0.362
2 1 0.319 0.368
100 10 0.299 0.408
64 50 0.247 0.322
100 50 0.124 0.169
100 20 0.086 0.130
64 10 0.047 0.070
Table B.8: Deep Neural Network Models - Results Ordered by Descending Γ(T ) (Al Qaeda)
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B ADDITIONAL RESULTS OF LSTM
Batch Look Back Γ(T ) Φ(T )
64 2 0.602 0.839
2 30 0.596 0.820
2 10 0.595 0.837
2 2 0.593 0.839
2 50 0.592 0.806
2 1 0.590 0.848
2 20 0.587 0.833
2 3 0.587 0.838
16 50 0.585 0.796
16 10 0.581 0.829
16 2 0.580 0.847
16 3 0.578 0.846
64 3 0.578 0.838
32 50 0.577 0.796
64 1 0.576 0.848
32 2 0.575 0.847
32 3 0.573 0.838
16 1 0.572 0.848
32 1 0.572 0.848
64 30 0.567 0.811
32 10 0.567 0.837
64 10 0.567 0.837
64 20 0.566 0.817
64 50 0.563 0.796
16 30 0.562 0.811
16 20 0.561 0.825
32 20 0.561 0.825
32 30 0.556 0.820
Table B.9: Deep Neural Network Models - Results Ordered by Descending Γ(T ) (Boko Haram)
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B ADDITIONAL RESULTS OF LSTM
Batch Look Back Γ(T ) Φ(T )
2 10 0.617 0.859
64 10 0.617 0.870
2 3 0.608 0.848
32 3 0.608 0.848
2 50 0.608 0.875
32 50 0.608 0.875
64 50 0.608 0.875
100 50 0.608 0.875
32 10 0.607 0.859
100 30 0.605 0.880
2 2 0.603 0.840
32 2 0.603 0.840
64 2 0.603 0.840
100 2 0.603 0.840
100 1 0.600 0.832
2 30 0.599 0.880
32 30 0.599 0.880
64 30 0.599 0.880
2 20 0.596 0.845
32 20 0.596 0.845
64 20 0.596 0.845
100 20 0.596 0.845
2 1 0.591 0.832
32 1 0.591 0.832
64 1 0.591 0.832
100 3 0.542 0.848
100 10 0.500 0.859
64 3 0.348 0.768
Table B.10: Deep Neural Network Models - Results Ordered by Descending Γ(T ) (Al Shabaab)
261
